The Changing World Order and the Responsibilities of Developing Countries during

Yang Jiemian

The Ukraine crisis from February 24 was the first large-scale proxy war between Russia and the United States in Europe since the end of the Cold War. The crisis itself is complicated and can be understood from three aspects， namely， the historical background， the immediate trigger， and the prospects going forward. Historically speaking， the Ukraine crisis is the result of the eastward expansion of NATO and the EU in the 30 years since the end of the Cold War， and the subsequent harsh reaction from Russia. In terms of the immediate trigger， as Yu Hongjun， former vice minister of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee， pointed out， “It is indisputable that Russia was forced to take the lead in this ‘special military operation by NATO and Ukraine.”1 Furthermore， the relationship between the US， the EU， and Russia will play a decisive role in considering the long-term strategic effects on Europes geopolitical and security landscape， the world order， and the international system.

Until now， the Ukraine crisis remains a local crisis but with global implications for the following four reasons. First， Europe is no longer the center of the world， and the crisis cannot determine the direction of the world order and the international system.2 Second， the US， the EU， and Russia still try to avoid direct armed conflict and frontal war. Their military operations are still limited geographically to Ukraine. The US and the EU provide arms， money， and political support. Third， the Ukraine crisis mainly affects areas such as energy security， food security and the humanitarian situation. Fourth， the crisis has not changed the US strategic focus. The US government still sees China as its number one competitor. In a speech on China policy on May 26， Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said the US considers Russias military actions in Ukraine “a clear and present threat” but still views China as “the most serious long-term challenge to the international order，” because “China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and， increasingly， the economic， diplomatic， and technological power to do it.”3 He also claimed that the US can hardly directly influence Chinas strategy， so the US must “shape the strategic environment around Beijing.”

However， as the Ukraine crisis continues， its spillover becomes increasingly serious. First of all， the crisis in Ukraine is likely to drag on for a long time， and may even trigger a larger-scale war， various secondary and derivative crises， and domestic conflicts in the countries involved. Secondly， the Ukraine crisis has affected world peace and stability. The world economy， energy security， food security and climate change have been upgraded from regional or local issues to global ones. The world economy has been negatively affected by many factors， including the major power conflict and the pandemic. The Ukraine crisis has added to these woes. Finally， the world has been split into pro-Russia or pro-Ukraine groups. The US has taken the opportunity to strengthen the Western alliance. The crisis in Ukraine has accelerated the pace of Finland and Sweden joining NATO， putting more pressure on reshaping the regional security architecture. Russias image has been tarnished. It is also in an awkward position in the UN vote. US and European sanctions have a chilling effect on pro-Russian countries. According to Russian scholars， the world has returned to the era of “Great War” after the Ukraine crisis， marking the end of the unipolar world， which has existed since the end of the Cold War. Even a truce between Russia and Ukraine would not end the existing political issues. There would be a longterm and irreversible military confrontation in Europe.4

The crisis in Ukraine is affecting the international landscape. There are three dividing lines with regard to national power. The first is the division based on economics， such as that between developed versus developing countries. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund （IMF） also have their definitions of countries in different stages of development. The second is the division of power relations， such as major powers versus regional or middle powers. Among the major powers， the United States and China are decidedly global powers while it is still debatable whether the EU， India， and Russia are major powers. Japan， Indonesia， Australia， Saudi Arabia， Iran and Brazil are typical regional powers. The third is the division based on ideology. During the Cold War， there was a distinction between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp. After the end of the Cold War， there was a distinction between the “West” and the “non-West” （the West vs “the rest”）. Today， the US and the West are attempting to draw a line between countries with the so-called “democracy vs authoritarianism” argument.

Everything is two-sided or even multi-faceted. While the world is undergoing important changes during the Ukraine crisis， developing countries are playing a proactive role instead of passively accepting“shocks.” In particular， some developing countries have adopted a hedging strategy between the US and Russia to gain greater autonomy. Admittedly，“developing countries” is a broad concept that includes a large number of state actors as well as supranational and non-state actors at varying levels of economic and social development and with different political， diplomatic， and security positions. However， most developing countries hope to turn the crisis in Ukraine into an opportunity to have a greater say in global affairs， and to further assume responsibility for the times. They wish to promote a multipolar world and a more just and reasonable international system.

According to Chinese President Xi Jinping， “With the increasing global challenges， we need to strengthen global governance and reshape the global governance system.” This is not only in order to address various global challenges but also to set rules for the international system. It is not only to compete for better development， but also to shape the role of different countries in such long-term institutional arrangements.5 Since World War II， the international system has remained stable despite the challenges posed by various crisis events. However， the old system today is showing more defects. The world is getting closer to the critical point of paradigm change. The impact of the current crisis in Ukraine has not yet been determined. Whether the Ukraine crisis will become a coup de grace to the existing world order still needs further observation.

Impacts of the Ukraine Crisis on the Multipolar World

Since the end of World War II， global and regional crises have shaken the leadership of the US-led Western forces in the world order， with the Ukraine crisis being the latest major shock. In sharp contrast， the influence of developing countries as a group has been on the rise， pushing the international landscape further toward multipolarity.

Since the 1990s， developing countries， represented by emerging countries， have started a historical process in the rapid rise in their influence. In 1992， according to the International Monetary Fund， all developed countries accounted for about 84 percent of global gross domestic product（GDP）， with the share of the Group of Seven （G7） reaching about 68 percent. The share of GDP of all developing countries was only about 16 percent， with the share of developing countries in the Asian region only about 5 percent. By 2021， the GDP share of all developed countries declined to about 58 percent and the G7 to about 44 percent. In contrast， the GDP share of all developing countries has risen to about 42 percent and that of developing countries in the Asian region to about 25 percent.6 PwC further predicts that by 2050， the Emerging Market Seven （E7）， including China， India， Indonesia， Brazil， Russia， Mexico， and Turkey， will account for nearly half of total global GDP， and countries such as Vietnam， the Philippines， and Nicaragua will also be in the top 20 of global GDP.7 Along with the increasing economic power， developing countries also have the ability and willingness of joining the global economic governance. The multipolar world and the trend of “East Rising， West Falling” increases the diversity of the international system. Multilateral mechanisms represented by the Group of Twenty （G20） are examples of the North-South cooperation in the global economic governance system， marking a turning point in the world political and economic order.8 The world pattern features a cyclical pattern of imbalance. It is not simply a cycle， but a search for a higher level of balance. History will not end with the current Western system. There is still great potential for non-Western countries to grow.

The majority of the international community believes that the contrast between Western and non-Western power is undergoing a fundamental change in favor of the latter， with different views on the speed， depth and intensity of the change.

In terms of the speed of change， developing countries have rapidly raised their international status， but still have a long way to go to achieve parity with developed countries. Since entering the 21st century， the rise of nonWestern countries has become the most obvious change in the international landscape. Non-Western and Western countries are generally close to a state of equilibrium.9 Although the mainstream recognizes this narrowing gap， it is undeniable that， so far， the developed countries led by the United States still exceed the group of developing countries in terms of total GDP， institutional influence， and the ability to set the rules and agendas. In important multilateral mechanisms such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank， developed Western countries hold a greater share in decisionmaking. The United States even enjoys a veto， while developing countries are underrepresented.10 To achieve true equality， it is necessary to narrow the gap not only in economic power， but also in comprehensive power， including politics， science and technology， culture and security. Developing countries need a group consensus and concerted action to jointly promote the reform of the international system in terms of principles and norms， institutional mechanisms and policy implementation. This will never happen overnight. It is a systemic project that requires continuous efforts.

In terms of the depth of change， cooperation among developing countries has become an important driving force for reshaping the international order. But there are still many difficulties. With the relative decline of US power and international influence， the multilateral order based on US hegemony is facing a crisis of legitimacy and effectiveness. The developed Western countries can hardly maintain the international system they dominate. Under such circumstances， developing countries have participated in various cooperation mechanisms in basically three ways. The first is the sustainable development agenda built around traditional multilateral mechanisms such as the United Nations； the second is SouthSouth cooperation led by middle powers and emerging countries on the basis of being on the same footing and facing common challenges； and the third is a new global development initiative promoted by China—international cooperation for structural transformation.11 These mechanisms facilitate the participation of developing countries in global issues， the formulation of policies in their own interests， and the narrowing of the gap with developed countries. However， cooperation among developing countries still faces many obstacles in terms of choosing development paths， distributing benefits， and setting up institutions. For example， disagreements among the BRICS countries （especially between China and India） over the international system and differing national interests have weakened the potential of the BRICS to reshape global economic governance and limited the combined efforts of developing countries in the international political and economic arena.12

In terms of its intensity， the growing contrast of political power between developing countries and developed countries will see an obvious change. It is inevitable for developing countries to balance or even surpass the developed countries in political power. It is impossible for a few Western countries to “dictate to the vast developing countries” as they did in the past.13 But such change is by no means an easy one. Unwilling to accept such change， the developed countries are eagerly reinforcing the international political and economic order in accordance with their values. They have managed to suppress， interfere with， and divide the groups of developing countries. To this end， the developed countries are even willing to create trouble for global governance and international mechanisms in order to stall the group rise of developing countries.14 The United States has listed China and Russia as its primary strategic competitors， and spared no effort to draw in other countries， including some developing countries， to build an antiChina and anti-Russia camp， thereby harming international security. These actions indicate an end to the post-Cold War order. The international order will witness more conflicts， major power games， and turmoil.15

The United States uses the Ukraine crisis to consolidate its allies and to draw in small and medium-sized countries to target China and Russia. It intends to reverse the decline of Western powers and maintain its dominance in the international landscape. Some argue that the crisis in Ukraine is a battle between “liberal democracies” and “authoritarianism，” but it is in fact a struggle by the Western countries to maintain their hegemony.

The crisis in Ukraine came out of nowhere， and many developing countries initially stood with the United States instead of Russia because the crisis involves sensitive issues such as sovereignty， territorial integrity， and intervention by force. The US and the West took the opportunity to widen the divide， and the initial rounds of UN voting were a typical reflection of the divide. However， with the development of the crisis in Ukraine and the tug-of-war between the US and Russia， many developing countries have changed their positions to avoid choosing sides between major powers.

The ongoing crisis in Ukraine faces many uncertainties. The confrontation between Russia and the West has entered a stalemate， and it is difficult for either side to gain an overwhelming advantage. Therefore， the outcome of the Ukraine crisis remains uncertain. The development of the military， economic， diplomatic and political rivalry between Russia and the West will largely determine the depth and breadth of its impact on the international landscape.

Developing countries as a group are not part of the Ukrainian crisis， but rather a “second front.” Developing countries may not have a decisive influence on the crisis， but they are a significant third party in the post-crisis international order. The majority of developing countries have chosen a proUS opinion so far， while the BRICS countries and some emerging economies insist on not taking sides. Most countries are reluctant to build an antiRussian camp not out of sympathy for Russia， but out of disgust with the Western hegemony and its abuse of power. As the crisis evolves， there may be more neutral counties.

The divide in the Ukraine crisis once again proves that changes in the international landscape are long-term， tortuous and complex. In the short term， the contrast of power between Western and developing countries is undergoing twists and turns. However， in the medium and long term， the multipolar world is inevitable.

Complex Impacts of the Ukraine Crisis on the International System

The international landscape serves as the basis of the international system. Major changes in the international landscape will affect the operation and effectiveness of the international system. Changes caused by the Ukraine crisis have varying impacts on the actors， mechanisms， rules， and agendas of the current international system， bringing in quantitative and qualitative variables.

Impact on international actors

The subjects of the international system are sovereign states and supranational actors. The shock of military conflicts on the supranational actors can have a huge counter-shock on sovereign states.

First of all， the Ukraine crisis， as a military conflict between state actors， is essentially a major power conflict between Russia and the United States. The US-led NATO has expanded eastward since the end of the Cold War and excluded Russia from equal participation in the European security architecture， squeezing Russias strategic space and exacerbating its security anxiety. The conflict between the two sides has intensified and triggered the Ukraine crisis. In a televised speech on February 21， 2022， Russian President Vladimir Putin made it clear that an important reason for the crisis was that Russia needs to act against the US and European NATO.16

Second， the Ukraine crisis has affected supranational actors such as the EU and the Western alliance. Since the Ukraine crisis， the US and the West have used their influence in international institutions to squeeze Russias strategic space. Russia has been suspended from the UN Human Rights Council， and faces the threat of G20 disqualification. In response， Russia has withdrawn from institutions such as the Council of Europe， the UN World Tourism Organization， and the Council of the Baltic Sea States. The consensus on major issues is even more difficult for supernational actors. Michael Carpenter， US ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe， publicly stated that member states are unable to agree on their positions on the Ukraine crisis， and the organization is unable to take an active role.17

Third， the Ukraine crisis has affected all states in the world. Economic sanctions and sub-sanctions have caused serious problems in the world food and energy supply system， triggering generalized inflation and even a possible economic and social crisis. According to World Bank projections， energy prices will rise by 50.5 percent and food prices by 22.9 percent in 2022， including a 42.7 percent increase in wheat prices， with nominal prices set to reach record highs.18 Countries also face political pressure to choose sides. US Permanent Representative to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield said to African countries that there is no neutral position to take on Russias“invasion” of Ukraine.19 Japan also sees itself as a defender of the international order. During his visits to Indonesia， Vietnam and Thailand， Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida tried to build a “united front against Russia.” On national security， many countries face the threat of large-scale war and nuclear war. Speaking at the Security Council， UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo said that the longer the Ukraine crisis， the worse it will be for world peace and security.20

Fourth， as the Ukraine crisis develops， non-state actors will be more divided. For example， in refugee affairs， economic trade， energy and food， and public opinion， international organizations have tried to speak out on the situation in Ukraine， often with varied positions. Many NGOs， multinational corporations and even individuals have also tried to influence the crisis in various ways. Militarily， US company SpaceX has helped the Ukrainian command and control system gain communications capabilities through its Starlink system and assisted Ukrainian drones in striking Russian troops.21 Economically， many multinational companies， such as Apple， Microsoft and Google， have chosen to participate in the sanctions against Russia by withdrawing from the Russian market. In terms of public opinion， Western social media has become a major battleground in the information war. They have even blocked so-called pro-Russian “disinformation.” Giants such as Facebook， YouTube and TikTok have either blocked Russian state media Russia Today and Sputnik outright，22 or have flagged them to alert users.23 Russia has also introduced counter-sanctions on BBC and the Voice of America （VOA）.24

Fifth， due to the Ukraine crisis， developing countries as a group have failed to play an important role in the international system. The crisis happened suddenly. Many developing countries reacted somewhat abruptly， and failed to coordinate a group position. As a result， developing countries have been divided by the US and the West. On March 24， the 11th emergency special session of the UN General Assembly adopted a draft resolution entitled “Humanitarian Consequences of the Aggression against Ukraine” submitted by 90 countries， including Ukraine， the United States， the United Kingdom and France， by a vote of 140 in favor， 5 against and 38 abstentions. But as the crisis continues， some developing countries have changed their approach to that of picking no side and began to view the crisis based on the international system. Leaders of the BRICS countries agreed on the expansion of the BRICS membership to improve the effectiveness of the BRICS mechanism. The Indonesian presidency of the G20 rejected the request of the United States and the West to cancel Russias participation in the meeting. Chinas Global Security Initiative was supported by developing countries. Developing countries are moving towards the reshaping of the international system.

Impact on current mechanisms

As the Ukraine crisis drags on， the authority of the United Nations is once again being questioned. The Security Council suffered dysfunction in the crisis， and the General Assembly and Human Rights Council have voted against Russia. More importantly， the US is not likely to bypass the Security Council as it did in the Iraq war， but instead will accelerate Security Council expansion to increase bloc rivalry within the UN. In addition， developing countries are being pressured to choose sides. The reform of the international mechanism since 2008 is facing new challenges. The G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting in Washington in April 2022 ultimately failed to shape a communiqué due to a Western boycott of Russias participation. There are even voices that question the need of the G20.25 The Asian Development Bank and the BRICS New Development Bank have announced the suspension of their operations with Russia under international pressure， prompting speculation about whether the decision was forced by compliance with US and European sanctions against Russia.26 In all cases， the Ukraine crisis has at least delayed the upgrading of developing powers from the worlds major economic powers to political powers.

Impact on existing norms

Russias main goal in the Ukraine crisis is to restructure the existing international system. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that Russias goal is to put an end to the world order dominated by the US and the West， a hegemony based on special rules and violations of international law. The United States and the West believe they are defenders of the international order and call for a robust response to Russias move.27 US Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken in a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in April 2022 declared the determination to “stand with Ukraine， to shore up and revitalize the international order that Moscow is trying to upend， and to bring to bear even greater costs on the Russian government.”28 EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy， Josep Borrell， said， “We will continue to defend a multilateral order， based on common objectives and international law. Violating the basic principles of this international order， as Russia has just done， cannot be condoned.”29

With regard to national sovereignty and territorial integrity， the US and other Western countries have established a precedent in Kosovo， and Russias moves in Crimea and the Donbas came later. The two sides have attacked each other. The head of the Russian delegation， presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky states in an interview that the Kosovo precedent and the ruling of the International Court of Justice fully legitimize the situation in the Donbas.30 Although Western public opinion accuses Russia of violating Ukraines sovereignty and territorial integrity and denies the comparison between the Kosovo conflict and the Ukraine crisis， some scholars point out that the US and the West have violated international law and norms of international relations in the name of human rights in the first place. With their support of “contingent sovereignty，” violations of basic principles such as the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference are allowed to happen and even legitimized in the name of humanitarianism. The situation is getting worse with the evolution of principles such as the Responsibility to Protect （R2P）.31

With regard to the security architecture， Russia and the US hold different views on the possibility of building a balanced， effective， and sustainable global and regional security architecture. Russia believes the situation in the post-Soviet space is turning into a zero-sum game and wants consultations with the West on the global security architecture.32 In other words， the Ukraine crisis is in fact a crisis of security architecture in Europe. Russia mainly wants to build a security architecture that is favorable to its own interests.33 Russian President Vladimir Putin repeated this view in several speeches. In his speech at the Red Square Victory Day parade on May 9， Putin said， “we proposed signing a treaty on security guarantees. Russia urged the West to hold an honest dialogue in search of a meaningful and compromising solution， and to take account of each others interests. All in vain. NATO countries did not want to heed us.”34

With regard to the guiding principles of the international system， the crisis in Ukraine has led to sharp divisions， badly undermining the principle of peaceful coexistence. According to IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva， these divisions based on geopolitical and economic blocs may lead to the fragmentation of global governance and leave us completely incapable of addressing other global challenges.35 The crisis in Ukraine has witnessed an obvious expansion of NATO in the Asia-Pacific region. Many neutral countries have adjusted their policies， weakened or even abandoned their neutrality， and moved closer to the US and the West. At the same time， Russia is strengthening its alliances with former Soviet states， such as the Fast Trace Alliance with Belarus and the revival of the Collective Security Treaty Organization （CSTO）. The alliance of great powers based on opposing views of world order and values is rapidly taking shape. The US， the West， and Russia have published lists of non-friendly countries and regions， deepening the polarization and tearing the world apart.

Impact on major issues

The Ukraine crisis is a hybrid war in which traditional and nontraditional security threats are intertwined， posing a major challenge to the world order. According to Elisabeth Braw， a researcher at the American Enterprise Institute， “Every war is now hybrid because it has both military and non-military dimensions....The grey-zone aspect is becoming more prominent because globalization and interconnections offer many options for sowing chaos. It often comes with lower risk of retribution.”36 Proxy wars， sanctions and counter-sanctions， information wars， financial wars， energy wars， moral wars， etc.， all pose new challenges to world peace and stability. If the crisis in Ukraine is left unresolved， it will generate many new problems. In addition， military security concerns and the difficult world economic recovery have largely set aside economic and social development， which are of most concern to developing countries. This has retarded their modernization and the rise of their status in the international community. UN Secretary-General António Guterres noted that “beyond Ukraines borders， far beyond the media spotlight， the war has launched a silent assault on the developing world. This crisis could throw up to 1.7 billion people—over one-fifth of humanity—into poverty， destitution and hunger on a scale not seen in decades.”37

The Status Quo and the Response of Developing Countries

The Ukraine crisis has both advantages and disadvantages for developing countries， but in the foreseeable future the disadvantages outweigh the advantages. Therefore， developing countries need to consider the situation， avoid harm， and create opportunities for reshaping the international system.

Good and bad times in the reform of the international system

Since the end of World War II， developing countries have continuously called for reform of the Western-led system， with three attempts achieving a global impact.

The first is the Non-Aligned Movement （NAM）， which began in the 1960s. The first NAM summit was held in Belgrade in September 1961. The Non-Aligned Movement calls for solidarity among developing countries， advocates the democratization of international relations， and pursues a new international political and economic order. It has so far 120 member states， the vast majority of which are developing countries， with wide representation in the international community.38

The second is the call for a new economic order in the 1970s. In April 1974， the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order drafted by the Group of 77. It set out a series of principles and proposed a new economic order to narrow the “gap between developed and developing countries.”39 This is the first time that developing countries acted as a group and ultimately achieved a significant outcome.40

The third is the reform of global economic governance system in 2008.After the outbreak of the 2008 international financial crisis， the economic landscape has witnessed profound changes in global economic governance. The G20 is rapidly rising in the economic governance system. It has become an important platform for multi-party coordination of macroeconomic policies. Non-Western mechanisms such as the BRICS have also rapidly developed. Since 2008， developing countries have contributed about 80 percent of global economic growth. It has become the consensus to increase the voting power and voice of developing countries in global economic governance and to shape a more democratic economic governance system.41

However， developing countries have experienced both good and bad times in reforming the international system. While 2008 witnessed the efforts and achievements of developing countries in reshaping global economic governance system， there has been an obvious regression in global economic governance for the West and the United States. For example， the Trump administration withdrew from UNESCO， the United Nations Human Rights Council， the Universal Postal Union， the World Health Organization and other international organizations， as well as the Paris Agreement on Climate Change， the Global Compact for Migration， the Iran Nuclear Agreement， the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces （INF） Treaty and other international treaties on the grounds of unilateralism and “America First.” All these moves have posed a major challenge to international rules and global governance.42 During the COVID-19 pandemic， the Trump administration focused on international politics instead of anti-pandemic cooperation. It discredited and suppressed China， further divided the international community， and missed opportunities to together fight against the pandemic.43 Also， the Biden administration upholds a form of multilateralism that is clearly exclusive. To establish the Alliance for Democratic Values， it has been coordinating efforts to impose “supply chain controls， technological blockades and military encirclement” on China. The Biden administration has focused more on military conflicts and bloc confrontations instead of economic and social development.44

The Ukraine crisis once again shows the shortcomings of developing countries as a group in shaping the global system. Large developing countries are difficult to form a consensus without a long-term organizational mechanism. Cooperation among developing countries is based on forums and projects with loose ties， making it unable to organize efficiently. Compared with Western mechanisms such as the G7 and NATO， developing countries must consider how to mobilize within the non-aligned mechanism to cope with global crises and safeguard common interests， which is a key issue in building a new international system.45

Different groups of developing countries

In general， developing countries see themselves as a group and agree with the notion of multilateralism. They support the UN and cooperation mechanisms in developing regions such as ASEAN， the African Union （AU） and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States （CELAC）. They uphold fairness and justice in development and emphasize peaceful development. There are four different paths open for developing countries.

The first option is to have a radical change in the international system led by the West. Russian President Vladimir has declared the end of “the era of the unipolar world.” He believed that revolutionary and structural changes are taking place in the geopolitical， global economic and technological spheres， and in the system of international relations.46 Russias use of force in Ukraine shows its dissatisfaction with the international security system dominated by the West. In addition to Russia， countries such as the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea （DPRK） and Iran have long been hostile to the United States and the West and also face serious threats， so they have continuously increased military investment， including the development of nuclear forces， to ensure their security and stability and fight back against the United States.47 Countries in the Americas， represented by Venezuela and Nicaragua， have openly criticized the double standards and values-oriented diplomacy of the US and the West. They have tried to change the situation and make America truly one for all the nations of the Americas.48 Russian scholars believe that with the rapid decline of Western dominance， there is a resurgence of anticolonial sentiment in the non-Western world. Russia， seeking to restore its former empire， has become the flagship of this anti-colonial movement.49

The second option is to raise their own power first and largely accept the current international system. India is a good example of a developing country that makes full use of the current international system. Indias policy flexibility allows it to have specific policies on different issues to maximize its own benefits. It can be said that the current international system is the best framework for India to enhance its status as a major power.50 As the eruption of the Ukraine crisis shook the international system， some developing countries wanted to lift their status through the expansion of the UN Security Council. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa called for the increase of the representation of African countries as the Security Council does not perfectly represent the real world.51 In February 2022， on his visit to Moscow， Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro sought Russias support for Brazil as a strong candidate for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.52

The third option is to reshape the existing international system in a prudent manner and raise the status of developing countries. China supports this idea. Chinese President Xi Jinping pointed out that “In the world， there is only one international system， i.e.， the international system with the United Nations at its core. There is only one international order， namely， the international order underpinned by international law. And there is only one set of rules， that is， the basic norms governing international relations underpinned by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.”53 China has successively proposed the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative， and put forward Chinese proposals for a steady reform of the international system and global governance. It has also strengthened South-South cooperation through mechanisms such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and increased the representation of developing countries in global affairs. China envisions a global governance vision that emphasizes extensive consultation， joint contribution and shared benefits to shape a new type of international relations featuring mutual respect， fairness， justice and win-win cooperation， and ultimately building a community of a shared future for mankind. This has sparked an enthusiastic response in the international community.

The fourth option is to enhance regional unity in order to raise the status of developing countries and to expand their interests. Regional organizations such as ASEAN， the African Union， and the Arab League support the UN-centered international system while seeking greater independence in international affairs through the regional organization. President of the Republic of Senegal and Chairperson of the African Union， Macky Sall， said in his statement at the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU that after more than 60 years of independence， Africa is more determined than ever to take its destiny into its own hands. Also， the Arab League has rejected the demand of the US to stand against Russia and actively played the role of mediator in the Ukraine crisis.54

Focuses of Crisis Response

The diversity of developing countries demands a basic consensus to enhance cohesion， bridge differences， and leverage the role of developing countries as a group in handling crises that have shaken the international system.

First， developing countries must enhance their combined power. After the end of World War II， non-Western actors promoted global movements， including socialist movements， national independence movements， the NonAligned Movement， and a movement for the reform of the international economic order and global economic governance. However， non-Western forces are divided in their common pursuits of greater domestic unity and international influence， so they do not have a consistent mechanism， a lack which facilitates Western attempts to further divide developing countries. Todays world has witnessed plenty of ups-and-downs. Developing countries have encountered great difficulties in expanding their influence from the economic sphere to the political and security spheres. Zhou Xiaochuan， former governor of the Peoples Bank of China， believes that while traditional security issues continue to threaten the global economy， non-traditional security has also become a global focus， especially with the COVID-19 pandemic， the frequent extreme weather events， and the loss of biodiversity， which no country in the world can defend against on their own.55 Therefore， developing countries must take the initiative to uphold peace and development， jointly resolve global challenges， including the Ukraine crisis， and reshape the international system toward a more just and reasonable one.

Second， developing countries must adhere to the overriding themes of the times—peace and development. After more than 70 years of post-war efforts， developing countries have been lifted out of poverty and have corresponding political and security pursuits. However， the existing global governance system is guided by the theories and experiences of the developed countries， which is increasingly incompatible with the requirements and aspirations of the international community， especially the vast number of developing countries. It has become the consensus of the vast majority that the global governance system needs urgent reform. Developing countries must come up with solutions based on their experiences with the status quo.56 The Ukraine crisis again illustrates the need for higher goals for developing countries， which are connected with the common pursuit of all countries. These are the new themes of the era. In 70 years after World War II， the world has made a historic transition from the era of revolution and war to the era of peace and development. The new themes should not be based on “democratic politics and allied security” of the West， but on new goals that can uplift the human spirit and raise human consciousness， such as peace and stability， fairness and justice， win-win cooperation， and comprehensive development. In this regard， emerging economies， which， as developing countries， enjoy advantages in many aspects of international competition， can play a more active role.57 Only in this way can developing countries correct historical injustices and take a leading role in the realizing the trend of the times.

Third， developing countries must seize the historical moment and create the greatest synergy. The crisis in Ukraine has been an unavoidable disruption in history on the way forward and also a major challenge amid the COVID-19 pandemic. During this period， non-Western forces need to expand the common ground in their basic principles and action plans on at least three fronts.

The first is to avoid the escalation and spillover of the Ukraine crisis in order to maintain the post-war peace. The crisis in Ukraine is not just between Russia and Ukraine， or between Russia and the West， but between multiple forces in a critical moment of global power shift. It is triggering the reshaping of the global order and the landscape in Eurasia， and offering renewed awareness of key issues. The resolution of the Ukraine crisis needs a solution that includes the interests and needs of all parties.58 The second is to add efforts to economic recovery， to avoid forming two rival blocs， and prevent the crisis from harming international economic mechanisms， global production， and supply and value chains. The World Trade Organization warns that the crisis in Ukraine may lead to economic decoupling of major economies due to geopolitical considerations， and corresponding adjustments of the supply chain will have a serious impact on the incomes of developing countries and emerging economies.

At the same time， the Ukraine crisis will also lead to severe food shortages in developing countries in the Middle East and Africa. In response， all countries should uphold multilateralism and work together to address these challenges.59 The third is to reconsider global and regional security governance to avoid a new round of global armed conflicts and a military arms race， or even the use of tactical nuclear weapons， etc. Zhang Jun， permanent representative of China to the United Nations， pointed out that“The outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine has further led us to think how to maintain peace and stability of the international system， and focus more on the real pathway towards universal security and common development.” We must adhere to the overall direction of dialogue and cooperation， uphold the important principle of indivisible security， and completely reject the ColdWar mentality based on bloc confrontation. “This world can live with the common growth and progress of all countries. All countries must， under the banner of multilateralism， strengthen unity and cooperation and work together for a community with a shared future for mankind.”60

Conclusion

As the Ukraine crisis turns from acute to chronic， its symptoms have become more complicated with larger and more lasting damage to the regional order and the international system. In this regard， developing countries need to be fully prepared and shoulder their historical responsibility to actively shape international rules and future trends. On the Ukraine crisis， developing countries should coordinate with each other to deescalate the crisis. With regard to international system reform， developing countries should strengthen regular and institutional consultations， and handle relations with major Western countries in a reasonable and favorable manner. They must make good use of existing mechanisms and of the groups strength to take a qualitative leap in reshaping the international system.

The world has entered a period of turmoil and change. China and developing countries have been taking the Ukraine crisis as an opportunity to reconstruct the international system. As the worlds largest developing country， China has its historical mission to design and implement the reform of the international system. Since the 2008 international financial crisis， and especially since the 18th CPC Party Congress， China has strengthened its top-level design and strategic thinking on the international system， and improved coordination with developing countries in terms of guiding principles， basic theories， vision， planning， deployments and a practical path to jointly build a just and reasonable international system. China and developing countries will continue to reshape the world order， the international system， and global governance amid the major changes brought about by the Ukraine crisis， and make new contributions to peace， development， cooperation and a win-win situation for the international community.

1 “Former Vice Minister of International Department of Central Committee of CPC： Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis Has Three Steps and May Take 10 to 20 Years，” May 5， 2022， https：//news.ifeng. com/c/8FlsThHfSWG.

2 Shivshankar Menon， “The Fantasy of the Free World，” Foreign Affairs， April 4， 2022， https：//www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2022-04-04/fantasy-free-world.

3 Antony J. Binken， “The Administrations Approach to the Peoples Republic of China，” May 26， 2022， https：//www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.

4 “The First Great War of the 21st Century，” Global Affairs， June 22， 2022， https：//globalaffairs.ru/articles/ pervaya-bolshaya-vojna-xxi-veka/.

5 “Xi Jinping： Promoting a More Just and Rational Global Governance System，” October 13， 2015， http：// news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-10/13/c_1116812159.htm.

6 Data is available at https：//www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2022/April.

7 PWC， “The Long View： How Will the Global Economic Order Change by 2050？，” February 2017， https：//www.pwc.com/gx/en/world-2050/assets/pwc-world-in-2050-summary-report-feb-2017.pdf.

8 Chen Weiguang， Liu Bin， and Nie Shikun， “Integration or Separation： The Logic of Institutional Change in Global Economic Governance，” Northeast Asia Forum， No.3， 2022， pp.29-43.

9 Liu Jianfei， “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the International Landscape，” Contemporary World and Socialism， No.3， 2020， p.12.

10 Ren Lin， “Reform of the Global Governance System amid the Major Changes Unseen in a Century，”Contemporary World， No.3， pp.60-61.

11 Sara Caria， “Cooperation Regimes and Hegemonic Struggle： Opportunities and Challenges for Developing Countries，” Politics and Governance， Vol.10， No.2， 2022， p.71.

12 Bas Hooijmaaijers， “China， the BRICS， and the Limitations of Reshaping Global Economic Governance，” The Pacific Review， Vol.34， No.1， 2021， p.29.

13 “Wang Wenbin： Gone Are the Days When Western Countries Rode Roughshod Over Developing Countries，” June 15， 2022， http：//new.fmprc.gov.cn/web/sp_683685/wjbfyrlxjzh_683691/202206/ t20220615_10703791.shtml.

14 Wu Zhicheng， “Major Changes Unseen in a Century and Chinese Diplomacy in the New Era，” April 2， 2022， http：//caes.cssn.cn/yjdt/202204/t20220402_5402024.shtml.

15 Liu Ming， “Peace and Development Eroded by the United States and the West， but Emerging Powers Will Not Let It Happen，” June 10， 2022， https：//m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_18512249.

16 “Address by the President of the Russian Federation，” February 21， 2022， http：//en.kremlin.ru/events/ president/transcripts/67828.

17 Myroslava Gongadze， “US Envoy： Ukraine War Has Brought ‘Sea Change in Views of Russia，”June 8， 2022， https：//www.voanews.com/a/us-envoy-ukraine-war-has-brought-sea-change-in-views-ofrussia/6608981.html.

18 World Bank， “Commodity Markets Outlook，” April 2022， p.5， https：//openknowledge.worldbank.org/ bitstream/handle/10986/37223/CMO-April-2022.pdf.

19 “Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfields Interview with Anne Soy of BBC News Africa，” March 18， 2022， https：//usun.usmission.gov/ambassador-linda-thomas-greenfields-interview-with-anne-soy-of-bbcnews-africa/.

20 Rosemary DiCarlo， “Ukraine War Threatens Global Peace Institutions，” April 5， 2022， https：//dppa. un.org/en/dicarlo-ukraine-war-threatens-global-peace-institutions.

21 Christopher Miller， Mark Scott and Bryan Bender， “UkraineX： How Elon Musks Space Satellites Changed the War on the Ground，” June 9， 2022， https：//www.politico.com/news/2022/06/09/elon-muskspacex-starlink-ukraine-00038039.

22 Elizabeth Dwoskin， Cat Zakrzewski and Gerrit De Vynck， “Major Social Media Platforms Ban Russian State Media in Europe，” The Washington Post， March 1， 2022.

23 Will Oremus， “Social Media Wasnt Ready for This War. It Needs a Plan for the Next One，” The Washington Post， March 25， 2022.

24 Guy Faulconbridge， Frank Jack Daniel and Alex Richardson， “Russia Blocks Access to BBC and Voice of America Websites，” March 4， 2022， https：//www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/russia-restrictsaccess-bbc-russian-service-radio-liberty-ria-2022-03-04/.

25 Andrea Shalal and David Lawder， “Delegate Protests over Russia to Upstage G20 Meeting，” April 20， 2022， https：//www.reuters.com/world/delegate-protests-over-russia-upstage-g20-meeting-2022-04-19/.

26 Iori Kawate， “China-backed AIIB Freezes Lending to Russia and Belarus，” March 4， 2022， https：//asia. nikkei.com/Politics/Ukraine-war/China-backed-AIIB-freezes-lending-to-Russia-and-Belarus.

27 “Russia Seeks to End US-dominated World Order，” April 11， 2022， https：//www.rt.com/russia/553674-lavrov-military-operation-us-dominance/.

28 “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Press Availability at the Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers，” April 7， 2022， https：//www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-press-availability-at-the-meeting-of-nato-foreignministers/.

29 Josep Borrell， “Russias War against Ukraine： Where do We Stand and What can the Future Bring？，”April 26， 2022， https：//www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/russia%E2%80%99s-war-against-ukraine-where-do-westand-and-what-can-future-bring_en.

30 “The Countrys Leadership Does Not Focus on the Interests of Its Citizens，” June 18， 2022， https：// russian.rt.com/world/article/1016052-medinskii-peregovory-ukraina.

31 Aarshi Tirkey， “The Ukraine Crisis： Sovereignty and International Law，” February 18， 2022， https：// www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/ukraine-crisis-sovereignty-and-international-law/.

32 Nickolay Kapitonenko， “Where Would a New Global Security Architecture Leave Ukraine？” January 14， 2022， https：//www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/where-would-a-new-globalsecurity-architecture-leave-ukraine-5648/.

33 Jonathan Masters， “Ukraine： Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia，” April 1， 2022， https：// www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia.

34 “Victory Parade on Red Square，” President of Russia， May 9， 2022， http：//en.kremlin.ru/events/ president/news/68366.

35 Kristalina Georgieva， “Facing Crisis Upon Crisis： How the World Can Respond，” April 14， 2022， https：//www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/04/14/sp041422-curtain-raiser-sm2022.

36 “What Is Hybrid War， and Is Russia Waging It in Ukraine？” The Economist， February 22， 2022， https：// www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/02/22/what-is-hybrid-war-and-is-russia-waging-it-inukraine.

37 António Guterres， “The War in Ukraine： A Silent Assault on the Developing World，” April 12， 2022， https：//www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2022/%E2%80%9C-war-ukraine-silent-assaultdeveloping-world%E2%80%9D.

38 See “NAM Profile （June 2022 Update），” http：//infogate.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjb_673085/zzjg_673183/ gjs_673893/gjzz_673897/bjmyd_673955/gk_673957.

39 See “Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order，” https：//www.un.org/ zh/documents/treaty/files/A-RES-3201（S-VI）.shtml.

40 Wang Wei， “The Group of 77 Pushes for New International Economic Order，” June 14， 2013， https：// opinion.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJAT5n.

41 Long Guoqiang， “History and Chinas Role in the Global Economic Governance Reform，” Peoples Daily， August 28， 2017， p.7.

42 Zhong Sheng， “International Order Cannot Allow Capriciousness，” Peoples Daily， May 23， 2019， p.4.

43 Pu Jingxin， “US Epidemic Governance under the Trump Administration，” Asia-Pacific Security and Maritime Affairs， No.4， 2021， p.100.

44 Zhang Xi， “A Review of the Biden Administrations Values Alliance，” International Data Information， No.10， 2021， pp.4-5.

45 “The Crisis in Ukraine and the Construction of a New International System，” Beijing Cultural Review， No.3， 2022， p.5.

46 Vladimir Putin， “St Petersburg International Economic Forum Plenary Session，” June 17， 2022， http：// en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/68669.

47 International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons （ICAN）， “Squandered： 2021 Global Nuclear Weapons Spending，” June 15， 2022； “Iran Increased Military Spending in Past Year – Report，” The Jerusalem Post， April 25， 2022.

48 “Venezuelan President： End of Hegemony，” June 22， 2022， https：//world.huanqiu.com/ article/48OHTloLU8i.

49 “Unexpected Indicator of Change，” Russia in Global Politics， No.4， 2020， pp.5-8.

50 Ashley J. Tellis， “What Is in Our Interest： India and the Ukraine War，” April 25， 2022， https：// carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/25/what-is-in-our-interest-india-and-ukraine-war-pub-86961.

51 “S. Africa Seeks Greater African Role in UN Security Council，” September 22， 2020， https：//www. france24.com/en/20200922-s-africa-seeks-greater-african-role-in-un-security-council.

52 “Russia Calls for Giving Brazil Permanent Seat on UN Security Council， Lavrov Confirms，” February 16， 2022， https：//tass.com/politics/1404343.

53 “Xi Jinpings Speech at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly，”September 21， 2021， http：//www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-09/22/content_5638597.htm.

54 “West Pressuring Arab States — Top Official，” June 13， 2022， https：//www.rt.com/news/557099-westpressure-arab-league-ukraine/.

55 “Zhou Xiaochuan： Non-Traditional Security Issues Become a Global Focus，” October 19， 2021， https：// www.163.com/dy/article/GMMPLF3I0530KP1K.html.

56 Xu Bu， “Promoting Global Governance System Towards a More Just and Reasonable Future，” March

25， 2022， http：//theory.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0325/c40531-32383783.html； “Lin Yifu： China Should Together with Developing Countries in Building the Global Governance System，” September 17， 2020， http：//www.counsellor.gov.cn/2020-09/17/c_1210804150.htm.

57 Xu Jian， “Counter-Globalization and the Transformation of Globalization，” China International Studies， No.3， 2017， pp.1-15.

58 Feng Shaolei， “The Ukraine Crisis in Transforming the International Order，” Peoples Forum， No.2， 2022， p.84.

59 WTO， “The Crisis in Ukraine： Implications of the War for Global Trade and Development，” April 2022， https：//www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/imparctukraine422_e.pdf.

60 Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations， “Remarks by Ambassador Zhang Jun，” March 15， 2022， http：//un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/hyyfy/202203/t20220315_10651684.htm.