European Union’s External Strategic Transformation and the Reshaping of China-EU

Jin Ling

Introduction

Historically， European integration and its international status have been deeply embedded in the international pattern and liberal order dominated by the United States. After the end of World War II， under the security protection of the US， Europe started the process of integration and continued to advance the process of liberalization. Europe practiced the “super globalization” aiming at the “four freedoms” in the regional scope. Thus， when the Cold War ended， the transformation of Europe to the EU was well placed to shape a new round of globalization. Globally through the pursuit of consistency with the global order of new liberalism， Europes elites hoped to obtain independence through rapid expansion and integration of the global economy. Through the single market， Europe improved competitivity， increased investment， promoted economic growth， so as to promote and support the particularity of the European welfare states and their vitality， and become a unified trade behavior body projected economic power externally.1 Under the neoliberal order， Europe has not only harnessed the power of its single market， as well as the rules and standards built on it to achieve unprecedented prosperity and become a major force in the international community.

However， marked by the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008， the international landscape and order have undergone a major transformation， which had a profound impact on the EU. However， the rise of the emerging power represented by China has shaken the “western center” of globalization. Accompanied by “decentralization，” with a more complex transformation of global politics and order， the world has entered a period of turbulence， differentiation and adjustment. Nationalism and populism are on the rise， and anti-globalization waves occur repeatedly. To maintain hegemony， the US leads in promoting geopolitical competition， which results in the intensified geopolitical conflicts， politicization of economy and security， and the risk of global disorder. The crisis of the liberal order， geopolitical conflicts， the process of deglobalization combined with multiple internal crisis make the EU deeply anxious and face challenges in its international identity and status.

In 2010， Herman Van Rompuy， then president of the European Council， said： “In the new， political phase of globalization， this changes. Prosperity is spreading， power is shifting. They （people in Europe） are anxious， not of losing “power，” but of losing their jobs， of declining welfare， as a consequence of a global competition.”2 In recent years， facing the tensions between China and the US， the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict， the EU has a growing sense of crisis. It has constantly reshaped its international strategic positioning and pushed forward the adjustment of its external strategy. In its foreign strategy， the EU increasingly emphasizes becoming a geopolitical actor， intending to safeguard European sovereignty and protects the European way of life through strategic autonomy. Significant pressures from global disorder and a strategic shift by policymakers are key to understand Europes place in a changing world.3

As an important force on the international stage， China is an important factor driving the EUs external strategic adjustment. Some even say that China is the catalyst for Europe to pursue strategic independence and realize a sovereign Europe.4 China-EU relations shape the international landscape and are influenced by changes in the international landscape and shifts in power. After the end of the Cold War， China-EU relations experienced a ten-year honeymoon period and became an important force for each others development and reform process. Europe has promoted Chinas integration into globalization， and China has played an indispensable role in Europes prosperity and stability. However， with the changing balance of power between China and the EU， marked by the EUs sixth Policy Document on EU-China issued in 2006， China-EU relations have entered a long period of transformation and adjustment， and the EUs strategic positioning towards China has been constantly adjusted. During this period， while the EU often emphasized competition from China， it tried to seek for balance between cooperation and competition. Until 2019， the EU for the first time added the dimension of rivalry to China-EU relations， recognizing China not only as a partner and competitor but also as a “systemic rival” from the perspective of competition and cooperation. At present， the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict are interacting with each other， accelerating the EUs efforts to reshape its China strategy. Under the USs strategy of decoupling and “new Cold War” with China， how will the EUs pursuit of power politics affect its balancing over the China related triple positioning？ How would the EUs correction of position on globalization change the interdependence of China-EU relations？ Will the strategizing of “ideology”change the basic logic of no “geopolitical conflict” between China and Europe？ These questions are not just about China-EU relations but will also affect the general trend of world peace and development.

The Strategic Challenge of International Power Shift to the European Union

The use of “international power” in this paper is intended to highlight the two dimensions of strength and influence with more emphasis on the state of power change. As a special international actor， in addition to hard power dimensions such as economic strength and market power， the normative power derived from the EUs economic strength and market power and its “model influence” of integration are more important in measuring the change of the EUs power. Since the 2008 global financial crisis， international power shift has been an important background for the discussion of the EUs international status. In the context of international landscape restructuring and international power shift， the EU is not only facing a trend of declining strength and influence， but also increasingly exposing its vulnerability in geopolitical conflicts due to the power mismatch caused by the crisis of the liberal order. Meanwhile， the multiple crises the EU has experienced since the debt crisis has also undermined its model influence. Todays EU is faced with the challenge of how to rebuild its strength and avoid being marginalized and how to achieve a balance between the principle of power politics and the idea of liberalism. More importantly， the EU needs to fundamentally deal with the deep challenges of integration and rebuild the influence of the European model.

International power shifts and the EUs power decline

The academic community has long discussed power characteristics of the EU. More than 40 years ago， Fran？ois Duchêne used “civil force”to emphasize its new character as a non-military response to international conflicts. Ian Manners defines the EU as a “normative power” that diffuses its norms of peace through influence rather than changing the behavior of other international actors through deterrence or rewards and punishments.The most important factor is not what it does or what it says， but what it is.5 Realists understand from an economic perspective， that the EU is， above all， a market force. Three different schools of thought explain the composition and characteristics of the EU from different perspectives. In fact， since the EU became a force in the international community， it has never been manifested as just one force， but as a combination of three interdependent forces. Among them， market power is the basis of its normative power， and the attraction of integration mode is the carrier of its“conceptual” power.

After the end of the Cold War， under the US led liberal order， the EU has made full use of its advantage of market size and rules and got unprecedented development in the process of globalization. By expansion， trade， aid and other means， the EU played a normative role and promoted“European model” in the world scope， becoming an important force in the international arena. In 2001 Mr. Kupchan said the EU was becoming the new pole， ending the single-tier world dominated by the US.6

However， marked by the 2008 financial crisis， the EUs international influence has been declining. At a meeting of envoys in 2019， French President Emmanuel Macron acknowledged that geopolitical and strategic realignment was driving the end of Western hegemony.7 The basis of international power shift is the change of global power balance， and the most important manifestation of diversification and decentralization of international power is the global economic center moving to the AsiaPacific region. After the EUs expansion in 2005， it was the worlds largest economy， accounting for 30% of global GDP， compared with 5% for China. The financial crisis and the eurozone debt crisis have completely changed the dynamics of global economic power. By 2019， the EUs and the USs share of global GDP had fallen to 21% and 24% respectively， while Chinas had risen to 16%.8 The OECDs latest long-term economic forecasts show an annual growth of 1.4% in Eurozone over the next decade.9 Compared with growth elsewhere， Europes position in the international economic system is at risk of further decline.

Economic strength and market size are the basis of the EUs normative power， which is weakened by its declining share in the global economic system. Although the EU can still use the single market to play a normative role， studies show that since 2003 the EU has been declining in areas where it has long had a normative advantage， such as climate change， trade， democracy promotion and regional cooperation.10 On climate change， from the leadership of the Kyoto Protocol to the marginalization of Copenhagen， it witnesses the rise of BASIC as a veto force. In the area of foreign trade， the negotiating process of the past 25 years has shown a decline in the EUs influence. The Uruguay Round was dominated by the EU， US and their bilateral cooperation. While in the Doha Round， emerging powers were no longer satisfied with the joint determination of the liberalization process by the EU and the US， and the differences between developed and developing countries became the main contradiction of the Doha Round.11 More importantly， in the field of green and digital technologies， the EU is currently trying to make up for its technological shortcomings through rules， despite relying on market forces.

European integration once made great progress， bringing prosperity and stability， and was the carrier of the European normative power. The EU has offered the world a regional model of balanced economic， social and natural development. It has demonstrated the propositions of equal emphasis on employment and growth， common progress between market and society， flexible security， social integration and environmental protection. It has shown a coordinated approach and balanced power with a strong European color as distinctive example of small and medium-sized countries coming together to defend their own interests while dealing with globalization.12 However， under the background of international power shift， since the debt crisis， the EU has experienced refugee crisis， large-scale fear of attack and a series of challenges such as Brexit. Liberal order shows structural contradictions， as well as economic， political， and social differentiation. Peoples trust in the political system and political institutions are eroding， while populist gains popularity.13 The multiple crises that the EU has experienced and the deep-seated challenges it faces have directly threatened its power base. The EU is no longer an example of prosperity and stability in the world， and its model has suffered a serious loss of influence.14

Geopolitical conflict highlights weakness in EU soft power

European integration is based on the assumption that interdependent cooperation can promote stability and peace. “After the end of the Cold War， many believed that the decline of inter-state conflicts would pave the way for economic inter-dependence， multilateralism and therefore the triumph of the European model.”15 Based on the above cognition， in 2003 the European Security Strategy emphasizes the non-confrontational and interdependence of the international community. It believes that the threat source is no longer the power conflict， but mainly from cross-border of non-traditional security issues. Through the multilateral framework， relying on partnership， making full use of its trade and aid policy tools， the EU can leverage its soft power advantage to achieve an effective multilateralist international order.16 Even after the eurozone debt crisis， the EU cannot imagine great power conflict and the threat of unilateralism becoming a reality.

However， driven by the transformation of pattern and order， geopolitical conflicts are increasingly intensified. After the chaos in the Middle East and North Africa， the EUs periphery is caught in proxy conflicts， and Russia and the US continue to wrestle. The crisis in Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine have brought back traditional security threats to Europe. Since taking office， Trump has pushed the great power game to the center of global politics， not only retreating from the international agreements， but also launching an all-out trade war， which directly undermines the interdependence system on which the EU has long relied for development and prosperity. The weaponization and securitization of the economy have caused the EU to constantly reflect on its weakness. After taking office， US President Biden expressed his embrace of liberal order and multilateralism， but he still adhered to the foreign strategy of great power game. He built exclusive alliances， promoted ideological antagonism and economic decoupling， and constantly increased the intensity of great power competition. The Russia-Ukraine conflict completely put an end to the long-held “norm export” dominated security concept in Europe， which in Europes view was the most primitive way to show geopolitical conflicts.

Geopolitical conflicts have highlighted the limits of the EUs power. Europes type of power， its governance， and its high dependence on the outside world are sources of its vulnerability. As a soft power， the EU feels overwhelmed by Russias hard power regarding Crimea. The EU is powerless， though aware of its security interests in a tussle between the US and Russia in its neighborhood. The trade war and technological war initiated by the US have undermined the long-held premise of the European integration of relative independence in economy， politics， and security. Although the EU does not agree， it can only accept the fact that the economy is increasingly tied with politics and security， and deal with the vulnerability brought by interdependence. When the US wielded the stick of secondary sanctions over the Iran nuclear deal， the EU lamented that it never had “sovereignty.”17 Frances President Emmanuel Macron has warned that Europe is at risk of disappearing geopolitically in the face of intensifying competition between China and the US.18 The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has made Europe deeply shocked and realize that the security path of seeking peace through cooperation and relying on export norms and expansion model has come to an end.

The crisis of multilateralism constrains the normative power of the European Union

As a result of the international power shift， the international multilateral system is experiencing multiple crises due to its failure to keep up with the pace of change. The legitimacy of international institutions derives primarily from their representativeness， effectiveness， and universal recognition. However， in the context of international power shift， the legitimacy of multilateral institutions faces challenges in all three aspects. In terms of power structure， some multilateral institutions were established on the basis of the power pattern at the beginning of their establishment and failed to reflect the changes in the international power pattern. At present， the common problem is that western countries are overrepresented， while many developing countries are underrepresented， which fundamentally undermines their legitimacy. In terms of effectiveness， multilateral institutions are struggling to respond effectively to challenges ranging from traditional issues such as peacekeeping and crisis management to trade， let alone emerging challenges such as cyber security and climate change. This is not only because multilateral institutions are poorly prepared， but also because， driven by the US， multilateral institutions have become a game ground for major powers， increasingly dominated by zero-sum mentality. In the absence of both representativeness and effectiveness， multilateral institutions are increasingly lacking in international recognition. Even those countries that have long supported multilateralism increasingly believe that international institutions do not help to achieve policy goals.19

In the international community， the preference for diplomacy and multilateralism are important aspects of the normative power of the EU. For the EU， multilateralism is an objective， an instrument and a value. It is at the heart of its identity and strategy to promote values and safeguard its interests.20 Under the multilateral mechanism， the EU has unique advantages. It not only has a representative capacity exceeding its size， but also has a better negotiating power in multilateral institutions due to its own integration practice， which helps it to safeguard its interests and values. “The EUs members wield great influence in organizations such as the UN and the World Bank， preserving and extending their leverage in a time of flux.”21

The crisis of multilateralism poses multiple challenges to the EUs international standing. From a strategic perspective， the EU has always stressed that multilateralism is in its DNA. It promotes multilateralism at the global level， emphasizes rules and cooperation， and gives itself a moral high ground in the global governance system. Therefore， the crisis of multilateralism is also partly an identity crisis for the EU， which explains why the EU has always stressed that the “European sovereignty”it pursues is not intended to be the opposite of multilateralism. From the perspective of diplomacy， the multilateral mechanism is more compatible with the power characteristics of the EU. As an alliance of small and medium-sized countries， the EU promotes the formulation of consistent rules to curb power politics and maintain the security and development of the EU through a common force. However， under the logic of geopolitical game， the EU can not only exert its institutional advantages through multilateral platform， but also often becomes a game field of great powers and faces the risk of marginalization. From a practical point of view， the decline of multilateralism will bring greater challenges to the EU， either in the current security threats brought by the Russia-Ukraine conflict or in tackling non-traditional security threats such as climate change and supply chain security.

The EUs External Strategy Has Accelerated Its Transformation

Facing the change of international power， the EUs foreign strategy has been under adjusting. In 2003， the EU was ambitious in its commitment to upholding the liberal international order and promoting effective multilateralism around the world. After the debt crisis and the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa， the EUs external strategy began a pragmatic transformation， focusing more on the balance between values and practical interests. While adhering to the principle of multilateralism， the EU also pays more attention to the instrumental value of multilateralism， increases investment in bilateral partnerships and builds coalitions of the willing， and increasingly focus our strategic focus on the periphery.

In 2016， the EU global strategy clarified the external strategy of principled pragmatism. Although using soft power is difficult to cope with a changing world， the strategy still hopes to contain power politics， and geopolitics is far from its strategic goal. Since then， under the impact of Trumpism and marked by Macrons Sorbonne speech， the EUs external strategy began to aim at strategic autonomy and European sovereignty. Driven by triple forces of the game between China and the US， the COVID-19 pandemic， and the Russia-Ukraine conflict， the EU has accelerated the adjustment of its external strategy in an unprecedented way. Its strategy dominated by geopolitical competition and conflict is gradually shaping. The EU clearly participates in the great power game as a geopolitical actor. The EU comprehensively uses its policy tools； combines attack and defense to build a “selective decoupling” globalization response plan； incorporates ideology not only into economic and political competition and confrontation， but also into security considerations due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict， so that ideology has been connected in all fields. Moreover， the Russia-Ukraine conflict has strengthened the defense and security dimension of the EUs external strategy in an unprecedented way.

The world view of geopolitical competition and conflict dominates the EUs external strategy

Under the impact of the game between China and the US and the COVID-19 pandemic， the EUs world outlook has already become increasingly competitive and conflicted. Facing the game of China and the US， the European consensus is that the world is increasingly towards the geopolitical competition， major powers refuse the EUs liberal model of shared sovereignty， and the links between each other are increasingly becoming tools for winning geopolitical advantage or serving geopolitical objectives.22 The world is more and more moving towards new two-poles， and the future is full of uncertainty. After the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic， the EU sees not only the fragility of interdependence， but also geopolitical competition， and believes a “global battle of narratives and influence” is taking place under the COVID-19 pandemic.23

In the perspective of competition and conflict， the EU emphasizes the need to adjust the logic of integration from domesticating sovereignty within Europe to reinstating the sovereignty lost compared with other major power，24 no matter in building the strategic independence or the European sovereignty discourse system. As European countries are increasingly damaged by outside pressure， they are not able to exercise sovereignty. The security， economic health and diplomatic freedom of action of the EU are threatened， allowing other powers to impose their preferences on it.25 Therefore， the essence of sovereign Europe is to build strength. While strengthening the construction of hard power， it integrates all policy means to realize the hardening of soft power， participate in the game of great powers， and avoid becoming a “wrestling ground.” The Russia-Ukraine conflict accelerates the geopolitical transformation of the EUs foreign strategy in an extreme way. After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict， Versailles Declaration was made during the informal meeting of the heads of state or government and mentioned “Russias war of aggression constitutes a tectonic shift in European history. Confronted with growing instability， strategic competition， and security threats， we decided to take more responsibility for our security and take further decisive steps towards building our European sovereignty.”26 In the preface to the Strategic Compass written by the EUs High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy， Josep Borrel， does not hide the logic of power politics， and can be interpreted as a declaration of the EUs external strategic geopolitical turn. He argues that the EU as a whole is committed to drawing the right lessons from the crisis. It needs to turn its previous geo-strategic awakening into a lasting strategic posture and learn and use the language of power. The EU needs hard power and using a full range of policy tools to achieve its goals is about thinking and acting in terms of power.27

Selective decoupling becomes the European Unions response path to globalization

Managing or shaping globalization has always been a priority on the agenda of the EUs external strategy. Confronted with Brexit and rising anti-globalization forces within the EU， the EU issued a reflection on globalization report in March 2017， pointing out that globalization has brought about social inequality， unfair competition and conflicts over the integration of migrants. However， the EU still regards globalization as a positive force for change and clearly opposes protectionism. According to the report， international competition， global climate action， scientific cooperation and the exchange of ideas promote creativity and accelerate innovation， and companies that actively compete internationally become more competitive. Openness to global trade promotes EU economic growth， enhances EU prosperity and helps maintain EU competitiveness. At this point， the overall EU-wide view of globalization as an opportunity is 55%. The EUs solution to the challenges of globalization is more of an inward dimension， emphasizing better sharing of the benefits of globalization through strengthening social， educational and innovation policies， and promoting long-term competitiveness to enhance resilience. It is obviously devoid of geopolitical competition.28

However， due to Trumpism， the China-US game and the COVID-19 pandemic， the EUs stance on globalization has changed significantly. Trumpism weaponizes interdependence and securitizing economic and technological policies. It impacts the European concept of globalization and promotes the extension of European strategic autonomy from the dimension of security to the fields including economy and technology. Safeguarding economic sovereignty has become the most important pillar of European strategic autonomy. After the outbreak of COVID-19， the European economy suffered the greatest systemic impact due to its global value chain nature. The fragility of interdependence becomes a main reflection in Europe， calling for value chain reflux. EU Internal Market Commissioner Breton spoke publicly that Europe has gone too far in globalization. Germanys then chancellor， Angela Merkel， argued that the pandemic showed the need for “some sovereignty through domestic production.”29

In fact， Europe is undergoing a profound rethinking of free markets and efficiency-maximizing liberalism. On the one hand， the EU discusses the links between interdependence， vulnerability and the process of globalization， thinking about its place in them. On the other hand， Europe increasingly links dependence with geopolitical regression， especially the increasing use of economic tools to achieve broader geopolitical and geoeconomic goals.30 When the EU incorporates the pursuit of strategic autonomy and the maintenance of European sovereignty into its economic， technological， trade， health and other policies， it clearly means that geopolitical game has been increasingly incorporated into its process of rethinking globalization. In the context of the China-US strategic competition and the COVID-19 pandemic， the EU has taken a series of measures to strengthen its economic sovereignty， which is in essence a selective decoupling from the globalization process and excluding some countries and industries from its globalization cooperation agenda. In the name of open strategic autonomy EU trade policy tries to seek a balance between openness and security， and protectionist measures are increasingly strengthened. In terms of industrial policy， from raw materials to electric vehicles， from chips to hydrogen energy， the list of strategic industries of the EU is gradually lengthening， and the demand of building the whole industrial chain of so-called strategic industries is increasingly prominent.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has reinforced the EUs distrust of interdependence and accelerated its pursuit of a selective decoupling strategy. For Europe， in addition to the security shock， the Russia-Ukraine conflict also prompted Europe to strengthen its recognition of interdependence and vulnerability. From the EUs point of view， its high dependence on Russian energy is not only a serious blow to its economy， but also a constraint on its ability to act. Whether it is the perceived “weaponization” of Russian energy， or the sanctions imposed by the US and Europe using all policy tools against Russia， the deeply bound economic and geostrategic and security policies will undoubtedly and profoundly change the process of globalization. After the outbreak of Russia-Ukraine conflict， the informal meeting of the heads of state or government in Versailles clearly put forward the goal of reducing energy dependence on Russia and strategic dependence on foreign commodities.

Rebuild the comprehensive link of values and benefits

In the European Basic Treaties， it is stated that upholding the values of the Union and consolidating and supporting the principles of democracy， the rule of law， human rights and international law are the primary strategic objectives of the EUs external action. The 2003 EU Security Strategy explicitly extends the European model through trade， aid and other means. For a long time， although the EUs values diplomacy has different manifestations in different policy fields， its essence is to export the EUs values of democracy and human rights in foreign policy， which has a significant expansionary feature. Among them， the EU has not only established a consistent link between good governance， development and security goals， but also made the EUs values and interests not deviated because its value diplomacy matches the identity and power characteristics of the EU. However， in the context of international power shift， internally there are disputes over democracy and rule of law， the rise of populist forces， and the damage to the political credit system. Whereas externally， the democracy promotion fails to bring about development but with poor effectiveness. The neighboring countries are in turmoil， and the logic of consistency between values diplomacy， development and security goals is often broken.

Faced with the logical dilemma of values diplomacy， the EU seeks a balanced solution between values and interests. After the debt crisis， the EU has given greater prominence to the primary objective of market access in its trade policy. After the turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa， the EU realized the limitation of expanding the European model in its neighborhood policy. In November 2015， the European Commission issued a new neighborhood policy paper， which abandoned the EU model as a criterion to judge the reform process of neighboring countries， sought to dilute ideology based on finding common interests， uphold the principle of “exchange of interests，” and develop normal partnership with all neighboring countries in a practical way. The pragmatic adjustment of EU values diplomacy is embodied in the 2016 EU Global Strategy. The EU had a more sober understanding on its own limitations and showed a remarkable shift towards pragmatism. It not only put forward the principle of “principled pragmatism，” but also brought up the goal of constructing toughness in the EU and the surrounding， emphasizing the national construction of local autonomy to face the challenges， rather than a transplanted European value in the external environment. The ultimate objective of EU external action seems to be shifting from shared prosperity and stability based on shared values to security through practical cooperation. Therefore， the links between values and interests in the EUs foreign policy actions appear to be separated to some extent， and the EUs value diplomacy shows a certain trend of contraction.

However， driven by the Trump effect， China-US competition， COVID-19 and other factors， the EU has reestablished the link between values and interests and incorporated values into the process of the geopolitical game. If the EUs previous logic of the consistency of values and interests is based on the export of the EU model， the value diplomacy under the geopolitical game is related to its own security from the EUs perception. In recent years， the EUs construction of a strategically independent and sovereign Europe has given new significance to ideology. In his first speech on a sovereign Europe， President Macron included words that defended European values. Since then， the leaders of the European Union have emphasized the interests and values of the European Union when discussing the maintenance of European sovereignty.

The EUs Geopolitical Outlook for Europe published in 2018 believes that the worlds return to democracy versus autocracy will reshape the geostrategic approach of the 21st century.31 In 2019， the EU in its The European Unions Global Strategy Three Years On， Looking Forward points out： “We have seen the emergence of different political narratives， some of which openly contest the values underpinning liberal democracies worldwide， and those of the EU itself....We have also seen how connectivity， while bringing about great opportunities for communication and exchanges， is being used to exploit vulnerabilities and undermine our democratic systems with a growing use of cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.”32 It is in this context that the EU strengthens the link between its values and economic and technological sovereignty， and stresses working with like-minded countries to build secure supply chains and shape future technological standards. In February 2020， the EU issued a new digital strategy， which clearly hopes that the empowerment of digital technologies in European society is rooted in common values， distinguishes digital technologies between democracy and autocracy， and attaches importance to cooperation with European partners who share values.33 In 2022， the EU issued a long-planned communication document on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence， which also clarified the link between supply chains and human rights and other values. Once in force， companies deemed incompatible with European values will be excluded from EU supply chains.

If the China-US game and the COVID-19 pandemic spurred the EU to integrate values into the economic and technological sphere， the RussiaUkraine conflict has created a link between values and security. The conflict not only impacts the security environment of the EU， but also profoundly reshapes its security concept. In the context of conflicts， the European security concept is increasingly “generalized，” and values are an important part of it. “Russias war of aggression constitutes a tectonic shift in European history，” said a joint statement from the informal summit of EU leaders in Versailles following the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.“The EU can live up to its responsibilities in this new reality， protecting our citizens， values， democracies， and our European model.”34 It is clear that values have become an important part of the security of the EU， which defends not only border security but also an open and democratic way of life.

The importance of defense and security issues has risen significantly

Due to the security dependence on the US-led NATO， defense and security has always been a weak point of European integration. Although the EU started building common defense and security， driven by the Kosovo War， the progress has been slow. In the context of the Iraq War， the EU issued a common security strategy， and civil crisis management is the focus of its defense and security policy. Although the EU Rapid Response Force was declared operational in May 2003， it has never been deployed. In 2013， under the background of the strategic shift eastward of the US and the deterioration of the surrounding security environment， the European Council Summit devoted itself to the discussion of European defense capacity building， proposing to enhance the effectiveness and visibility of the EUs common security and defense policy， enhance operational capacity， and strengthen the European military industry and related research and development. On May 18， 2015， the Council of Foreign Ministers of the EU again made a resolution on the common security and defense policy， believing that in the context of major changes in the global and European security environment， a strong Europe and a strong and effective common security and defense policy are needed. But it was not until Trump took office in 2017 that Europe took a series of substantial steps in the area of security and defense policy.

With the US withdrawing from the Iran Nuclear Agreement and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and questioning NATOs collective defense clause， France and Germany have made clear calls for the construction of a “European army.” Since then， European defense building has gone far beyond its previous crisis-management objective to focus on defense capacity building. The EU has not only launched permanent structural cooperation involving 25 countries， but also established the European Defense Fund and the mechanism of annual defense evaluation among member states. The EUs a series of defense cooperation initiatives aimed at strengthening coordination and cooperation in defense industry investment， ability development， and military act， reducing the repetitive weapon system between member countries and strengthening the compatibility in military actions. These initiatives made the European defense more effective， strengthened the EUs strategic autonomy， and realized goals that it had never achieve in two years. In order to promote strategic autonomy in the field of European defense， the new European Commission has created a Defense General Office in 2019 to strengthen the coordinated development of European defense industry.

The chaos of the USs withdrawal from Afghanistan has given renewed impetus to EU defense and security policy. The crisis has served as a catalyst to Brussels once again that Europes security cannot be put in one basket of the US， and the USs strategic contraction will not take Europes interests into account. As Borrel puts it： “The Europeans dont have a choice. We must organize ourselves to deal with the world as it is and not the world that we dream of.”35 On September 2， 2021， the European Union held an informal meeting of defense ministers to discuss the construction of a rapid reaction force and the possibility of special military cooperation among member states. In her State of the Union address， von der Leyen publicly stated： “It is time for Europe to step up to the next level，”36 proposing to hold an European defense summit during the French presidency and put forward proposals on the establishment of a rapid reaction force.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has fundamentally reshaped the EUs security concept and posture. Defense and security issues have never been more important and 2022 will be the year of European security and defense in a real sense. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has highlighted the limits of the EUs previous efforts to build security through model export and has therefore fundamentally reshaped its defense and security strategy， shifting from seeking peace through cooperation to strengthening military deterrence capacity building. After the outbreak of the conflict， the informal leaders of the EU summit in Versailles promised to significantly increase the defense budget， promote defense cooperation， increase the military mobility capacity within the alliance， and effectively strengthen the development of the European defense industry. Since then， the EU Strategic Guide has for the first time realized the recognition of common threats among member states， especially the clear threat of Russia to European security. Since February 21， 11 countries have announced plans to increase their defense budgets to at least the target of 2% of GDP， adding 200bn to the coalition budget， with Germany announcing100bn for defense and committing to a target of 2% of GDP. The European Union has also broken institutional limits on military aid， using the European Peace Fund to provide weapons aid to conflict areas for the first time. The European Union has offered financial incentives to support joint purchases of armaments to 35% from the current 11%. The change of European security concept and the increase of defense spending， especially Germanys breakthrough of “restraint doctrine，” represent the beginning of a new European security order.37

The Impact of the EUs External Strategy Transformation on China-EU Relations

As two major forces， two major markets and two major civilizations， China and Europe are both important driving forces and deeply influenced by the international power shift. For a long time， the basic logic of ChinaEU relations has been that there is no geopolitical conflict in politics， but mutual cooperation and mutual benefit in economy. Although there are differences in ideology due to their political systems， and historical and cultural factors， they will not fundamentally hinder bilateral cooperation. Following this logic， China-EU relations experienced a tenyear honeymoon period from 1995 to 2005. During this period， ChinaEU relations have achieved a leapfrog development， from cooperative partnership to comprehensive partnership and then to strategic partnership， with improved cooperation mechanisms and expanded cooperation areas， forming an all-dimensional， wide-ranging and multilevel cooperation pattern.

However， times have changed. Marked by the EUs sixth China Policy Paper in 2006， China-EU relations began a period of transformation and adjustment that lasted for more than a decade. The changing balance of power between China and Europe， the multiple crises in the EU and the adjustment in Chinas domestic and foreign policies are structural factors that have led to a long period of transition and adjustment in China-EU relations. During the period， the EU issued two policy documents on China， constantly trying to clarify Chinas position in its foreign strategy， its China policy priority， and its policy means and tools. China has also adjusted its policy towards Europe according to the changing situation. Some structural factors that have long determined bilateral relations have also changed. The deficit of strategic demand and mutual trust between China and the EU is increasing. The competitive and cooperative factors in economic and trade cooperation are both rising. The deviation of practical cooperation and the EUs perception of China are becoming more and more obvious.

In March 2019， the EU issued “EU-China： A Strategic Outlook，”marking the initial completion of the EUs strategic transformation towards China. “There is a growing appreciation in Europe that the balance of challenges and opportunities presented by China has shifted”the Outlook says. There is “a further EU policy shift towards a more realistic， assertive， and multi-faceted approach.” The Outlook defines China in multi-dimensions that China is “a cooperation partner， a negotiating partner， an economic competitor and a systemic rival.”38 The EU sets out “10 concrete actions” to promote the rebalancing of ChinaEU relations. Among them， a systematic rival is the EUs new positioning of China. Under the joint effect of the three major forces of the China-US game， the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict， China， as the focus of the EUs foreign strategy， is increasingly affected by the adjustment of the EUs foreign strategy， and the basic logic of China-EU relations is impacted.

The fragmentation of Chinas strategic positioning intensifies from the perspective of geopolitical competition

In 2019， the EU has fully demonstrated its repositioning of China from a geostrategic perspective. The EU simultaneously defines China as a partner， competitor and rival， hoping to cut different issues and form a multi-dimensional framework for relations with China， exceeding the single positioning of strategic partner previously. The EUs perception of China has not only increased the dimension of competition， but also means that the EU understand the ideological differences between the two sides from the perspective of geopolitical competition and regarded China as an “systematic rival.” However， there was still a lack of consensus within the EU on the weight of the triple positions in China-EU relations and the extent to which the relations with China should be handled from the perspective of “systematic rival.”

The EU has deepened its bias against China over the COVID-19 pandemic. Borrell said that “China is as much an economic partner as it is a ‘systemic rival that seeks to promote an alternative model of governance，” pointing out that China has a different understanding of the international order from the EU.39 The European Commission report also publicly accused China for the first time of “disinformation campaigns related to the pandemic，” “seeking to undermine democratic debate and exacerbate social polarization， and improve their own image in the COVID-19 context.”40 Nevertheless， after the China-EU Summit in 2020， when European Commission President von der Leyen spoke of China as an “systematic rival” from the perspective of different systems and values， Borrell made it clear that he did not want to engage with China as an “systematic rival.”41 Borrells comments at the post-summit press conference were perhaps the most emblematic of the EU-wide ambiguity about the identity of an “systematic rival.” Borrell said “the word “rival” is important in diplomatic language； because it is not a soft word. What does“rival” mean？ “Rival” on what？ Is “systemic” a matter of rivalry between two systems？ Or is it a systematic rivalry？ There are two interpretations.”In clarifying his position later， Borrell said that China and Europe though have different interests and values， but clearly emphasize more on cooperation between the two sides.42 The differences in the positions and expressions of the EU leaders on the issue of “systematic rivals” show that the different organizations within the EU and their member states are far from reaching a consensus on “systematic rival.”

However， after Biden took office， in the context of significant improvement in transatlantic relations， China-EU relations have been repeatedly impacted by the dispute over sanctions and anti-sanctions and the Lithuanian authorities erroneous steps on issues concerning Taiwan. The EUs triple relationship balance on cognition of China has been significantly tilted towards the direction of “competitor” and “systematic rival.” In a speech on China at the European Parliament in April 2021， Borrell stressed， the importance of working with China to address challenges. On the other side， he also highlighted China as systematic rival.“The reality is that the EU and China have fundamental divergences， be it about their economic systems and managing globalization， democracy and human rights， or on how to deal with third countries.These differences are set to remain for the foreseeable future and must not be brushed under the carpet，” von der Leyen and Borrell said in a letter outlining the report to the European Council comprising leaders of the 27 EU countries， on April 21.43 It is evident that the EUs positioning on China as “systemic rival” tends to shift in the direction of “rival systemically.”

In fact， the EU is not without reflection on the above deviation in its positioning of China. Many people in the EU institutions believe that the recent triple positioning of China has focused too much on “systemic rival，”and that the multiple dimensions have lost its balance.44 However， the Russia-Ukraine conflict has interrupted the reflection process and further aggravated the deviation and fragmentation of the EUs strategic positioning towards China. The EU sees Chinas neutral stance on the conflict as ostensible but actually pro-Russia and its endorsement of Russias claims of a “sphere of influence” as a challenge to Europes core security interests. Von der Leyen spoke at the Munich Security Conference that Moscow and Beijing sought a new era and an alternative to existing international rules. The China-Russia joint statement was even framed by Borrell as a“revisionist declaration.”45 The EU-China summit in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict was described by Mr Borrell as a “dialogue of the deaf，”46 highlighting differences in political values on everything from human rights to Ukraine issue. The EUs positioning towards China is shifting from trying to separate different areas in 2019 to re-linking economic， political and security issues， and intensifying geopolitical competition and conflict in China-EU relations.

Reducing economic and trade dependence on China has become a priority on agenda

Under the background of China-US rivalry and the COVID-19 pandemic， the EUs debate on trade and economic policy on China has taken a new turn toward politicization and securitizing. The EU reexamines the economic and trade interdependence between China and the EU from a geostrategic perspective and reducing the dependence on China has increasingly become the core issue of its economic and trade policy agenda on China. French Minister of Economy and Finance Bruno Le Maire said， “Coronavirus shows we must reduce our dependence on China.”47 Focusing on the EUs dependence on China， the 2022 Report of the EU-China Think Tank Network classifies the EUs vulnerability to China into six categories， which are related to imports， supply chains， market access， competitiveness， security and Chinas geopolitical ambitions. In its national classification， only Greece， Portugal and Latvias dependence on China is classified as “limited concerns， limited priority，” other countries are either “serious concern，” or “high priority.” Especially worth noting that France， Germany and the Netherlands all see the dependence on China as a “serious concern and a high priority.”48 Economic dependence on China is at the heart of Germanys current policy debate on China and the focus of its policy adjustment in the post-Merkel period. Debate over the dependence on China surged in the German parliament in 2019 and 2020.49

After the breakout of Russia-Ukraine conflict， the EU further mapped its energy dependence on Russia into the economic and trade relations between China and Europe. In its new China strategy， Germany is seeking ways to respond， including targeted government incentives for companies to invest in other markets and tighter restrictions on technology transfers， including through export controls and heightened scrutiny of research and development collaboration.50 New German Chancellor Scholz， despite his restraint on China-related issues， said during a visit to Japan that German companies need to diversify their strategies to ensure their supply chains were not overly dependent on one country， citing lessons from the war in Ukraine.51 Recently， for the first time， he even publicly questioned German companies reliance on the Chinese market. Germanys foreign and economic ministries are considering changes to long-standing policies on export credits and investment guarantees in order to encourage companies to diversify their business to markets outside of China.52

Interference of ideological differences shows in all domains

Ideological factors have always been deep-seated asymmetric factors in China-EU relations， which have interfered with the development of ChinaEU relations to varying degrees for a long time. However， at different historical stages， the EU has given them different importance and adopted different policy approaches to promote its values of human rights， democracy and the rule of law. For a long time， the EU has been under a policy of“engagement and dialogue，” hoping to shape China through economic cooperation and social dialogue.

After the transition period of China-EU relations， there were frequent frictions due to ideological differences between China and Europe from 2008 to 2010. After that， based on the strategic assessment on China in 2010， the EU believes that it is difficult to change Chinese society， that China cant meet the EU standard of human rights and the rule of law in a period of time， and that the convergence of the future should be on in the areas with a common ground of the two sides. The EU and China need to manage expectations on each other and will take more fair and free China market access as the EUs first strategic priority in China.53 For a time， the EUs China policy entered a period of pragmatic cooperation and played down ideology.

As the EU intensifies its understanding of the relationship from a competitive perspective and reasserts the centrality of values in its China policy， ideological factors once again become prominent. In 2016， for the first time in 10 years， the EU issued a policy paper on China， in which it criticized Chinas human rights situation with an extensive length. When the EU first defined China as an “systematic rival” in March 2019， democracy and human rights values were the main connotations， further elevating the role of ideological factors in China-EU relations.

Now under the influence of external strategy growing more geopolitical， ideological factors are significantly beyond the system and values differences， and have become an important field of the EUs geostrategic competition. Ideological factors also realize all rounded links with economy， technology and security. The ideological differences in China-EU relations therefore present and interact in all domains. In March 2021， the EU imposed sanctions on China over the Xinjiang question， and the European Parliament froze the China-EU investment agreement after China imposed countersanctions. This is a typical case of differences over human rights affecting China-EU economic and trade cooperation. The EU has included human rights provisions in its Supply Chain Act. In its supply chain diversification strategy， the socalled strengthening of cooperation with “like-minded” countries is a concentrated expression of ideological and economic links. In the field of digital technology， the EUs mindset of opposing autocracy and democracy has seriously hindered cooperation between the two sides， and Huaweis 5G technology has been basically excluded from the European market.

As the EUs perception of “systematic rival” with China increasingly shifts towards “rival systematically，” ideological differences will also impact areas where the EU sees the two sides as partners， including joint responses to challenges such as climate change， international development cooperation and global health cooperation. In recent years， the EUs ideological bias has been behind its criticism of Chinas COVID-19 diplomacy， its commitment to counter the regional influence of so-called“authoritarian states” when talking about its Indo-Pacific strategy， and its criticism of the Belt and Road Initiative for creating dependence and expanding political influence. When ideological differences spread to the level of multilateral governance， international rules and global order， with the addition of the Russia-Ukraine conflict promoting links between values and security， the basic logic of China-EU relations which long followed that no geopolitical conflict with each other， has been seriously affected.

Conclusion

In a century of changes， the turbulence in China-EU relations is not only a component of the changes， but also an important shaping force. Over the past seven decades and more， China and the EU have witnessed and participated in each others peace， reform， and development， and worked together to make the international landscape and order more balanced， fair and just. The current international situation is facing unprecedented challenges. The COVID-19 crisis is compounded by the conflict between Russia and Ukraine， and a new Cold War mentality is intertwined with antiglobalization forces. The world is at an important crossroads. As two major forces， two major markets and two major civilizations， China and EU are important forces that will determine whether the world moves toward a new division or a community of shared future.

The geopolitical turn of the EUs external strategy， its global response to selective decoupling and its ideology in all domains have brought new difficulties and uncertainties to China-EU relations. The two sides should draw lessons from history and pursue practical cooperation to build a new type of China-EU relationship.

Historically speaking， the China-EU relations can get out of difficulties and open a new chapter when the time comes to the relations can build consensus from a strategic height. During the Cold War， the strategic need to jointly counter hegemonism pushed China and the EU to break through the Cold War barrier. Since the end of the Cold War， China and the EU have valued each others strategic position， worked together to meet global challenges， and made a qualitative leap forward in our relations. At present， when China has been attaching great importance to the EU as a strategic partner， the EU needs to break away from zero-sum thinking and establish an objective strategic positioning towards China. Only in this way can China and the EU build consensus and avoid becoming “rivals” of each other in a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Mutually beneficial and win-win economic and trade cooperation has provided internal impetus to China-EU relations. Despite the ups and downs in the development of China-EU relations， economic and trade cooperation has been on the rise and served as a ballast stone for both sides. Chinas economic development has provided a stable and reliable market for Europe and played an important role in ensuring economic stability and employment in Europe. Europes deep participation in Chinas reform and opening up process is also an indispensable factor for Chinas development and prosperity. Against the backdrop of politicization and securitization of the EUs China-related economic policies， trade and investment cooperation between the two sides bucked the trend in 2021， with trade in goods reaching a record high and twoway investment rising steadily. China remained the EUs largest trading partner， demonstrating sufficient resilience and strong impetus for bilateral economic and trade relations. Instead of going against the trend and damaging the already fragile economic recovery process that leads to a lose-lose outcome， the EU should read through a strong impetus for economic logic.

In dealing with ideological differences， China and Europe have accumulated rich experience and lessons. Respecting each others core interests and seeking common ground while shelving differences is an effective way to properly handle differences. “China and the EU have multiple and multi-level asymmetries， as partners. Different social nature， development stage and cultural history lead to multiple misalignments and misunderstandings between China and the EU in the process of development extension.”54 The reality of China-EU relations determines that differences can often play a leading role in bilateral relations. Questions such as Taiwan， Tibet and Xinjiang， as well as human rights and democracy have all become disruptors of the development of China-EU relations. Experience shows China-EU relations can only grow along the track of cooperation when China and the EU respect each other， transcend institutional and cultural differences， look at their differences with an open and inclusive mind， and step-up dialogue and communication. The idea of a “community” proposed by the precedent sages of European unity was to share responsibilities and benefits. This idea is highly compatible with vision of “a community with a shared future for mankind” proposed by President Xi Jinping. It is a sign that the Chinese and European civilizations though on different path， share the same destination. It is also a direction that both sides need to continue to promote.

1 Scott Lavery and Davide Shmid， “European Integration and the New Global Disorder，” JCMS， Vol.59， No.5， 2021， p.1323.

2 Herman van Rompuy， “The Challenges for Europe in a Changing World，” EU Diplomacy Papers， 3/2010， http：//aei.pitt.edu/13210/1/EDP_3_2010_vanRompuy.pdf.

3 Scott Lavery and Davide Shmid， “European Integration and the New Global Disorder，” p.1323.

4 John Seaman， ed.， “Covid 19 and Europe China Relations： A Country Level Analysis，” ETNC Report， April 29， 2020， p.6， https：//www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/etnc_special_report_covid-19_china_ europe_2020.pdf.

5 Ian Manners， “Normative Power Europe： A Contradiction in Terms？” Journal of Common Market Studies， Vol.40， No.2， 2002， p.252.

6 Charles Kupchan， “Introduction： Explaining Peaceful Power Transition，” in Charles A. Kupchan， Emanuel Adler， Jean-March Colcaud and Yuen Foong Khong， eds.， Power in Transition： The Peaceful Change of International Order， United Nations University Press， 2001， pp.4-5.

7 “Ambassadors Conference-Speech by M. Emmanuel Macron， President of the Republic，” August 27， 2019， https：//lv.ambafrance.org/Ambassadors-conference-Speech-by-M-Emmanuel-MacronPresident-ofthe-Republic.

8 Carlo Carraro， Otilia Dhand， et al.， “A New Era for Europe： How the European Union Can Make the Most of its Pandemic Recovery， Pursue Sustainable Growth， and Promote Global Stability，” March 1， 2022， pp.187-193. https：//ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/economy-finance/hlg_report_en.pdf.

9 European Commission， “Trade Policy Review： An Open， Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy，”February 18， 2021， https：//trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2021/april/tradoc_159541.0270_EN_05.pdf.

10 Douglas Webber， “By Most Objective Measures， Europe Must Now Be Classed as a Declining Power，”February 4， 2015， https：//blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/02/04/by-most-objective-measures-europe-mustnow-be-classed-as-a-declining-power/.

11 Douglas Webber， “Declining Power Europe： The Evolution of the European Unions World Power in the Early 21st Century，” European Review of International Studies， Vol.3， No.1， pp.31-52.

12 Zhou Hong ed.， European Union as a Power， Social Science Academic Press， 2008， p.5.

13 Carlo Carraro， Otilia Dhand et al.， “A New Era for Europe： How the European Union Can Make the Most of Its Pandemic Recovery， Pursue Sustainable Growth， and Promote Global Stability，” March 1， 2022， pp.193-197.

14 Jin Ling， “A Sovereign Europe： Transforming the European Union to ‘Hard Power？” China International Studies， March/April 2020.

15 Zaki La？di， “Can Europe Learn to Play Power Politics？” Centre for European Reform， November 25， 2019， https：//www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pbrief_power_politics_25.11.19.pdf.

16 Council of the European Union， “European Security Strategy： A Secure Europe in a Better World，”Brussels， December 12， 2003， https：//op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d0928657-af99-4552-ae84-1cbaaa864f96/.

17 Mark Leonard and Jeremy Shapiro， “Strategic Sovereignty： How Europe Can Regain the Capacity to Act，” June 25， 2019， https：//www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/strategic_sovereignty_how_europe_can_ regain_the_capacity_to_act.

18 Mark Leonard， “The Makings of a ‘Geopolitical Commission，” November 28， 2019， https：//www.ecfr. eu/article/commentary_the_makings_of_a_geopolitical_european_commission.

19 Anthony Dworkin， “Three Crises and an Opportunity： Europes Stake in Multilateralism，” September 5， 2019， https：//ecfr.eu/publication/three_crises_and_an_opportunity_europes_stake_in_multilateralism/.

20 European Parliament， “The Future of Multilateralism and Strategic Partnerships，” September 11， 2020， https：//www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652071/EPRS_BRI（2020）652071_EN.pdf.

21 Anthony Dworkin and Richard Gowan， “Rescuing Multilateralism，” June 25， 2019， https：//ecfr.eu/ publication/rescuing_multilateralism/.

22 Mark Leonard， Jean Pisani-Ferry， Elina Ribakowa， Jeremy Shapiro and Guntram B. Wolff， “Redefining Europes Economic Sovereignty，” June 25， 2019， https：//bruegel.org/2019/06/redefining-europes-economicsovereignty/.

23 Josep Borrell， “The Coronavirus Pandemic and the New World It Is Creating，” March 23， 2020， https：// www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-hrvp-josep-borrell-coronavirus-pandemic-and-new-world-it-creating_en.

24 Mark Leonard and Jeremy Shapiro， “Strategic Sovereignty： How Europe Can Regain the Capacity to Act，” June 25， 2019， https：//www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/strategic_sovereignty_how_europe_can_ regain_the_capacity_to_act.

25 Ibid.

26 European Council， “Informal Meeting of the Heads of State or Government Versailles Declaration，”March 10-11， 2022， https：//www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54773/20220311-versailles-declaration-en.pdf.

27 EEAS， “Europe in the Interregnum： Our Geopolitical Awakening after Ukraine，” March 24， 2022， https：//www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/europe-interregnum-our-geopolitical-awakening-after-ukraine_en.

28 “Reflection Paper on Harnessing Globalization，” May 10， 2017， https：//ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/ files/reflection-paper-globalisation_en.pdf.

29 Jakob Hanke Vela， “Coronavirus wont Kill Globalization， but will Clip Its Wings，” Politico， April 7， 2020， https：//www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus-wont-kill-globalization-but-will-clip-its-wings/.

30 John Seaman et al.， eds.， “Dependence in Europes Relations with China： Weighing Perceptions and Reality，” April 25， 2022， p.8， https：//www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/etnc_2022_report.pdf.

31 EPSC， “Geopolitical Outlook for Europe： Confrontation vs Cooperation，” June 8， 2018， https：// ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/files/epsc_brief_geopolitical.pdf.

32 EEAS， “The European Unions Global Strategy Three Years On， Looking Forward，” June 14， 2019， https：//www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_global_strategy_2019.pdf.

33 Pierre Vimont， “Between China and the USA， Europe Seeks Its Future，” May 13， 2019， https：//www. robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0515-between-china-and-the-usa-europe-seeks-its-future.

34 European Council， “Informal Meeting of the Heads of State or Government，” Versailles， March 11， 2022， https：//www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54773/20220311-versailles-declaration-en.pdf.

35 Eszter Zalan， “Von der Leyen Offers Funding for Resettling Afghans，” Euobserver， August 23， 2021， https：//euobserver.com/world/152700.

36 European Commission， “State of the Union 2021，” September 10， 2021， https：//ec.europa.eu/ commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_21_4701.

37 Rachel Tausendfreund， “Zeitenwende—The Dawn of the Deterrence Era in Germany，” February 28， 2022， https：//www.gmfus.org/news/zeitenwende-dawn-deterrence-era-germany.

38 European Commission， “EU-China： A Strategic Outlook，” March 12， 2019， p.11， https：//ec.europa.eu/ info/sites/default/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf.

39 Louise Guillot， “Europe Has Been ‘na？ve about China， Says Josep Borrell，” Politico， May 3， 2020， https：//www.politico.eu/article/europe-has-been-naive-about-china-josep-borrell/.

40 European Commission， “Tackling COVID-19 Disinformation — Getting the Facts Right，” Brussels， June 10， 2020， https：//ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication-tackling-covid-19-disinformationgetting-facts-right_en.pdf.

41 Louise Guillot， “EU Leaders Face Tough Time Getting Tough on China，” June 22， 2020， https：//www. politico.eu/article/eu-leaders-charles-michel-ursula-von-der-leyen-face-tough-time-getting-tough-on-chinaxi-jinping/.

42 EEAS， “EU-China Strategic Dialogue： Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell at the Press Conference，” October 6， 2020， https：//www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-china-strategic-dialogueremarks-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-press_en.

43 Stuart Lau， “EU Slams Chinas ‘Authoritarian Shift and Broken Economic Promises，” Politico， April 25， 2021， https：//www.politico.eu/article/eu-china-biden-economy-climate-europe/.

44 Stuart Lau， “EU， China Set April 1 Summit amid Tension on Trade， Geopolitics，” Politico， February 11， 2022， https：//www.politico.eu/article/eu-china-set-april-1-summit-amid-tension-on-trade-geopolitics/.

45 Stuart Lau， “Putin Puts China in a Bind，” Politico， February 24， 2022， https：//www.politico.eu/article/ russia-vladimir-putin-puts-china-xi-jinping-in-a-bind-ukraine/.

46 EEAS， “EU-China Summit： Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell at the EP Plenary，” April 6， 2022， https：//www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-china-summit-speech-high-representativevicepresident-josep-borrell-ep-plenary_en.

47 “French Minister Le Maire： Cornonavirus Shows We Must Reduce Our Dependence on China，”February 21， 2020， https：//news.yahoo.com/french-minister-le-maire-cornonavirus-111356253.html.

48 John Seaman et al.， eds.， “Dependence in Europes Relations with China： Weighing Perceptions and Reality，” April 25， 2022， p.8， https：//www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/etnc_2022_report.pdf.

49 Barbara Pongratz， Bernhard Bartsch and Vincent Brussee， “Germany： Politics Trying to Break Free from the Narrative of Economic Dependence，” in John Seaman et al.， eds.， “Dependence in Europes Relations with China： Weighing Perceptions and Reality，” April 25， 2022， p.96， https：//www.ifri.org/sites/ default/files/atoms/files/etnc_2022_report.pdf.

50 Noha Bakin， “Watching China in Europe，” March 1， 2022， https：//www.gmfus.org/news/watchingchina-europe-march-2022.

51 Stuat Lau， “As China maintains ties with Russia， Europe turns to Japan and India，” Politico， May 1， 2022， https：//www.politico.eu/article/europe-japan-india-trade-russia-china-ukraine-war/.

52 Noha Bakin， “Watching China in Europe-June 2022，” June 1， 2022， https：//www.gmfus.org/news/ watching-china-europe-june-2022.

53 Yuan Xue， “Market Access： Top Interest of European Union on China，” 21st Century Business Herald， December 21， 2010， http：//epaper.21cbh.com/html/2010-12/21/content_137167.htm.

54 Zhou Hong， “Misunderstanding in China-EU Relations，” China International Studies， Issue 5， 2021， p.40.