The AUKUS Trilateral Security Partnership:Features, Implications and Prospects

In September 2021, the leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced the establishment of an enhanced trilateral security partnership called AUKUS.1“Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS,” The White House, September 15, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/.Over the past few months, the three countries have made some progress in Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine program and advanced collaboration in capacity building. Up to now, academic discussions on AUKUS within China mainly focus on the nuclear-powered submarine program, with different views on the nature,priorities and driving forces of the partnership. Therefore, it is necessary to comprehensively examine its characteristics and explore its impact on the US alliance and partnership system, the Asia-Pacific regional order and the broder international norms, so as to better grasp its prospects as well as the trends of regional and global security.

Features of the Trilateral Security Partnership

Since its establishment, AUKUS has shown unique features in its nature,driving forces and priorities.

Different from traditional military alliances despite some common characteristics

AUKUS is officially described by leaders of the three countries as a partnership. However, quite a few scholars and media reports refer to it as an alliance, and believe that it’s essentially a military alliance. Part of the reason for the controversy is that the definition of “alliance” is not unified.Some hold a strict definition of alliance, believing that an alliance must include a commitment to fight a common enemy with other countries and an agreement to provide military aid to each other. Others take a broad view of what an alliance is. Stephen Walt sees it as a formal or informal security cooperation arrangement between two or more sovereign states,and he specifically emphasizes that an alliance does not require signing a formal treaty. The two schools have something in common: first, the main component of an alliance is a limited number of sovereign states; second, the core element of an alliance is cooperation and commitment in security and military fields, with member states generally assuming the obligation to use or consider the use of force; third, an alliance usually targets one or certain specific countries.

From this point of view, AUKUS has two sides in its nature. On the one hand, it has the nature of an alliance, which is mainly reflected in the following aspects. First, it is composed of three sovereign states—the US, the UK and Australia. Second, the core content is highly sensitive military security cooperation and commitment, including nuclear-powered submarines and advanced capabilities. Although it does not declare that member states have the obligation to use force, it clearly enhances Australia’s ability to undertake the obligation to use force, and it has the tendency to deepen cooperation and deliver tangible results. Third, it is self-evident that China is the target. On the other hand, it is obviously different from traditional military alliances. The most important difference is that there is not yet public obligation to the use of force that is stipulated in the form of treaties, and it does not belong to the system of “treaty alliances” in American diplomatic discourse. The Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS)Security Treaty is a representative of “treaty alliance” in the Asia-Pacific region, which stipulates in a Article 4, “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.”2“Appendix B-The ANZUS Treaty,” https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inquiries/jfadt/usrelations/appendixb.AUKUS, by contrast, differs from traditional military alliances over its ambiguous obligation to the use of force.

In a word, AUKUS is in nature a military group aimed at promoting in-depth security cooperation among member states with a clear direction. It has certain characteristics of an alliance, but it is not a military alliance in the traditional sense. The duality and ambiguity are a prominent feature of the partnership.

Driven by member countries’ respective military strategies

For the US, the implementation of the Indo-Pacific strategy requires a military bloc in a multilateral form. However, whether the QUAD mechanism joined by the US, Japan, India and Australia, which focuses on politics and diplomacy, or the “Five Eyes,” which focuses on intelligence cooperation, is difficult to carry out in-depth military and security cooperation. From the institutionalized practices of the Indo-Pacific strategy in recent years, the QUAD is still generally a political and diplomatic forum so far. Even if it was upgraded to the summit level in 2021, it still has the defect of making more political statements while solving fewer substantive issues. Attempts to include New Zealand, South Korea, Vietnam and other countries in the “QUAD+” have not been fully echoed by relevant countries.Though members of the “Five Eyes” alliance, which dates back to the Cold War era, have a common Anglo-Saxon pedigree, cooperation among them is mainly confined to intelligence. Since the COVID-19 outbreak, the“Five Eyes” has tried to expand their cooperation to diplomatic, economic and other fields, but New Zealand has always had reservations about the expansion. In May 2021, New Zealand’s Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta explicitly rejected the “outsourcing” of diplomatic rights to the “Five Eyes”and opposed building it into an anti-China alliance. The opinion was then endorsed by New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern. In addition,the G7, NATO and other institutions are not appropriate for advancing cooperation in these areas. Under such circumstances, the establishment of a mechanism capable of conducting cooperation in military security and related sensitive areas has become a priority for the Biden administration to implement the Indo-Pacific strategy.

At the military level, the US intends to provide an institutional leverage for the implementation of its “integrated deterrence” strategy. “Integrated deterrence” is a comprehensive deterrence that combines military deterrence with high technology, industrial foundation and other advanced capabilities. It includes the integration of the US and its allies, of multiple domains, of the best weapon systems and the most advanced technologies, and of different military services and their capabilities through new operational concepts.3Lloyd J. Austin III, “Secretary of Defense Remarks for the US INDOPACOM Change of Command Ceremony,” US Department of Defense, April 30, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/2592093/secretary-of-defense-remarksfor-the-us-indopacom-change-of-command/.However, the existing military arrangements, such as the rotating stationing and training of US troops in Port Darwin, Australia, cannot achieve the goal of “integrated deterrence” in terms of scale and depth. Therefore, a new mechanism is required for carrying out the strategy. First, in the cooperation mode of AUKUS, the US provides technology, the UK joins it, while Australia bears the main burdens including hard ones such as military and personnel spending and soft ones such as possible default. This is in line with the principle of the US “integrated deterrence” strategy that requires its allies to undertake more obligations. Second, AUKUS can improve the interoperability among the three countries in terms of strategic perceptions, weapon systems,personnel, military terms, information systems, military meetings and exchanges, joint military drills, real-world situational exercises, etc., which is the focus of the “integrated deterrence” strategy. Finally, Australia’s geographical location and the range of its power projection can especially enhance the forward deployment of the US in the Southwest Pacific region, which is a key area of the “integrated deterrence” strategy. The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States released in February 2022 clearly regards AUKUS as a means to strengthen deterrence, and especially to implement the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI).4“Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” The White House, February 11, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.

For the UK, the “tilt” towards the Indo-Pacific region is part of its effort to implement the Global Britain strategy, which not only expands the UK’s diplomatic space in the post-Brexit era, but also serves the goals set out in its documents “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy” and “Defense in a Competitive Age.” It is the important reason for the UK’s participation in AUKUS. Specifically, the “Global Britain” strategy puts forward the goal of expanding the British navy’s presence in the Indo-Pacific region, but the lack of its military strength and insufficient support from allies have constituted constraints. AUKUS helps bridge the gap between strategic objectives and practical capabilities. Moreover, the UK hopes to use the trilateral cooperation to enhance its advanced scientific and technological capabilities and achieve the goal of becoming a scientific and technological superpower. And the creation of jobs related to nuclear-powered submarines and advanced capabilities is the realistic driving force.

Australia was the first country to propose a nuclear-powered submarine program, which has since evolved into a more comprehensive trilateral security partnership.5Harry Lye, “DSEI 2021: Australia Opened Nuclear Submarine Discussions in March,” Shepard News,September 17, 2021, https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/naval-warfare/dsei-2021-australia-openednuclear-submarine-discu/.Australia’s direct impetus comes from its strategic goal of “shape, deter, respond,” which was put forward in the 2020 Defence Strategy Update. Given that it is difficult to achieve the objective on its own, Australia seeks in-depth cooperation with the US and the UK. A more fundamental driving force for Australia to join AUKUS is the growing“China threat” domestically and the sense of responsibility to follow the US in implementing the Indo-Pacific strategy. Upgrading the specific nuclearpowered submarine program into a more comprehensive trilateral security partnership is not only consistent with Australia’s established defense strategy, but also enables Australia to access more financial, equipment and technological support.

In addition, enhancing the ability to implement its “Pacific Stepup” strategy in its “immediate region” is also a motivation for Australia to promote in-depth security cooperation with the US and the UK. The“Pacific Step-up” strategy aims to consolidate Australia’s influence in its “immediate region” and guard against the so-called “China threat.”6Liu Qing, “Australia’s Strengthened South Pacific Diplomacy: Measures, Motives and Constraints,”International Studies, No.4, 2019, pp.64-81.Compared with the “arc of instability” in Australia’s traditional strategic concept, the “immediate region” covers a wider geographical area, including not only the Southwest Pacific, but also Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region, which places higher demands on military forces. AUKUS is expected to enhance Australia’s offensive capabilities and support its “Pacific Step-up”strategy in the “immediate region.”

Prioritizing military cooperation projects

While some observers initially suggested that AUKUS is more symbolic than substantive, developments over the past months have shown that AUKUS has a certain degree of “solid” characteristics, with a particular emphasis on military cooperation projects.

The first important project is the US and UK support for Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. In November 2021, the three countries signed the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement, making the first substantive agreement since the establishment of the partnership, which allows the US and the UK to exchange sensitive and classified information on naval nuclear propulsion with Australia. The agreement also provides a mechanism for Australian personnel to access training and education from the UK and the US, necessary for learning how to safely and effectively operate, maintain and even build nuclear-powered submarines.7“Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of Australia, and the Government of the United States of America for the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information,” U.K. Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, MS No.8/2021,November 22, 2021.In December of the same year, the inaugural meeting of the AUKUS Trilateral Joint Steering Group was held. During the meeting on advanced capabilities, the three countries committed to significantly deepen cooperation and enhance interoperability, and focus on cyber capabilities,artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and additional undersea capabilities. In the meeting on Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine program,they agreed on the next steps over the 18-month consultation period to define the optimal pathway for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines.8“Readout of AUKUS Joint Steering Group Meetings,” The White House, December 17, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/17/readout-of-aukus-joint-steering-groupmeetings/.

In the one and a half years after the establishment of the Trilateral Joint Steering Groups, the progress of AUKUS will be centered around two related lines of effort. In terms of nuclear-powered submarines, the three countries will hold consultations on how to implement the delivery of Australian nuclear-powered submarines, which will cover a series of specific issues such as industrial basis, labor, construction, maintenance, safety, design,operation, waste disposal, supervision, personnel training, environmental protection and infrastructure. In terms of advanced capabilities, capacitybuilding cooperation and interoperability in key areas such as cyberspace,artificial intelligence, quantum computing and underwater capabilities will be a substantive issue for some time to come, and the UK and Australia are looking to receive technical and financial support from the US in these areas.

In addition, the US, the UK and Australia have jointly or separately disclosed the following cooperation plans, including: the US and Australia will actively support the UK to increase jobs related to the nuclear-powered submarines program and the defense industry; the US and the UK will support Australia’s role in maintaining stability in the Indo-Pacific region, enhance its coordination with NATO, and strengthen its local defense industry. The UK will invite Australia to participate in its naval construction projects and military exercises. AUKUS will also strengthen in-depth cooperation between the three parties in industries, supply chains, high-tech and emerging areas.9“Secretary Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne, and Australian Defence Minister Peter Dutton at a Joint Press Availability,” US Department of State,September 16, 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-austinaustralian-foreign-minister-marise-payne-and-australian-defence-minister-peter-dutton-at-a-joint-pressavailability/; Melissa Price, “Australia’s Defense Industry Minister: The Importance of AUKUS and a Strong Economy,” Defense News, December 6, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2021/12/06/australias-defense-industry-minister-the-importance-of-aukus-and-a-strong-economy/.

After the escalation of the Ukraine crisis, the substantive military cooperation programs of AUKUS did not stop but accelerated. In March 2022, Australia announced more specifics of a plan to acquire nuclearpowered submarines.10“Australia to Fast-Track Nuclear Submarine Plans,” GCaptain, March 6, 2022, https://gcaptain.com/australia-nuclear-submarine-plans/.In April, leaders of the three countries announced plans to commence new trilateral cooperation under AUKUS on hypersonics and counter-hypersonics, strengthen electronic warfare capabilities, expand information sharing, and deepen cooperation on defense innovation.11“AUKUS Leaders’ Level Statement,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/aukus-leaders-level-statement/.The hypersonics and counter-hypersonics program marks the beginning of military cooperation under AUKUS in a new field with more cutting-edge technology and targeted features.

Implications of the Trilateral Security Partnership

As the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia are three Western countries with special historical and cultural ties residing on different continents, the security partnership they build will have broad and complicated implications.

Solidifying US-UK and US-Australia alliances

The AUKUS partnership is set to boost the role of the UK in the US Indo-Pacific alliance system. Despite its constrained national power after Brexit, the UK still has considerable strategic assets in the Asia-Pacific,including military bases, commercial networks, knowledge and talent reserves, and the important institution of the Commonwealth of Nations.To the US, the UK’s participation not only strengthens its capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, but also closely aligns the US strategic pursuit in the whole Indo-Pacific region with that of Europe, especially the UK.12“Background Press Call on AUKUS,” The White House, September 15, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/09/15/background-press-call-on-AUKUS/.This will transform the UK’s role from a mere long-time US transatlantic ally to an Indo-Pacific ally. The UK could make use of its various strategic assets in the Asia-Pacific region to serve the US Indo-Pacific strategy. Aside from activating the existing strategic assets, the UK would work to develop its technological capabilities in the cyberspace to acquire a strategic edge,become a “responsible, democratic cyber power” and a “science and tech superpower,” and promote a “free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace.”13“Great the UK in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,” British Government, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2021, pp.56-58.

AUKUS is set to consolidate Australia’s role in the US Indo-Pacific alliance system. First of all, it would solidify Australia’s military reliance on the US. Improvement in interoperability would deepen the Australian military’s dependence on US strategic outlook, weapons and weapon system,and military thinking, and it would strengthen Australia’s role as a “hub” in the US military system. Secondly, it would make Australia’s foreign policy more rigid. While Australia’s China policy has been more confrontational in recent years, some analysts believe there is room for improvement.14Gong Gaojie and He Jian, “Australia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy from the Perspective of Image Analysis and China’s Countermeasures,” Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review, No.1, 2021, pp.76-93.But the establishment and development of AUKUS would bind Australia’s foreign policy, narrow the space for Australia to maintain strategic autonomy between China and the US, and solidify Australia’s role as a special partner of the US. Lastly, it would strengthen Australia’s internal interest groups that lean toward ”new Cold War” thinking. AUKUS would step up cooperation among the three countries on national defense science and technology,research, education and industrial basis, providing opportunities for Australia to develop its defense industry.15Melissa Price, “Australia’s Defense Industry Minister: The Importance of AUKUS and a Strong Economy,” Defense News, December 6, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2021/12/06/australiasdefense-industry-minister-the-importance-of-AUKUS-and-a-strong-economy/.Some Australians, especially militaryindustrial interest groups, aspire to turn Australia into an “arsenal,” focusing on key industries valued by the leaders of the three countries. For example,Australia’s quantum computing industry has received greater attention from federal finance and capital. Some think tanks closely related to militaryindustrial interest groups, such as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute(ASPI), take this opportunity to advocate that Australia should make bigger investment in the local quantum computing industry.16Gavin Brennen and Peter Rohde, “Australia Should Invest in a Home-grown Quantum Industry,”Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 1, 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-shouldinvest-in-a-home-grown-quantum-industry/.

Encouraging some US allies and partners to get involved in regional security

AUKUS sent a clear political signal that the three countries intend to advance the Indo-Pacific strategy and collective containment against China through military and other means, which has received positive response from some allies and partners. Japan immediately expressed its support for AUKUS, with then Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi saying that the launch of the partnership would strengthen engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.17“Press Conference by Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,September 21, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken25e_000038.html.India expressed its welcome to AUKUS and regarded it as a further step to deter the “China challenge.”18C. Raja Mohan, “India Welcomes AUKUS Pact as China Deterrent,” Foreign Policy, September 16,2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/16/AUKUS-india-australia-uk-us-submarines/.Canada is actively seeking opportunities to cooperate with AUKUS.19Leyland Cecco, “Trudeau Lambasted over Exclusion from US-led Military Alliance as Election Nears,”The Guardian, September 17, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/17/justin-trudeaucriticism-AUKUS-canada-federal-election.New Zealand firmly upholds its nuclear-free policy and declared that it would not allow Australian nuclearpowered submarines to enter New Zealand’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, but it also “generally welcomes” the increased engagement of the US and the UK in the Pacific affairs and would like to cooperate with AUKUS on advanced capabilities.20Jamie Ensor, “AUKUS: Jacinda Ardern Welcomes United Kingdom, US Engagement in Pacific, Says NZ Nuclear Stance ‘Unchanged’,” News Hub, September 16, 2021, https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2021/09/AUKUS-jacinda-ardern-welcomes-united-kingdom-united-states-engagement-in-pacificsays-nz-nuclear-stance-unchanged.html.Some European countries and politicians in favor of deeper transatlantic ties also welcomed or made positive comments on this partnership. All these have added confidence for US allies and partners to deeply engage in Asia-Pacific security affairs.

Destabilizing the Asia-Pacific order

AUKUS has intensified the pressure on coutries in the Asia-Pacific region, especially Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands region, to choose sides between China and the US, and aggravated the divergence within the region, which has somewhat weakened their strategic autonomy and regional cooperation in the context of strategic competition.

After decades of development after World War II, Southeast Asia has maintained a relatively peaceful and stable regional order focusing on cooperation and development, and has formed an overall pattern of benign competition and interaction with extra-regional powers, with ASEAN as the institutional center, the “ASEAN Way” as the normative framework, and ASEAN centrality as the priority.21Wei Ling, “Upgrading the China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership: ASEAN’s Concerns, China’s Responsibility and the Evolution of Regional Order,” International Studies, No.6, 2021, p.34.

The “new Cold War” undertone of AUKUS is inconsistent in terms of objectives and means with the ASEAN-centered Southeast Asian regional order, especially in three aspects. First, some ASEAN countries are concerned about triggering a regional arms race. Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri repeatedly cautioned that AUKUS could “potentially spark a nuclear arms race in the Indo-Pacific region.”22“Malaysia Expresses Concern over AUKUS Deal,” Malay Mail, September 18, 2021, https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2021/09/18/malaysia-expresses-concern-over-AUKUS-deal/2006578.Second, it would be more difficult for ASEAN countries to hedge between extra-regional powers, especially between China and the US, increasing their pressure to choose sides.Third, the ASEAN centrality has been weakened, which intensifies the divergence within ASEAN and impaires its ability to respond to geopolitical impacts from extra-regional powers. After the establishment of AUKUS,ASEAN is clearly divided into a concerned group represented by Malaysia and Indonesia, a greeting group represented by Singapore and a cautiously neutral group represented by Thailand, while in the Philippines, the president and senior officials have differing stances. This makes it difficult for ASEAN to speak with one voice on AUKUS.23Heru Prayitno, “AUKUS and the Role of ASEAN Centrality in Managing Regional Security Affairs,”Technium Social Sciences Journal, Vol.26, 2021, pp.678-688.

Although Pacific island countries (PICs) are small in size and population, their role in the international community has become increasingly prominent in recent years, frequently speaking with a “Pacific voice,” enhancing their autonomy in regional affairs, and strengthening their regional identity under the “Blue Pacific” narrative.24Chen Xiaochen, “‘Blue Pacific’ with Multiple Connotations: Pacific Island Countries’ Response to the New Geopolitical Environment,” Contemporary World and Socialism, No.5, 2021, pp.149-158.There are contradictions between AUKUS and the evolutionary direction of the Pacific regional order. First of all, as traditional metropolitans of the Pacific,the US, the UK and Australia have made arrangements for security issues,especially nuclear issues, that impinged on the vital interests of PICs without consulting with them, threatening the “Pacific Way” that emphasizes joint consultation and challenging their growing autonomy. Second, AUKUS intensifies the existing divergence among PICs, weakens their overall strength, and thus dampens the “Pacific voice.” Lastly, AUKUS might heighten the geopolitical competition among extra-regional powers to such an extent that PICs could not bear. Some extra-regional powers might even directly use territories and waters under the jurisdiction of PICs for military deployment guided by the “integrated deterrence” strategy, threatening the regional order which features long-term peace and stays away from majorpower disputes. Henry Puna, Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum(PIF), the Pacific’s most important regional organization, said that AUKUS would increase the possibility of strategic miscalculation in the region.25“Pacific Islands Forum Slams AUKUS Pact, Demands to Keep Region Nuke-Free,” Pacific Island Times, September 28, 2021, https://www.pacificislandtimes.com/post/pacific-islands-forum-slams-AUKUS-pact-demands-to-keep-region-nuke-free.

Impacting existing international institutions and norms

Although the US, the UK and Australia reiterated that they would honor their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, and Australia stressed that it would continue to fulfill responsibilities and obligations as a non-nuclear state,the Australian nuclear-powered submarine project has caused multiple impacts on the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. It takes advantage of the loopholes in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)which is ambiguous about whether naval power fuel should be subject to the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and erodes the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation system. In particular,considering that Australia is rich in uranium resources, there is risk of using nuclear materials and technologies for the development of nuclear weapons.Moreover, if Australia gains the technology to purify highly enriched uranium,it would directly threaten the integrity of the NPT. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi described this as a “very tricky technical problem.”26Francois Murphy, “AUKUS Submarine Deal ‘Very Tricky’ for Nuclear Inspectors - IAEA Chief,”Reuters, September 28, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/AUKUS-submarine-deal-very-tricky-nuclearinspectors-iaea-chief-2021-09-28/.

The more far-reaching implication is the demonstrative effect brought about by the nuclear-powered submarine project. Acquiring nuclear-powered submarines has become a feasible path for non-nuclear countries to access and even master nuclear technology, which might lure other countries to follow suit, prompting countries like Israel, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, Brazil and Canada to develop nuclear-powered submarines in this way, thus creating a fuzzy zone for nuclear proliferation and possibly inducing a broken window effect on the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.27Luo Xi, “AUKUS Pact Might Trigger Collapse of the International Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime,”World Affairs, No.22, 2021, pp.17-19.

AUKUS directly threatens the integrity of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty signed in 1985 constitutes an important part of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, to which Australia is a signatory. The Treaty defines three principles, including refusing to participate in nuclear proliferation, stopping nuclear arms race and preventing radioactive pollution in the entire South Pacific region. The AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine project clearly challenges these principles.PICs and their people have been victims of Western nuclear tests and are particularly concerned about nuclear proliferation. PIF Secretary-General Henry Puna said that Australia has deviated from its commitment to the spirit of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.28“Pacific Islands Forum Slams AUKUS Pact, Demands to Keep Region Nuke-Free.”

On a larger scale, the geopolitical small cliques represented by AUKUS has a negative impact on the theme of peace and development of our times.The security outlook of “small cliques” is based on a common crisis. Without conflict or confrontation, the “small cliques” would only shrink. Under such a security outlook, the “small cliques,” on the one hand, would exacerbate the deterioration of the security situation, giving rise to more crises, and on the other hand, would strengthen its own existence through these crises. Therefore,the more the solidified these “small cliques,” the more damage would be done to the global security architecture.29Li Jiabao, “What Purpose is the US-UK-Australia Military ‘Iron Triangle,’” People’s Daily (overseas edition), September 25, 2021, p.6.Driven by ideology, AUKUS creates the illusion that countries with the same or similar political systems and governance models are “like-minded partners,” which would provoke ideological antagonism and attempt to forge value-based military containment against China, dampening the theme of the times of peace and development.

Prospects

The AUKUS partnership may develop into the core of the institutional network on which the US Indo-Pacific strategy relies. Building a reliable valuebased alliance is the premise for the US to deepen military security cooperation under the Indo-Pacific strategy. India, despite a member of the QUAD mechanism, is seen as an “unreliable partner” in the eyes of the US. India’s foreign policy since the escalation of the Ukraine crisis has drawn criticism from the US, Japan, Australia and some other Western countries. New Zealand is regarded by the US as the weak link in the “Five Eyes” alliance due to its pursuit of economic and trade cooperation with China. In contrast, the UK and Australia have been steadfast in following the US Indo-Pacific strategy since President Biden took office, which makes AUKUS a reliable mechanism for the US to implement its Indo-Pacific strategy.

AUKUS is established with the goal to build “secure” industrial, supply and technological chains, and serves as a key mechanism for the US to expand its Indo-Pacific strategy to these areas. According to the official information available, the AUKUS advanced capabilities building demonstrates an obvious tendency toward “over-securitization” of economic, scientific and technological issues. In other words, advanced capabilities building is not simply an economic or technological issue, but an attempt to use military security as a pretext to build a “secure” and “value-based” industrial chain that serves the national defense economy. Its ultimate goal is to suppress China’s development space in relevant fields and supplanted China’s leading position in some of them. As a value-based alliance, AUKUS has provided “teeth” for the Indo-Pacific strategy, and its “mini-lateral” form is also in line with the priority of the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. In the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, AUKUS is regarded as a way to foster security ties with its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.30“Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” The White House, February 2022.Under this framework, AUKUS also has the possibility of membership expansion, and Japan and Canada have expressed positive attitudes toward cooperation with the mechanism. However, due to various constraints, the more likely direction is for the three core members, the US, the UK and Australia, to carry out cooperation with other countries in specific issue areas.

Although AUKUS has made some progress since its formation, its development also faces multiple constraints.

First, it faces tensions brought about by “mini-lateralism.” AUKUS aims at consolidating the US alliance system, but it also sends a clear signal: not all QUAD and “Five Eyes” members gain the full trust of the US. This would lead to a hierarchy of “core allies,” “secondary allies” and “marginal allies” in the US alliance system, which would directly result in a rift in the loyalty and mutual trust among allies and offset different mechanisms of the Indo-Pacific strategy to a certain extent. In particular, the India-France-Australia trilateral mechanism pushed hard by France in recent years was dealt a direct blow by AUKUS.

Originally designed to improve internal efficiency, the “mini-lateralist”mechanism would have limited influence due to its fewer members, and has to face trade-offs in the future. If it deepens cooperation in sensitive areas, the high bar set for access would enlarge the gap between “core allies”and “marginal allies.” If it seeks expansion, it would then face constraints in cooperation in sensitive areas. Thus, the US would have to create similar partnership mechanisms, which might once again cause tensions with AUKUS.

Second, it faces tensions with the regional autonomy of Southeast Asia and the Pacific. AUKUS exacerbated the divergences among Southeast Asian and Pacific island countries. However, instead of reacting passively,these regions took the initiative to strengthen intra-regional coordination to overcome internal divergence, enhance strategic autonomy and regional awareness, and some also strengthened coordination and cooperation with China.

Although the Southeast Asian countries have different reactions to AUKUS, they all advocate maintaining ASEAN centrality amid geopolitical changes and are reluctant to choose sides between China and the US.Most Southeast Asian countries did not express positive attitudes towards AUKUS, nor are they willing to conduct security cooperation under the mechanism. Under increasing external pressure, ASEAN is likely to accelerate the implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and allow more extra-regional actors to play a role in the region, as a hedge against the pressure of choosing sides. As ASEAN countries expressed concerns about Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, China has strengthened consultation and coordination with Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and other countries, and deepened communication and cooperation with ASEAN on relevant international and regional affairs, creating more opportunities for China and ASEAN to improve their strategic coordination.31Du Lan, “Progress and Challenges of China-ASESAN Relations in the Context of Covid-19 Pandemic,”International Studies, No.6, 2021, p.56.

For PICs, under external geopolitical pressure and internal divisions,they have strengthened their advocacy for the “Blue Pacific,” and made it clear that the militarized AUKUS, especially the Australian nuclear-powered submarine project, is incompatible with the regional nuclear-free vision.Shortly after the establishment of AUKUS, Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare of Solomon Islands and President Taneti Maamau of Kiribati expressed their adherence to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone and their criticism of AUKUS at the United Nations General Assembly.32Pita Ligaiula, “Solomon Islands PM Warns about Nuclear Pollution in Pacific by AUKUS,” Pacific News Service, September 30, 2021, https://pina.com.fj/2021/09/30/solomon-islands-pm-warns-aboutnuclear-pollution-in-pacific-by-AUKUS/.In addition,Australia’s secret diplomacy in the whole process has cast a shadow on its credibility in participating in the affairs of its immediate neighborhood,and prompted some PICs to seek independent and pluralistic diplomacy,demonstrating a tendency to get rid of Australia’s control in the region.33Greg Fry, “AUKUS Undermines Australia’s ‘Pacific Family,’” Devpolicy Blog, November 4, 2021,https://devpolicy.org/AUKUS-undermines-australias-pacific-family-20211104/.

Of course, the US, the UK and Australia would also take measures,including stepping up divide-and-rule, to maintain their relations with Southeast Asian countries and PICs. This makes the tension between the autonomy of these regions and external involvement a long-lasting problem.

Third, it faces tensions with the global development consensus. Instead of focusing on the development needs of the world, especially those of developing countries, AUKUS puts geopolitical self-interests above the global common interests, and carved out a closed geopolitical “small clique” along the fault line based on ideology and Anglo-Saxon kinship. Its obviously exclusive and confrontational nature is not conducive to regional and global peace and prosperity, but creates tensions with the global consensus on development. At present, amid the raging COVID-19 pandemic, it is the common appeal of people all over the world to fight the pandemic,revive the economy, strengthen unity and improve global governance. The people have more ardent expectations for peaceful development. So far, the Global Development Initiative proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping has gained acclaim and support from over 100 countries and international organizations, fully demonstrating that global development is mainstream consensus and the geopolitical “small cliques” would not win support from the people around the world, which is especially true for people from developing countries. In the long run, such a policy of trumping geopolitical considerations over developmental cooperation is contravening the interests and well-being of the people in the countries concerned.

Conclusion

AUKUS is a new mechanism that is still evolving. Its implications for international relations, regional order and international security remain to be seen. However, it is clear that AUKUS is turning back the wheel of history and runs counter to the trend of peace, development and cooperation. As a defender of international order, a contributor to global development, and a builder of world peace, China should continue to actively support the efforts of countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands to maintain regional peace and oppose bullying, uphold the ASEAN centrality, sustain the “Blue Pacific” vision of Pacific island countries, continue to strengthen its efforts against nuclear proliferation and “new Cold War” activities under the UN framework, promote the implementation of the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative, reduce the negative impact of geopolitical “small cliques” represented by AUKUS, so as to maintain the theme of peace and development in our times.