Global Governance of Food Security and China’s Role

The resilience of global food security is at stake because of the changing climate, and the still raging coronavirus pandemic in recent years has only made the situation more alarming. At the Climate Ambition Summit in December 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping pointed out that“in meeting the climate challenge, no one can be aloof and unilateralism will get us nowhere.”1Xi Jinping, “Building on Past Achievements and Launching a New Journey for Global Climate Actions,”Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, December 12, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/202012/t20201213_678958.html.As food governance becomes an important aspect of global governance, and a pattern of cooperation and competition among different actors in global food governance gradually takes shape, China’s practice of building an ecological civilization has become an important guarantee for promoting sustainable food supply globally and building a beautiful world. While actively playing a leading role in the reform of the global food governance system and solemnly proposing the Global Development Initiative, China has been helping developing and neighboring countries address issues on agricultural development and food security with its funds, technologies and experience, under the Green Silk Road initiative and the framework of South-South cooperation.

As the largest developing state and a responsible major country, China can play an important part in solving the current challenges of global food supply with its solutions and contributions to international cooperation. Looking to the future, China can contribute to global food security by coordinating the competition in food governance among major powers and promoting global ecological conservation, which will also serve its vision of building a community with a shared future for mankind.

As a matter of national importance, food security has always been taken seriously by all stakeholders. Due to the uneven geographic distribution of food and agricultural resources, competition for food resources has gradually become more prominent with increasing urbanization and growing middle class, leading to periodic outbreaks of food crises.2Michael T. Klare, The Race for What’s Left: The Global Scramble for the World’s Last Resources, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2012, pp.13-19.Since 2020, the issue of food security has once again drawn attention as the impact of locust plagues, climate change, and the COVID-19 pandemic caused a chain-reaction crisis in food availability.3Irina Vilcu et al., “Food Supply Fears Are Growing as Romania Bans Grain Exports,” Bloomberg,April 10, 2020, https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/food-supply-fears-are-growing-as-romania-bans-grainexports-1.1420121.According to the 2020 report of the State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World, almost 690 million people, or 8.9 percent of the global population, were undernourished, with West Asian nations, such as Yemen, and parts of Africa at serious risk of food insecurity.4FAO et al., The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2020, Rome: FAO, 2020.The issue of food security continues to be a hotspot in global governance and requires global solutions.

Challenges for Global Food Governance

As the global geopolitical landscape changes, food security has evolved from a development issue to a complex, controversial and politically loaded category that integrates economic, social and political aspects under the combined effects of resource endowment, ecological environment, population, trade, investment,and technology.5D. John Shaw, World Food Security: A History since 1945, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007,pp.383-386.In light of this, food security has become more transnational,diffuse, and multi-layered, which makes its governance even more complex.

First, there exists a serious deficit of comprehensive food security governance. The UN Sustainable Development Goal 2 “Zero Hunger” proposes that by 2030, “[to] end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round.” However, the UN has admitted that “the world is not on track to achieve Zero Hunger by 2030.” “If recent trends continue,” it stated, “the number of people affected by hunger would surpass 840 million by 2030.”6“The UN SDG Goal 2: Zero Hunger,” https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/hunger/#tab-6f500e1aa274b23d96d.The enhanced systemic effects of food security call for a shift from singledimensional to comprehensive security. In terms of the typology of food security dimensions, the classification by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)of the United Nations is currently a more comprehensive and internationally accepted standard. This approach divides food security into four dimensions:food availability, food accessibility, food utilization, and food stability, which mainly include traditional security elements such as total food supply, food trade,and population. In addition to this traditional division system, it also includes spillovers from some new security dimensions.

Second, multilateralism is all the more needed in the context of globalization. Despite the trend of “deglobalization,” the food economy of each country is still inseparable from the global food industrial chain. The different natural endowments and comparative advantages in food production and transportation between countries have led to global complementarity. Besides,the rise of developing countries partly depends on reshaping food governance through multilateralism. In fact, there is a certain degree of positive correlation between food security transformation and national development. With a larger market demand, developing countries, especially those with large populations such as India, may take advantage of the market structure to shape a new discourse on food security. Therefore, the demand for global governance of food security remains high for developing countries in transition. Transnational security governance has become an important paradigm with which to address non-traditional security problems and pursue unified governance under a multilateral system. It is the multilateral mechanism that makes it easier to achieve universal sharing of food security benefits, reach universally applicable food trade rules, and reduce the additional transaction costs due to countryspecific barriers.

Third, there is an institutional demand for building fair, just and inclusive rules. As the chain of global food trade is deepening, the demand from different subjects for the value chain of food security is also developing,with inclusiveness and fairness gradually incorporated into the understanding of global food security. For countries, food security based on a nation’s natural resource endowments means national power, but this heterogeneous structure of food security determines that food-abundant countries are always more powerful,which can result in sensitivity or vulnerability in different geographical regions.In contrast, a human rights perspective on food security underlines the idea that the food security governance system should focus more on the value of equity,which is primarily embodied in individual human rights. The first World Food Conference in 1974 adopted the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, as well as the International Undertaking on World Food Security, defining food security as “Every man, woman and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger and malnutrition in order to develop fully and maintain their physical and mental faculties.” The complex challenges of the food governance system in the context of the climate crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic have again highlighted the importance of individual health and nutrition issues and the urgency of building a more equitable and inclusive governance. The lack of international aid for poor countries will further jeopardize the food available to developing countries, leading to wider international gap in global food security.

Fourth, effective leadership is absent in the operation and development of food security governance mechanisms. As the early history of food trade shows, great powers have driven the emergence of food trade, albeit primarily dominated by the national interests of a few capitalist powers. It was first reflected in the food system with the United Kingdom at the core. The British-centered food system was based on a complementary and continually shifting division of labor between the domestic agricultural sector and the British colonies, with Britain outsourcing most of its grain production and encouraging colonies,including Canada and Australia, to convert their land to wheat and meat production on a large scale. The global food trade was then embodied in the food system centered on the United States. Under the US-centered regime, the flow path of surplus food changed, primarily from the US to post-colonial countries at the strategic frontiers of the Cold War, with the aim of addressing the post-war dilemma of domestic food over-production.7Zhang Hongzhou, Securing the “Rice Bowl”: China and Global Food Security, Palgrave Macmillan,2019, pp.265-295.Meanwhile, in order to cut off the Soviet Union’s access to the international food market, the Reagan administration implemented the so-called “Reverse Oil Shock,” forcing Saudi Arabia to double its oil production, which caused the plummeting of international oil prices and left the Soviet Union unable to obtain enough foreign exchange from its oil exports for food purchase. To maintain its basic survival needs, the Soviet Union had to turn to the West for food aid and loans, as a result of which its political reforms were required to meet the West’s additional conditions. In the post-Cold War era, despite becoming the country with the most international clout, the US did not incorporate food security governance into an international framework,but continued to use it to serve its own hegemony in food production and distribution. The biofuels program launched by the US has also had a negative impact on food security.

Currently, international leadership for food security is in a chaotic situation. The US has retreated from promoting liberalism and instead adopted unilateralist policies, and the EU is too busy dealing with various internal and external shocks such as Brexit, debt crisis and the pandemic, to attend to other business. On the other hand, as the majority of developing countries are still undergoing economic construction and national development, it is difficult for them to assume absolute leadership for the moment. In the absence of effective leadership, issues of food security governance are either shelved or stalled. As food security governance is still institutionally immature, countries need to ensure that relevant mechanisms function in an orderly manner through political negotiations and norms-setting. However, the logical premise for all this is an effective leadership that is able to coalesce different forces and push food security governance mechanisms forward.

Problems of Global Food Governance Mechanisms

The international nature of food security resilience has led to a global system for food security governance, whose demand is diversified and cannot be separated from the institutional supply of global food security mechanisms. Driven by political negotiations and practical development, a series of mechanisms have taken shape, and are currently in a process of dynamic development. At present, there are several problems with the mechanisms of global food security governance.

First, global food security platforms are fragmented and decentralized.The Agreement on Agriculture under the World Trade Organization (WTO)framework involves rules on agricultural subsidies, while the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Human Rights Council focus on addressing violations of the right to food.8Matias E. Margulis, “The Regime Complex for Food Security: Implications for the Global Hunger Challenge,” Global Governance, Vol.19, No.1, 2013, pp.53-67.In addition, the Bretton Woods institutions,including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), play an important role in financing agricultural and rural development projects, as well as food imports, and have continued to introduce structural adjustment policies to promote greater access to credit for developing countries in response to debt crises. The absence of a truly authoritative and inclusive institution to deal with food security issues across sectors and levels has led to fragmented discourse in this area, making it difficult to create synergy. In addition, there is a mismatch between developed and developing countries’ commitments with regard to trade liberalization in the agriculture sector. For example, on the issue of agricultural subsidies, developed countries use large-scale agricultural subsidies as a basic means to protect their own development, while China, as a developing country,has made huge concessions and even given up some of the special and differential treatment given to developing members under the Agreement on Agriculture,which is a serious unfair, unbalanced and unreasonable phenomenon.

Second, multilateral cooperation platforms for food security governance have stagnated, while regional platforms have emerged with relatively few political or regulatory obstacles. As one of the most important platforms, the actions of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) and its reforms aim to improve coordination and create synergy among all stakeholders,pool knowledge and field experience, and enhance communication and information exchange, among other things. Since the Agreement on Agriculture was concluded during the Uruguay Round negotiations, the WTO, as one of the few global international organizations, has been trying to further advance the integration of global agricultural governance in the Doha Round. Due to the unique nature of agriculture in national economic development, it has been considered as a core element of the Doha Round negotiations. However,the role of both the CFS and the WTO in global food security governance has been limited. In contrast, regional food security governance is deepening as compared to the stalled global governance paradigm. ASEAN’s commitment to food security cooperation in recent years has contributed to the formation of the ASEAN Integrated Food Security Framework and the adoption of the Strategic Plan of Action on Food Security in the ASEAN Region (2015-2020),which substantially enriched ASEAN’s agenda. As the world’s largest FTA, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement, signed in November 2020, stipulates the cancellation of agricultural export subsidies,the full elimination of quota restrictions, and the optimization of market access conditions in the “Trade in Goods” chapter, further facilitating the food trade in ASEAN countries. Multilateral trade agreements such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) Agreement and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) have all covered sensitive agricultural issues with partial consensus reached on tariff concessions and sectoral categorization. Specifically, the USMCA establishes a special committee on agricultural trade as well as advisory bodies and technical working groups to coordinate issues arising from possible future changes in tariff rates for related products due to domestic political reasons, tariff schedule adjustments, etc.

Third, with “soft law” and “hard law” co-existing, there is still a lack of fairness in the rules of the global food security governance system and ambiguity in their application. In order to achieve greater international rule of law for food security, the WTO has been pursuing a role in the sensitive area of agriculture. However, in the 20-year process of the Doha Round, no substantive progress has been made in agricultural negotiations, with only partial results achieved in the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration on subsidies. Among the numerous meetings on the topic, the main reason for the failure of the Cancun Ministerial Conference was the differences among the parties on agricultural issues and the “Singapore issues” of trade and investment, trade and competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation. In addition to the “hard law” in the form of treaties such as the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, “soft law” also has a role to play in governance. The Rome Declaration on World Food Security, the Den Bosch Declaration, the World Food Summit Plan of Action, the United Nations Millennium Declaration,and important food security governance documents such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries are more of a mobilizing incentive than a legally binding international treaty or convention, but the institutional flexibility of “soft governance” enhances the feeling of national autonomy. With the introduction of detailed food inspection rules, “high-standard” food quarantine has indirectly hindered food exports of other countries. Since African and Southeast Asian countries are comparatively poor in quarantine standards, these rules will definitely cause asymmetry in the two-way trade of food. At the same time, certain ambiguity and omission in international food rules have resulted in unexpected events which cannot be coped with easily. A typical example is the decoupling between the characterization of a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO)and the food trade controls allowed under the WTO framework. The WHO’s epidemic characterization is an important consideration in defining “emergency”and “national security.” Although the general exceptions and security exceptions under the WTO can be invoked, and there are provisions in the Agreement on Agriculture for export control in special cases, the rules are too vague to use correctly.

Fourth, effective great-power leadership in food security is insufficient due to changes in power structure and a return of sovereignty, while nonstate actors have become an indirect force to provide leadership. In the post-Cold War era, as the country with the most capability to lead the international order, the United States has reduced the provision of global governance public goods, and instead strongly promoted liberalized trade rules out of its selfinterests. On the one hand, through the establishment of the WTO and the development of its rules, it curbs food trade control measures by developing and food-importing countries to reduce the threshold for accessing their markets. On the other, it dominates global food industrial chains through foreign investment and greater control of the genetically modified food technology. The US government uses its financial power to compete with less developed countries with its food subsidy policy, thus permitting food oligarchs to establish monopoly in underdeveloped countries. At the same time, the food oligarchs have played a pioneering role in American economic and political expansion. Multinational enterprises represented by the four major grain merchants—ADM, Bunge,Cargill and Louis Dreyfus—have built a complete industrial chain “from field to table,” covering farming, storage, transportation, processing, distribution and marketing. They have also developed various governance models such as a twoway extension of the industrial chain, “whole industrial chain plus core business”and “grain industry plus financial industry.” With a significant regulatory role,these multinational food companies have the power to disrupt food production and distribution processes, dominate international markets with their ownership of genetic and production resources, and set food security standards that serve their interests.9VanDer Ploeg and Jan Douwe, “The Food Crisis, Industrialized Farming and the Imperial Regime,”Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol.10, No.1, 2010, pp.98-106.

Geopolitical factors are also impeding collaboration in global food governance among major powers. The world today is undergoing major changes unseen in a century. In such a context, the disparities between countries,especially between developed and developing countries, are becoming more pronounced. Developed countries increasingly see emerging powers as strategic competitors, and climate governance as a matter of economic dominance, energy security and technological leadership. This beggar-thy-neighbor competitive policy will not only undermine mutual trust among major powers, but also distort the global distribution of clean energy and green industrial chains, and hinder international cooperation in clean technology research and development.In turn, it will increase the economic cost of green transition, widen the gap between major powers and developing countries, and present unprecedented challenges for global climate governance as well as green and low-carbon transition. Some countries try to build up advantages in trade through policy instruments, which will affect the fairness of international trade and increase the cost of green transition. A few countries regard the agricultural industry through the lens of geopolitical competition. Some developed countries try to hinder cooperation among developing countries by dominating overseas investment standards, which may widen the global development gap.

Impact on China’s Food Security

Global food security governance is currently undergoing a dual construction process where the tensions in demand and the ineffectiveness of institutional supply are both to be addressed. Many factors are playing a role in this process:competition among fragmented organizations, geopolitical maneuvering arising from structural differences between the North and the South in food security development, struggle for leadership and discourse power regarding the international standards of food security, contradictions between neutral and nonneutral rules of global food security governance, and indirect intervention using non-state actors as springboards. China’s food security is under both domestic and international impacts. The complexity of cross-border transportation channels as well as the open nature of foreign food aid are elements that may escalate local or foreign conflicts into global food security issues.10Thomas M. Kane and Lawrence W. Serewicz, “China’s Hunger the Consequences of a Rising Demand for Food and Energy,” Parameters, Autumn 2001, pp.63-75.

First, regarding tensions on the demand side, trade and finance are key elements in reshaping food security but also areas whose discourse may be monopolized and cause fluctuations in China’s food security.With the advance of its internationalization, China’s food security structure is no longer simply a self-sufficient and self-dependent one. According to the latest data released by the General Administration of Customs of China, from January to April 2022, China’s grain imports reached nearly 50.8 million tons,a 57.8 percent year-on-year rise. To maintain a stable balance between import and export in global food security governance, it is an important strategic arrangement for countries to rely on the supply from international food trade to adjust the size and structure of their food reserves. It is also for this reason that the disruption of important international supply chains can destroy the long-term balance of China’s food trade. In addition, the pricing mechanisms of financial instruments such as food futures and options are still closely related to the US dollar. Despite the ongoing internationalization process of China’s renminbi, the international status of the US dollar remains unshakable, which requires China to further deepen its participation in food financial governance.In the international food market, while narrow nationalism that fanatically advocates “food sovereignty and human rights” may not be internationally recognized as legitimate, we need to be wary of unilateralist measures that bypass direct restrictions such as food “tariff wars” and impose new limits. Competition between major powers remains an important cause of friction. In recent years,the US has invoked Sections 337, 301 and 232 investigations against China,especially since the bilateral trade friction began in 2018. The expanding scale of tariffs and range of products affected has brought huge challenges to China’s food trade market. In addition, with the announcement by the WHO in late January 2020 that the coronavirus outbreak was classified as a public health emergency of international concern, some countries attempted to invoke the WTO’s multilateral rules and national security exceptions to impose discriminatory trade policies and restrictive trade measures on Chinese products. Moreover, there is a lack of reasonable regulatory limits to measures based on otherwise justifiable value choices, and excessive discretion is detrimental to food security recovery and subject to inter-state retaliation. To alleviate the food security challenges brought about by geopolitical competition, continued international food-friendly political engagement is needed.

Second, China’s food security governance is also under impact from the perspective of instituional supply. For China, its changing international role requires a shift from being a recipient of food security governance rules to a participant in the rules-making process, and the new round of rules-making is a test of China’s political and diplomatic negotiating capacity. Although China has participated extensively in the governance of various international issues since the early 21st century, the mode of its participation was often accepting rules rather than renegotiating them, given the power gap China had with the major powers. As negotiations on international rules are often time-consuming and costly, subsequent governance tends to inherit the previous framework.In the case of China’s accession to the WTO, for example, while the list of China’s accession commitments and the special determination on its market economy status were products of compromise at the time, it has constrained China’s food trade to some extent. Meanwhile, many of the existing unfair rules accepted by China have served the interests of just a few countries. For the rules on subsidies, the Agreement on Agriculture subdivides domestic support into the three categories of Yellow, Green and Blue Box subsidies.11In WTO terminology, the Yellow Box refers to all domestic support measures considered to distort production and trade, the Green Box covers schemes that are considered minimally or not at all tradedistorting, and included in the Blue Box are any support payments that are not subject to the Yellow Box reduction agreement because they are direct payments under a production limiting program.In fact, in 1986-1988, which was determined by the Yellow Box reduction agreement as the base period for the reduction of the Aggregate Measurement of Support(AMS), the level of domestic support in developed countries was much higher than that in developing countries. As for Green Box measures, since they are costlier to implement, they are mainly used by developed countries, which causes inequality in the application of subsidy rules. If China wants to deepen its internationalization process and promote an equitable transformation of the food security governance system, it needs to change its identity from a rules-taker to a rules-maker. Whether it is the abolition or the establishment of global food security governance rules, China’s participation in international negotiations is indispensable.

In terms of international participation in institutional supply, there also remains a gap between non-state actors in developing countries and their counterparts in developed states. Although Chinese multinational enterprises and civil society organizations have played an important role of dissemination and financing in food security governance, their international influence is still weak. In comparison, three of the Big Four multinational grain enterprises are from the US, and the home country, through corporate ownership, can indirectly dominate the discourse of global food security governance, especially on the structure of supply and demand and the pricing mechanism. Currently,the influence of Chinese food security stakeholders is still limited. While they have demonstrated governance resilience in terms of public opinion and foreign aid, the lack of large international food companies prevents them from having real international leverage. At the same time, multi-stakeholder participation in food security governance is both challenging and risky. Compared with a limited number of sovereign states, screening out effective governance subjects in a large system of multiple food security stakeholders poses higher requirements for the construction of a reasonable and orderly mechanism for participation.

In the global food security governance, the positive side of major-power leadership is often overwhelmed by the discourse of “food hegemony” and thus trapped in a cycle of accusations among the players. While adhering to inclusiveness, shared benefits, joint contribution and co-management in the choice of governance values, positive leadership of some major powers is also required. At present, the overall structure of global food security is still weak, with the issues of coordination among subjects and fairness of governance rules yet to be addressed. Among all the challenges, food crisis is the one that poses the largest threat to most countries, and—situated at the nexus between development and security—have generated demand for a solution that demonstrates real concerns for world peace and effectively addresses difficulties holding back development. It is in this context that the Global Development Initiative was proposed by President Xi Jinping at the 2020 United Nations General Assembly.Fair and orderly formulation of governance rules and maintenance of food security stability on a larger scale require leaders with international authority.While ensuring the stability of its own food security, China has also felt the multi-dimensional impact of global food security issues, which makes it all the more important to carefully plan the paths of its participation and cooperation in global food security governance and balance the food security at home and abroad.

Paths for China’s Participation in Global Food Governance

The COVID-19 pandemic and climate change have jointly impacted the resilience of food security governance. Promoting a balanced global food security governance system and preventing shocks from extreme events is a matter of sustainable development of global resources, as well as an anchor for regional order and cooperation among major powers. For China’s participation in global food security governance, the imbalance between supply and demand not only brings shocks to China, but also comes with opportunities, through which China can help improve the resilience of global food security.

Stable grain production enables China to confidently participate in global food security governance and provides the basis for developing its own external food chain. Judging from China’s grain production statistics in the past five years, overall grain production, seasonal grain harvest, and the production of representative crops have all maintained a very stable and high standard. It is due to the high grain production that China’s grain self-sufficiency rate has remained stable at over 90 percent in recent years,ensuring national food security and a basic balance of total grain, with a large population base not posing a big threat to global food security. In response to the food security crisis brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, although there was a decrease compared to previous data, China’s grain exports in 2020 were 3.54 million tons with a value of over US$2 billion.12Ministry of Commerce of China, “China Monthly Export Statistics Report (Rice) January-July 2020,”http://wms.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zt_ncp/table/dami_202007.pdf.Whether in Asian, African or European countries, China’s grain exports have eased the food shortage crisis to a certain extent, and also driven the supply chain of China’s foreign grain industry by capturing market opportunities both at home and abroad, which is conducive to regulating the balance of grain import and export. In particular, China has responded positively to the food aid programs advocated by the United Nations, providing humanitarian relief in the form of food donations, food technical assistance, and investment in food enterprises, which establishes its international authority and makes it possible for China to exert crucial leadership in global food security governance. Admittedly, food aid is not unique to China, and the US has been an early promoter of food aid programs. However, the American programs are more about “giving fish” rather than “teaching how to fish,”and primarily aimed at addressing the surplus value flow brought about by agricultural mechanization. With regard to its participation in international food aid programs, China has gone from being a food recipient to a food donor, and from a net capital attractor to a net investor. For example,China partnered with the World Food Program (WFP) to provide food aid to South Sudan and implement a school meals program. In April 2019,the Chinese government cooperated with the WFP to provide emergency food aid to five African countries through the South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund (SSCAF). Since the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic,China has provided technical support and material assistance to relevant countries affected by the epidemic and the locust plague, and supported Chinese enterprises to set up temporary warehouses in China in cooperation with the WFP. In addition, China has actively promoted the dissemination of food cultivation technology to Africa and other less-developed regions,helping the development of local food economy through the establishment of multinational food and agricultural enterprises. International humanitarian relief is an excellent way to shape a country’s image, and is also a proper way for major countries to take international responsibility. Judging from the effect of China’s food aid implementation, though questioned by some states,it has received positive recognition from the majority of developing countries.

From the perspective of institutional supply, the decentralization of food security governance platforms has provided more channels for China’s participation, and the trend of co-governance by multiple stakeholders has stimulated the participation of non-state actors in China’s foreign food security governance. In terms of participation in multilateral food security governance platforms, China has taken an active part in political meetings such as the G20 summits, initiated political dialogues on the coronavirus pandemic and agricultural trade and investment cooperation, and utilized existing regional cooperation mechanisms for agricultural cooperation. For example, in addition to the ASEAN Integrated Food Security Framework and the Strategic Plan of Action on Food Security in the ASEAN Region (2015-2020), the RCEP Agreement, which was signed in 2020 and entered into force in 2022, aims to establish a free trade area with low or even zero tariffs. Signatories to the agreement include both important food-exporting countries such as Vietnam and major importers like Japan, who expect to promote food supply security through trade by breaking down trade barriers.

Meanwhile, as for governance actors, China has mobilized multiple stakeholders in its non-governmental diplomacy on food security. During the coronavirus pandemic, civil society organizations and other key players have served an important role in food security risk response. The Kenya Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry used social networking platforms to establish an online community including senior officials, entrepreneurs,social activists, and other elites from all walks of life to share and exchange information. In order to let the Kenyan community understand and appreciate the effectiveness of China’s epidemic prevention and control efforts, the Chamber arranged for its staff to translate news reports on China’s epidemic response into English and then publish them on social media platforms, presenting a transparent and efficient image of China’s epidemic prevention to the Kenyan public, and highlighting China’s basic principle of being people-oriented.13Wang Zezhuang and Kuang Zewei, “Paths, Characteristics and Enlightenment of Overseas NGO’s Support for Public Diplomacy: Experience of China Chamber of Commerce in Kenya during the COVID-19 Epidemic,” Public Diplomacy Quarterly, Vol.1, No.1, 2020, pp.51-55 & 122-123.The donation and allocation of materials was also a weak spot during early stages of the pandemic, and many civil society organizations responded positively to calls for epidemic support. According to a survey by the China Development Research Foundation, the Narada Foundation, and the China Alliance of Social Value Investment, 50 civial society organizations raised and distributed materials worth 31.8 million yuan in the first months after epidemic outbreak. Among them, 25 community organizations undertook most of the landing work, collecting and distributing nearly 24.79 million yuan of supplies, accounting for more than 3/4 of the total.14Yu Jianguo and Xia Tian, “The Role of Civil Society Organizations under the COVID-19 Pandemic,”China Philanthropy Times, May 12, 2020, http://www.gongyishibao.com/html/gongyizixun/18698.html.It is evident that China has much experience not only in official diplomacy, but also in semi-official and civil diplomacy in terms of governance approaches.

Amid the irreversible trend of multipolarization in international power configuration, the weakening leadership of some countries or regions has given additional space for China to actively participate in global food security governance. China incorporated “implementing a food security strategy” into its 2021 government work report, demonstrating that it will continue to focus on food security in the post-pandemic era. As the largest country with the biggest population, China’s deep involvement in global food security governance is also an integral part of its development. Considering the evolving global food security governance system, there are several potential paths for China’s participation.

First, China should actively take part in the political agenda of food security governance platforms and promote changes in relevant mechanisms.Most importantly, to alleviate the funding pressure on international organizations, China should take the initiative to provide more funding based on its financial strength or mobilize important economies to do so. Since most UN food governance organizations are non-profit in nature and their funding is not as abundant as international economic and financial organizations, China can serve as a bridge to promote mutual help and support among international organizations. China should respond positively to the cooperation initiatives and programs of governance organizations. In addition, it can get involved in more country strategic plans. For example, the WFP’s new food development project in Kyrgyzstan is a favorable path for China’ participation in global food security governance.

Besides, in meetings of global food security organizations, China should propose new initiatives to set the agenda in a more active manner. Based on the UN Sustainable Development Goals, which are comprehensive in nature,and more specifically the four-dimensional goals proposed by the FAO in food availability, access, utilization and stability, the indicators for assessing the effectiveness of relevant projects should be continuously enriched. Specifically,there are many goals associated with population security as well as the natural dimensions of security that need to be incorporated, and the set of goals involving emerging food security dimensions such as biosecurity and financial security should be expanded. In addition, the content of specific goals should be updated in a timely manner, and sustainable development goals such as the unit pesticide reduction rate and conservation goals such as the waste rate can be included. Given the current fragmented pattern of food governance, China can also propose specific measures for specialization and integration.

Second, it is important for China to promote solid and effective development of regional mechanisms in order to build a multilateral platform for inclusive food security governance based on regional consensus.

China should also gradually expand the scope of food security cooperation to prevent food security containment arising from embedded geopolitical considerations. Recognizing the irreversible trend of achieving food security in a multilateral way, neighboring countries and regions remain the key direction of China’s food security cooperation, as reflected in the regional cooperation mechanism for food security between China and ASEAN countries.

In addition to building food partnerships and expanding food transportation channels with traditional Southeast Asian countries to promote food security facilitation, China should focus more on interacting with other major powers, especially on food tariffs and food security technical cooperation with the United States and European countries. Given that various platforms for regional food security governance have been built by other major powers,China needs to further deepen its food security cooperation with the US and major European countries in order to avoid a monopoly of discourse on global food security policy by an exclusive bloc of major powers. While promoting the implementation of the RCEP, China could also actively participate in other important regional cooperation platforms such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) Agreement. Moreover, China should establish cooperative relationships with African countries and small island states, and enhance the convergence of their interests. By actively getting involved in external governance agendas such as the African Union’s Agenda 2063, China could contribute external political engagement and decision-making wisdom.

At the same time, in the process of implementing its Belt and Road Initiative, there is still ample room for China to improve cooperation with neighboring countries. China should make good use of the existing Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism and the bunch of cooperation arrangements with ASEAN to better address issues such as territorial disputes over agricultural land and barriers to food trade. China should also utilize its domestic free trade drive to set up an Asian food trade facilitation zone on its territory, which would boost the development of neighboring countries and help transform the current dollar-based pricing mechanism of the international food market into a more diversified one.

Third, China should promote a unified rules-making process to build a fair and just legal order for global food security governance. China needs to push forward the process of unification in food regulation and governance standards. From the perspective of international trade and statistics, China could encourage countries to define agricultural products and agricultural production materials with common standards and concepts, and enhance transparency in the form of a list of commitments. It is important for China to engage in the discussions on “the Right to Food” led by the FAO and human rights organizations, help advance the formulation of provisions on public health emergencies by the FAO, the WFP and the WTO, and establish external link terms based on the WHO’s epidemic characterization to prevent the abuse of trade control measures.

In addition, China should adhere to the basic principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, promote the negotiation of new food security governance rules, and propose a global regulatory paradigm of universally applicable low-standard harmonization. Commonly applied low-standard harmonization aims to maintain the stability of the global multilateral food cooperation framework, and seek the greatest common denominator for all parties, while individually and voluntarily followed high-standard rules consider some countries’ different interests. Only by building an inclusive institutional framework can the normal operation of global food security cooperation be guaranteed.

Moreover, China ought to actively participate in the WTO reform process and put forward feasible proposals for the food sector. It is necessary to build relatively unified export support rules in order to reduce the abuse of Green Box and Blue Box measures, and determine a base period in line with national conditions as the minimum standard to be followed. Meanwhile, the scope of“sensitive” and “special” products should be separately regulated. For the abused Article 21 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), China should stick to the principle of limited national security exceptions which requires a submission of a detailed list of such exceptions. Specifically, it should insist that food public security exceptions be defined in accordance with standards issued by international organizations, to eliminate the arbitrary use of food public security exceptions and invoke compensation when necessary for damages incurred under such exceptions.

Fourth, it is necessary for China to take on international responsibilities, deepen its food security assistance programs and refine the content of its assistance. China must try its best to expand its food distribution networks and invest in foreign food industries, improve its public investment system, broaden financing channels, and optimize its overseas agricultural investment. China should strengthen the implementation of a joint supervision mode by host and home countries on transnational grain traders to achieve a balance between international food supply and demand while developing China’s foreign food industry.

China’s deep involvement in global food security governance has always been based on food aid programs that are not merely a transfer of “surplus”but a means for promoting the overall development of the food industry in the country in need, which include the following types. First is the assistance for basic food needs, to alleviate the current situation of food-deficit countries through food exports and donations. Second is the assistance on crop species,for example by introducing hybrid rice into Africa and improving crop varieties.Third is the assistance on agricultural science and technology. China should put more emphasis on providing expertise for long-term benefits in its food cooperation and help disadvantaged countries achieve food independence by agricultural investment projects and agricultural technology sharing, with the“symptoms” and “root cause” of their problems in development both taken into account. Fourth is the assistance on food transportation, with the goal of realizing interconnectivity through land, sea and air routes. Specifically,Chinese enterprises can promote cross-border food transportation through the construction of high-speed railways and other transport facilities. Fifth is the assistance for the development of food industry. To help other countries shorten the development cycle of their food industrial structure, better utilize the investment from foreign food and agricultural enterprises, and benefit from the sharing of relevant experience and technology, the focus of China’s foreign food security cooperation should be changed to a model that relies more on local means of production and local ecological environment, instead of simply transporting food. China can better share its development experience through knowledge production and the institutional spillover effect, and provide other countries, especially developing countries, with better public goods in agricultural products as well as experience and technologies for building the green public service system, thus contributing to the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals.

Fifth, China should work to break the knowledge and information barriers of food production and construct a big data-based transnational early warning mechanism to prevent and mitigate cross-border food security risks caused by major public events. With the basic feature of instantaneous mobility, big data has the ability to go beyond territorial boundaries and realize transnational information sharing in a timely manner. From the perspective of the entire agricultural industry, the need for informatization and digitalization is very urgent. According to a 2019 article published by the World Resources Institute, the data revolution,even though it is developing rapidly, has not reached every economic sector yet, leaving the agriculture sector in developing countries yet to fully enjoy the convenience of digitalization.15Luiz Amaral, “The Data Revolution Hasn’t Yet Hit Agriculture,” World Resources Institute, March 5,2019, https://www.wri.org/insights/data-revolution-hasnt-yet-hit-agriculture.China’s agricultural industry is gradually developing towards centralization, moderate scale production,and industrialization, which requires a transition from the conventional extensive mode of production based on experience to a more digitalized and science-based mode. It was once proposed by the UN High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security to develop a sharing mechanism for international data on climate change and food security, which could achieve great synergy by coordinating food security data with climate change data for the benefit of the most vulnerable regions and populations.16The High-Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition, Food Security and Climate Change,May 18, 2021, http://www.fao.org/3/me421e/me421e.pdf.To deal with complex food security risks in a comprehensive and timely manner,it is also necessary to build a big data-based food security early warning mechanism for transnational supervision in the event of major public events.Given that food security is linked to international factors such as climate change, fluctuations of dollar value, and large-scale infestations, there is a need to establish a transnational mechanism for food security data sharing to better inform China’s policy-making and emergency response. China should actively promote the construction of such mechanisms with other major powers as well as its neighboring regions, to achieve coordination of regulatory standards for data sharing while balancing the relationship between data sharing and localization requirements, to effectively enhance the ability to anticipate food security risks.