Motivations and Prospects of Japan’s Enhanced Security Cooperation with Europe

Sun Wenzhu is Associate Research Fellow at the Department for Asia-Pacific Studies, China Institute of International Studies.The article was originally published inPeace and Development Studies, Issue 5, 2022.

In June 2022, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida attended the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid and delivered a speech.This is the first time for a Japanese Prime Minister to attend the NATO Summit, marking a new level of security cooperation between Japan and Europe.In recent years, Japan has enhanced its security cooperation with Europe, which has led to increasingly close exchanges and communications between the two sides in the security sector.Besides, the cooperation mechanism has been steadily improved and the content of cooperation has been continuously enriched, not only raising the risk of confrontation among different sides in the Indo-Pacific Region, but also bringing more challenges to China’s peripheral security.Based on the summary and review of the main trends in recent Japan-Europe security cooperation, this article,for reference, intends to analyze the motivations behind the enhanced security cooperation and form an outlook on the future direction of Japan-Europe security relations.

Major Trends in Japan-Europe Security Cooperation

After World War II, Japan and Europe all belonged to the Western camp,but in the security sector, they belonged to respectively two major military alliances led by the United States, focusing on indigenous defense.During the Cold War, Japan-Europe exchanges and cooperation mainly focused on the economic area, with little political and security cooperation.1Song Lilei and Cai Liang,“The Characteristics of the European-Japanese Cooperation Model after the Cold War,”European Studies,No.6, 2016, pp.48-64; Chen Jingjing and Zhang Yong, Changes in the International Order and Japan-Europe Strategic Approach,”European Studies,No.2, 2021, pp.52-82.In the post-Cold War period, Japan-Europe relations continued to improve, with each recognizing the other as an important political partner, and their cooperation experiences accumulated gradually in operations such as the Gulf War, the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War.After Shinzo Abe was sworn in for the second time as prime minister at the end of 2012, Japan reformed its foreign and security policy, expanded the scope of activities in the security sector, and began to regard Europe as an important security partner.2Michito Tsuruoka,“The Role of Europe in Abe’s Diplomacy: Has Mainstream Become a Reality,”Report of Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 2021, https://www.jiia.or.jp/research- report/post-70.html.

After 2017, under the influence of factors such as the“Trump impact,”“Brexit”and the intensification of Sino-US Competition, Japan paid more attention to cooperation with Europe3Yasuyuki Kokubo,“EU-Japan Relations in the Honeymoon Period,”International Affairs,May 2020,pp.41-49, https://www2.jiia.or.jp/kokusaimondai_archive/2020/2020-05_005.pdf?noprint., and consequently, security cooperation became an important growth point of Japan-European relations,achieving multi-level and multi-disciplinary advancement in mechanism building, joint military operations, defense equipment and technology cooperation.Now their cooperation has begun to extend to economic security.

Enhancing institutionalized security cooperation at all levels

At the bilateral level, security cooperation has become an important part of high-level exchanges between Japan and major European countries, with various cooperation mechanisms continuing to be upgraded and expanded.In January 2017, based on the previously concluded Memorandum of Defense Exchange and Cooperation, Agreement on Transfer of Defense Equipment, Technology and General Security of Military Information Agreement, Japan and Britain signed the Agreement concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services.In September, British Prime Minister Theresa May visited Japan and the two countries issued the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation.In May 2022, Japan and Britain reached a framework consensus on signing the Reciprocal Access Agreement.In March 2017, Shinzo Abe visited France and reached a consensus with President François Hollande on further deepening security and defense cooperation,particularly maritime security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.Japan and France signed the Agreement concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services in 2018, and the negotiation on the Reciprocal Access Agreement is also nearing completion.In 2018, Japan and Germany signed the Agreement on Transfer of Defense Equipment, Technology.In February 2019, German Chancellor Angela Merkel visited Japan and reached a consensus on enhancing security cooperation between the two countries.In 2021, Japan and Germany signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement and held the first“2+2”dialogue between foreign ministers and defense ministers.In addition, Japan signed the Agreement on Transfer of Defense Equipment, Technology with Italy in 2017, and successively signed the Memorandum of Defense Exchange and Cooperation with the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Finland, and Poland from 2017 to 2022.The scope of Japan-Europe security cooperation has gradually expanded.4Ministry of Defense of Japan,“Defense White Paper 2021,”pp.84-88, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/wp/wp2021/pdf/R03shiryo.pdf; Ministry of Defense of Japan,“Defense White Paper 2022,”pp.520-521, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/wp/wp2019/pdf/R01shiryo.pdf.

At the multilateral level, in July 2017, after 13 rounds of negotiations over a four-year period, Japan and the EU reached an agreement in principle on the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), laying a legal foundation for security cooperation between the two sides.5Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,“Diplomatic Blue Book 2022,”p.96, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/ bluebook/2020/pdf/pdfs/2_4.pdf.The agreement was officially signed on the same day as the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement(EPA) in July 2018, which will come into force after all EU member states have completed the ratification process.The Japan-EU SPA stipulates that Japan and the EU conduct dialogue and cooperation at all levels on“political, foreign and security policy,”covering 40 areas such as counterterrorism, maritime, space, and cyber.6Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,“Strategic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and Its Member States, of the one Part, And Japan, of the other Part,”July 17, 2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000381942.pdf.Since the SPA took effect, Japan and the EU have held several consultative meetings on security and defense attended by officials from the diplomatic and defense departments, and the“SPA Joint Committee Meeting”of the foreign department, in which the two sides jointly discuss the priority issues and target plans for security cooperation.7European Union,“European Union and Japan Hold Consultations on Security and Defence,”April 15, 2021, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-union-and-japan- hold-consultations-security-anddefence_en.From 2020, Japan began to send military missions to the EU.In July 2021, Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi was invited for the first time to attend the European Parliament’s“Subcommittee on Security and Defense”and delivered a speech.

The security cooperation mechanism between Japan and NATO has also developed.From 2018 to 2020, Japan and NATO twice revised the“Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme”signed in 2014,and successively included“Maritime Security”and“East Asian Security”in the cooperation and agreed to regularly update the document according to the changing situation.8Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,“Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme between Japan and NATO,”May 31, 2018，https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ files/000382902.pdf; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,“Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme between Japan and NATO,”June 26, 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100068529.pdf.In July 2018, the Japanese Office in NATO was officially established.Since then, Japan has successively sent liaison officers or experts to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence(CCDCOE), NATO Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) and Supreme Allied Command Europe (SHAPE) to strengthen communication and coordination between the two sides.9Jeffrey W.Hornung, Allies Growing Closer: Japan-Europe Security Ties in the Age of Strategic Competition, RAND, 2020, p.85, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA186-1.html.From April to May 2022, the Japanese Foreign Minister and the Chief of Staff of the Self-Defense Forces respectively attended the NATO Foreign Ministers’Meeting and the NATO Military Committee Chiefs of Staff Meeting, both for the first time in history.10Sun Shaohong and Feng Shuoyu,“Japan’s Intention of Cooperating with NATO in the Asia-Pacific,”PLA Daily, June 23, 2022, p.11.

Strengthening capability of coordinated military operations through joint exercises and training

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has conducted frequent joint exercises with European navies in recent years in order to enhance interoperability in actual combat.From 2017 to 2021, Japan,Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium have held more than 50 bilateral and multilateral joint exercises in the Gulf of Aden, the eastern Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the waters around Japan, covering anti-submarine, air defense, sea control, and mutual landing of ship-borne helicopters, etc.11Ministry of Defense of Japan,“Defense White Paper 2021,”pp.84-88, 99-104; Ministry of Defense of Japan,“Defense White Paper 2022,”pp.520-521, 527-528.In 2018, 2021, and 2022, the JMSDF sent fleets respectively to the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and Mediterranean Sea to conduct joint exercises with NATO, Ukraine, and other countries.12NATO,“NATO and Japan Conduct Exercise in the Baltic Sea,”August 27, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_157770.htm; U.S.Navy,“U.S.Sixth Fleet announces Sea Breeze 2021 Participation,”June 21, 2021, https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/article/2664699/us-sixth-fleet-announcessea-breeze-2021-participation/.The“Anti-Piracy Special Operations Force”dispatched by the JMSDF to Somalia waters and the EU Naval Force continued to carry out joint exercises and training in the waters of the Gulf of Aden, and worked together to support anti-piracy capacity building in Djibouti and other coastal countries.13European Council,“Eu-Japan Strategic Partnership,”May 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/49921/eu-japan-2021-05-final.pdf.Additionally, since 2018, the JMSDF and the Coast Guard have cooperated on several occasions with the navies of Britain, France, and Germany that deployed in the Pacific Ocean to track and monitor suspected North Korean vessels prohibited by United Nations sanctions carrying out“maritime barging”behavior.14Ministry of Defense of Japan,“Efforts to Ensure the Effectiveness of UN Security Council Resolutions in Japan,”https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/sedori/.

The Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) and the Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) have also carried out joint exercises with European powers on fighter jet operations and land-based special operations, etc.Since 2016, when the British Royal Air Force fighter units went to Japan and conducted their first joint military exercise, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and the British Royal Air Force fighter units continued to have exchanges and mutual visits.15Ministry of Defense of Japan,“Unit-to-Unit Exchange with UK Air Force,”December 25, 2017,https://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/news/release/2017/1225/.In 2022, the commander of the German Air Force personally flew a fighter jet to Japan, where the fighter forces of the two countries held joint training for the first time in Japan.16Japan Air Self-Defense Force,“Conducting Joint Training with the German Air Force,”September 20,2022, https:// www.mod.go.jp/asdf/news/houdou/R4/20220920-2.pdf.On the land army side, in 2018, the British Army sent the Honorable Artillery Company(HAC), a surveillance and reconnaissance unit, to Japan to conduct a joint exercise with the Japan Self-Defense Force for the first time.The following year, the Ground Self-Defense Force returned to visit the unit and held another joint exercise.17Ministry of Defense of Japan,“Defense White Paper 2021,”p.85.In 2021, the Troupes de marine made their first visit to Japan aboard the French amphibious helicopter carrier“Tonnere”and conducted joint drills with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, the US Marine Corps and the Australian Defense Force for island scrambling,landing operations, alley warfare, etc.

In addition, Japan and NATO are also cooperating to improve their cyber defense capabilities.In late 2019 and late 2021, Japan participated in the NATO“Cyber Alliance”exercise twice, and in April 2021 and April 2022, it successfully participated in the“Locked Shields”cyber exercise organized by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence,which aims to prevent imaginary enemies from paralyzing military command centers and critical infrastructure through cyber-attack by joint operations.18Ministry of Defense of Japan,“Defense White Paper 2021,”p.332; Nai Qian,“Japan and the UK Cooperation in Developing Next-Generation Combat Aircraft,”China Defense News, August 22, 2022, p.4.

Developing in-depth cooperation in defense equipment and technology

Relying on its own advantages in technology and capital, Japan is actively cooperating with Britain, France, Italy and other countries in the research and development of advanced weapons and equipment.Japan’s next-generation F-X stealth fighter, jointly developed by Japan and Britain, can be considered as a representative project of Japan-Europe arms cooperation, for which both sides have conducted a large number of feasibility studies, and some of its technology will be compatible with the current British-led development of sixth-generation European“Tempest”fighter.Fighters communicate.The two sides also plan to export the new fighter to other countries.19“Japan and the UK Jointly Develop Next-Generation Combat Aircraft with BAE, Italy to Join,”Sankei Shimbun, May 14, 2022, https://www.sankei.com/article/20220514-O7FEJWGHTFKXDCXYQD CFAIAOZU/.In conjunction with this,in 2018, Japan and Britain reached an agreement to jointly develop a common radio frequency wave sensor (JAGUAR) and a new type of airto-air missile (JNAAM) for use on fighter aircraft.20“Japan, UK to Collaborate on Future Fighter Sensor Development,”The Diplomat, February 18, 2022,https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/japan-uk-to-collaborate-on- future-fighter-sensor-development/.In December 2021,it was announced that Rolls-Royce and Japan’s IHI would cooperate to develop engines for new fighter jets.21UK Government,“UK and Japan to Develop Future Fighter Jet Engine Demonstrator,”December 22,2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-japan-to-develop-future-fighter-jet-engine-demonstrator.Japan and France cooperated around maritime military equipment.In 2018, the two countries signed an agreement on joint research and development of a new generation of mine detection technologies, combining Japan’s low-frequency sonar mine detection capabilities with France’s sonar data processing and image display technologies to develop high-performance sonar.Since 2021, the Framatome Nuclear Company, jointly established by Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the Electricité de France (EDF), has been involved in the development of France’s next-generation nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.22Janes,“France Selects Nuclear Propulsion Option for Future Aircraft Carrier,”December 10, 2020,https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/france-selects-nuclear-propulsion-option-for-futureaircraft-carrier.Furthermore, Japan is also actively participating in the“Science for Peace and Security”(SPS) project under NATO’s framework.In recent years, Japan has conducted multiple joint research projects with Portugal,Croatia, Lithuania and other countries on infrared detection, nuclear material detection, rapid wound healing and other technologies.23NATO,“The NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme Country Flyer 2021 JAPAN,”June 2021, https://www.nato.int/science/country-fliers/Japan.pdf.

Cooperating in economic security

Affected by the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and the US perception of“All-Consuming Great Power Competition,”Japan regards controlling the frontiers of science and technology, as well as the dominance of international economic rules as an important part of“national security.”At the same time,“economic security”became a new focus for promoting security cooperation with Europe.In October 2019,Japan and the EU signed the Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure, agreeing to“jointly promote investment projects based on rules and sustainable principles in the areas of trade, economy,transport, environment and high-quality infrastructure construction, and address the risks posed by the United States and China.”In February 2021 and January 2022, Japan held“2+2”dialogues with Britain and France respectively, both of which mentioned the need to carry out“economic security cooperation”around the industrial chain, digital transformation,cybersecurity, 5G communications and others.In May 2022, Japan and the EU established“digital partnership”and announced that they would cooperate in fields like rules-making, technology research and development, and“reliable infrastructure development”around the“free and safe flow of data.”24Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,“EU-Japan Digital Partnership,”May 12, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100343686.pdf.

Against the backdrop of the Ukraine crisis, the connotation of Japan-EU economic and security cooperation has been further expanded.In February 2022, Fumio Kishida had a phone call with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and reached a consensus on cooperation in maintaining energy security.After Russia launched a special military operation against Ukraine, Japan and Europe have been in lockstep within the framework of the G7, freezing Russia’s assets abroad, removing major Russian banks from the SWIFT system, banning coal imports from Russia and military technology products exports to Russia, in an attempt to force Russia to change its policy and even to promote regime change through strong sanctions, so as to achieve its security goals by economic means.

Motivations for Japan in Enhancing Its Security Cooperation with Europe

Japan’s enhancement of its security cooperation with Europe is not only to hedge against the uncertainties brought about by the changes in the current world order, but also to seek the“Indo-Pacific”geographical advantages,expand its security influence abroad, and further promote the transformation of its domestic security strategy.

Responding to the change of the international order and the strategic adjustment to the United States

In recent years, the relative power of the United States has continued to decline, and it is unable to play the role of“leader of the international order.”Both the“America First”policy of the Trump administration and the“foreign policy for the middle class”of the Biden administration reflect the“inward-looking”nature of the overall US strategy.In this regard, Japan has a clear understanding.In 2022, its Diplomatic BlueBook publicly acknowledged the“relative decline of US national power”and pointed out that“the era when the United States played a leading role and supported for international stability and prosperity”has come to an end.25Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,“Diplomatic Blue Book 2021,”p.14, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ files/100334590.pdf.

Japan, as a beneficiary of the Western-dominated international order,has long relied on the US-Japan alliance for its security.The decline of US power has brought profound anxiety to Japan, but at the same time, Japan has seen opportunities to highlight its influence and boost its international status.By building a diversified cooperation network, Japan is trying to act as a secondary security cooperation network center within the US alliance system to jointly maintain the so-called“rules-based liberal international order”and hedge against the security risks resulting from the“absence”of the United States.26Meng Xiaoxu,“Japan-UK Security Cooperation at the Intersection of the‘Indo-Pacific’Strategy and Global Britain Strategy,”Contemporary International Relations, No.3, 2020, pp.11-21.EU countries and Japan share similar ideologies, identify with each other and both believe that the future direction of the international order is closely related to their own security.Therefore, deepening security cooperation has a common ideological and interest basis.As early as 2013,Japan’s first National Security Strategy promulgated after the war had positioned the EU as an“important strategic partner with similar values and principles.”In recent years, with the evolution of the international order brought about by the shift of power between developed countries and emerging countries, and the intensification of the competition between US-Russia and China-US, Japan and Europe have become more negative about the future prospects of the“international order,”which provides more motivation for them to“huddle together for warmth.”27Tian Ci,“The Conceptual and Cognitive Foundations of Japan’s Enhanced Security Cooperation with NATO,”Journal of Strategy and Decision-Making,No.6, 2021, pp.81-98.

In addition, in recent years, the national strategic goals of the United States have gradually shifted to great power competition, repeatedly exaggerating the“challenge to the international order”posed by China and Russia, and intending to maintain its advantages through the full resource mobilization and integration of“the whole-of-government, the whole-ofsociety, and the whole-of-alliance.”For this purpose, the United States needs to integrate the military forces of its allies and build a“strong network of allies and partners”to contain China and Russia and maintain its hegemonic order.28U.S.Department of Defense,“Summary of the National Defense Strategy 2018,”https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf; The White House,“Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,”February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.At this time, Japan’s enhancement of Japan-Europe security cooperation is in line with the US strategic reorientation, and provides a basis for“maintaining”the US presence, and hindering its return to a policy of isolationism.In practice, in recent years, the United States has encouraged Japan to be closer to NATO, the EU, and European powers in terms of security, and has“built bridges”for Japan and Europe through multilateral joint military exercises and security forums.The“2+2”security meeting,in which the US and Japanese foreign ministers and defense ministers participated, also expressed appreciation for the cooperation between Japan and Europe on many occasions.29“Pentagon Official Touts NATO-Asia Cooperation Amid China Threat,”Nikkei Asia Review, July 1,2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Pentagon-official-touts-NATO-Asia-cooperationamid-China-threat.Japan has responded positively to these movements.In 2018, the Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono stated at the Munich Security Conference,“The international community should help the United States, share its burdens, and cooperate with each other.Therefore,cooperation between Japan and Europe is extremely important.”30Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,“Press Conference of Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Kono,”February 17, 2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/kaiken4_000652.html#topic1.

Pursuing geopolitical competitive advantages and containing China’s rise

Against the background of the shift in power between China and Japan, Japan regards China as a challenger to the“Indo-Pacific”order and is unwilling to give up the possibility of shaping the future development direction of the“Indo-Pacific.”In 2016, the Abe government launched the banner of“free and open Indo-Pacific,”claiming to be the standard-bearer for maintaining“democratic and liberal values,”trying to integrate US and European forces and to underline this by using the bond of values, serving as the leader of the“Indo-Pacific”region.For this reason, Japan has repeatedly hyped China’s“threats and challenges”to the so-called“Indo-Pacific security order,”claiming that China’s promotion of the“One Belt One Road”is aimed at“building a regional and international order that is self-centered parallel to the current Western-dominated international rules system.”31Michito Tsuruoka,“China’s Role in EU-Japan Relations,”Keio SFC Academic Review,Vol.21, No.1,2021, https://gakkai.sfc.keio.ac.jp/journal/.assets/SFCJ21-1-05.pdf.

Japan sees NATO, the EU and major European countries as important platforms for promoting the“free and open Indo-Pacific”and exaggerating China’s policy as“heterogeneous”and“dangerous,”targeting propaganda on maritime issues, a sensitive area related to the“principle of freedom of navigation,”accusing China of“unilaterally changing the status quo”in the East China Sea, South China Sea and other places, hoping to introduce European power into the“Indo-Pacific”region, and“leveraging its strength”to strengthen checks and balances against China.32Wu Huaizhong,“Japan’s Security Strategy toward China: An Analysis of the Counterbalance,”Japanese Studies,No.5, 2021, pp.59-86.The growing European precautionary attitude toward China also creates opportunities for Japan to promote Japan-Europe security cooperation.In March 2019, the European Commission released its Strategic Outlook for EU-China Relations, which positions China as an“economic rival and an institutional rival pursuing an alternative model of governance,”33European Commission,“EU-China—A Strategic Outlook,”March 12, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf.and the third edition of the“NATO Strategic Concept”released in June 2022 further described China as a“systemic challenge”in terms of“interests, security and values.”34NATO,“NATO 2030: United for a New Era,”November 25, 2020, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf.From 2021 to 2022, the“Joint Statement”issued after the regular Japan-EU summits all mentioned“maintaining peace and stability in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait”and made unreasonable accusations on issues related to Xinjiang and Hong Kong, showing a clear orientation toward“restraining China’s rise..”

For both Japan and Europe, the Indo-Pacific region is not only an important economic lifeline, but also the hope for future economic prosperity.The joint efforts to strengthen their“presence”in security affairs in the“Indo-Pacific”region, and transform security influence into economic influence on the grounds of“economic security”are conducive to ensuring the sharing of future regional development dividends.In recent years, Europe has paid more and more attention to the“Indo-Pacific”region, which has created favorable conditions for Japan and Europe to strengthen security cooperation.After Brexit, both Britain and the EU face the risk of declining or even marginalizing their international status, and the“Indo-Pacific”has thus become an important stage for the two to demonstrate their influence and seek initiative in the global arena.France, Germany, the Netherlands, Britain, Italy, the EU and NATO have either put forward their own versions of“Indo-Pacific Policy,”or emphasized the great importance they attach to the“Indo-Pacific.”Although the focus is different, there is a general call to strengthen the security ties between Europe and the Indo-Pacific region to compensate for the previous focus on economic cooperation and to take the lead in shaping the regional order.35Hu Zhiyong,“European Strategic Trends and Their Geopolitical Implications from the‘Indo-Pacific’Perspective,”Pacific Journal, No.10, 2021, pp.27-40.In this line of thinking, European powers such as Britain, France, and Germany have frequently dispatched elite naval forces to the Indo-Pacific region to emphasize their security presence.As the ninth largest country in the world in terms of military spending, Japan’s military power is comparable to that of France, Germany and other European powers and it has extensive influence and security cooperation ties in the“Indo-Pacific”and a strong willingness to cooperate with Europe.So, it is natural for Japan to become an important support and fulcrum for Europe to“enter the Indo-Pacific.”

Promoting strategic transformation and expanding space for activities in the security sector

For Japan, enhancement of security cooperation with Europe is also conducive to its“borrowing a boat out to sea,”which can strengthen its presence in the sector of military security, so as to completely break through the post-war system, and become a“political security power”again.That is the long-cherished wish of the Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party.

Since the 1990s, the Japanese government has continued to generalize the concept of“self-defense,”gradually bypassing the principle of“purely defensive defense,”and elevated the Japanese Peace Constitution to give legitimacy to military activities.Since Abe’s government came to power for the second time, Japan has gradually promoted the lifting of the ban on the right of Collective Self-defense and amended the Self-Defense Forces Law,authorizing the Self-Defense Forces Act to provide“military protection”to“allies and partners.”By carrying out more policy communication and joint action with“like-minded countries”in Europe, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces can not only use the port bases of Britain and France and other countries in the Indian Ocean and even in Europe to improve their own power delivery capabilities, but also provide itself with more“protection targets,”thus expanding the space for Japan’s security activities.

The strengthening of security cooperation with Europe, especially the establishment of a formal framework for cooperation mechanisms, is also beneficial to Japan’s“promoting domestic security from the outside,”which means pushing back on the transformation of Japan’s domestic security strategy, and relieving internal and external pressure that may be faced in the process of revising the Peace Constitution.For example, since 2021,Shinzo Abe, the defense minister Kishi Nobuo and other conservative forces of the Liberal Democratic Party have strongly demanded that Japan’s GDP share of the military expenditure increase to two percent36“The Liberal Democratic Party’s Draft Proposal: to Increase Defense Expenditures to 2% of GDP in Five Years,”NHK News, April 16, 2022, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20220416/k10013584771000.html.“in reference to NATO objectives.”After the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian crisis, Abe and others even once proposed that Japan should“follow the NATO model”and“share the nuclear strike capabilities”with the United States.The Japanese government also broke through the restriction on“no transfer of military materials to belligerents”in the“The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment,”on the grounds that“Ukraine’s response to threats from the international order is equivalent to maintaining Japan’s security”and provided material support to the Ukrainian army.37Shinya Oguma,“Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and Japan’s Initial Response Decision Process,”NIDS Commentary, March 17, 2022, http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/publication/commentary/pdf/commentary210.pdf.

In addition, the joint training and technical equipment cooperation with European countries is also conducive to improving the actual combat capability of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.Compared with the United States, the scale of the British and French amphibious combat forces and aircraft carrier battle groups is closer to that of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, so it can provide Japan with more valuable experience.38Jeffrey W.Hornung, Allies Growing Closer: Japan-Europe Security Ties in the Age of Strategic Competition, RAND, 2020, p.100, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA186-1.html.Active participation in the joint military operations with NATO and the EU also help Japan deepen its understanding of the modes of action of all parties in the multilateral security cooperation framework.

For Europe, its security transformation in recent years has also highlighted the value of Japan as a security partner.After the Brexit, the barriers to the EU defense integration were removed.The EU intended to make up for its lack of military capabilities and strengthen its security influence by making global allies an indispensable support force.39Zhang Bei,“The Impact of Brexit on EU-US Relations,”China International Studies, No.1, 2022,pp.85-104.The introduction of Japanese capital and technology will also help boost Europe’s independent defense industry and avoid losing competitiveness due to excessive dependence on the United States.40Michito Tsuruoka and Daniel Fiott,“EU-Japan Cooperation on Defence Capabilities: Possibilities?”Elcano Royal Institute, May 22, 2020, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/eu-japancooperation-on-defence-capabilities-possibilities/.At the same time, NATO also needs to shift its goals beyond Europe to ease internal pressure and evade the competition and overlap in terms of function of their two organizations.41NATO,“NATO 2030: United for a New Era,”November 25, 2020, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-FinalReport-Uni.pdf.

Challenges and Trends of Japan-Europe Security Cooperation

On the whole, despite the rapid development of Japan-Europe security cooperation in recent years, the two sides have long focused on economic cooperation and have relatively ignored the security sector.The differences between Japan and Europe in terms of threat perception and security goals,the different internal economic and political pressures they face, as well as the constraints of the United States and other factors have restricted the upgrading of Japan-Europe security cooperation from a condition of fragmented cooperation in specific areas to a real military alliance.

Major challenges faced by Japan-Europe security cooperation

First, Japan and Europe have different primary security goals.The differences in the geographical positions of Japan and Europe determine that the sources and targets of security threats faced by both sides are different.For Europe, prevention and response to Russia has always been the primary focus of maintaining its own security for many years.The recent crisis in Ukraine has been protracted, which highlights Russia’s threat to Europe.Although Japan has adopted a series of economic sanctions against Russia,it is still very limited in the face of Russian counter-measures, and with its current military strength, it cannot directly compete with Russia in the security sector.Japan’s primary security goal is still to build a“free and open Indo-Pacific”to balance China’s power and“gain the upper hand”in the maritime sovereignty dispute between China and Japan.However, despite verbal support for“free and open Indo-Pacific,”Europe actually tries to avoid direct confrontation with China, and avoid being involved in the maritime sovereignty dispute between China and Japan.The EU’s“Indo-Pacific Strategy”clearly recognizes the necessity for cooperation with China.

What’s more crucial is the future direction of the Indo-Pacific order for Japan and Europe, especially since they have deep differences in the role of the United States in this region.The“free and open Indo-Pacific”promoted by Japan has a strong value orientation and ideological“New Cold War”overtones.It hopes to jointly contain China by integrating American and European resources and help the United States consolidate hegemony in exchange for enhancing its standing in the alliance system.However, the EU’s“Indo-Pacific Strategy”is more for strategic autonomy and the desire to become a major participant in geopolitics again.42James Crabtree,“Where Next for EU Security Policy in the Asia-Pacific?”IISS, January 21, 2022,https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2022/01/where-next-for-eusecurity-policy-in-the-asia-pacific.Josep Borrell, the EU’s High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,made it clear that“unlike the United States, the EU does not pursue a strategic confrontation of the‘New Cold War’style,”while French President Macron said more frankly, Europe will neither take the same position as the United States with regard to the Indo-Pacific issue, nor become a“vassal of China.”43Xing Ruili,“The Strategic Interaction between the EU and the US in the Indo-Pacific Region,”Social Sciences in Xinjiang,No.6, 2021, pp.81-94.The deep contradiction between Japan and Europe on the“unipolar or multipolar”order in the Indo-Pacific region will restrict the further deepening of their strategic interaction.

Second, Japan and Europe are short of current strategic resources.Japan and Europe have suffered from sluggish economic growth in recent years.Against the background of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukrainian crisis, both sides are faced with heavy burdens such as high debt and rising inflation.The prospect of economic recovery is still in doubt, and the use of debt to develop military power continues to be controversial, making it difficult to implement.In addition, both sides are facing a serious problem of“declining birthrate and aging,”which directly restricts the development and construction of military organizations.44Zhu Jingbin,“Japan’s Self-Defense Force Helplessly Turn Weak,”Xinmin Daily, January 10, 2022,p.10.In practice, the military strength of both sides is not enough to provide meaningful security support to each other, and security cooperation is highly symbolic.For example, if Japan conducts joint exercises and training at sea with European countries in the Indian Ocean or Atlantic Ocean, it often needs to be combined with other tasks or training plans in order to save costs.European maritime forces,including the UK, are also overwhelmed by the demands of tasks in the Atlantic, the Middle East and the Russian periphery, which makes it difficult to focus on power projection far away from the Western Pacific, with limited response to Japan’s most urgent security needs.45Mirna Galic,“Navigating by Sun and Compass: The Future of Japan-NATO Relations,”JIIA Policy Brief, January 15,2021, https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/column/2021/01/PDF/FINAL_Japan_NATO_Next_Steps_End_Notes_12320.pdf; Meng Xiaoxu,“Japan-UK Security Cooperation at the Intersection of the‘Indo-Pacific’Strategy and Global Britain Strategy,”pp.11-21.

Third, Japan and Europe have great disputes over their respective security pathways.Japan’s current security system still restricts Japan-Europe indepth security cooperation.For example, if the Japanese Self-Defense Forces invoke the“right of collective self-defense”to provide military support to European countries in conflict, it must be approved by the Japanese Diet.If the conflict is judged to be a“significant impact situation”rather than a“crisis survival situation,”the Japanese Self-Defense Forces can only provide support outside the battlefield and cannot directly intervene in the conflict,which makes it difficult for Japan to provide reliable security commitments to European countries.At the same time, taboos such as the“Three Non-Nuclear Principles”also limit the feasibility of British and French nuclearpowered aircraft carriers and submarines stopping at Japanese ports.At the same time, the modification of the security system will face strong opposition from domestic public opinion.Although the Liberal Democratic Party government has long tried to promote the constitutional amendment to further remove the restrictions on the exercise of force, pacifist thought is deeply rooted among the Japanese people.Experts, scholars, the opposition party and even the Komeito Party within the ruling coalition have strong reservations about the“constitutionalization of the Self-Defense Forces,”and the public is generally unwilling to bear the risk of passive involvement in the conflict, which restricts Japan-Europe security cooperation to military cooperation treaties in different sectors, and it is difficult to conclude a military alliance with clearly defined obligations.

At the same time, there are also big differences among European countries regarding the focus of security operations, which can be broadly divided into three camps.After Brexit, Britain tends to work with the United States and extra-territorial partners to expand its scope of security action globally.France, Germany, and other European powers are primarily concerned about the security of Europe, when considering the affairs of the Indo-Pacific region.Some Eastern European countries, such as the Baltic States, oppose the pursuit of other security goals by Europe other than balancing Russia.These differences make it difficult for the EU and NATO to flexibly adjust their existing exercise and training plans, deploy more military forces outside Europe, or to focus Japan-Europe security cooperation on other than“country specific”or a“one case, one discussion”situations,given the inability to build a comprehensive deep security cooperation mechanism.46Mirna Galic,“Navigating by Sun and Compass: The Future of Japan-NATO Relations”; Axel Berkofsky,“Moving Beyond Rhetoric? The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA),”Institute for Security and Development Policy, April 2020, https://isdp.eu/publication/the-eu-japanstrategic-partnershipagreement/.

Fourth, Japan-Europe security cooperation is still restricted by the United States.From the perspective of the United States, although strengthening security cooperation between Japan and Europe is conducive to its“Integrated Deterrence”against China, it also brings about the risk that Japan and Europe may depart from the security framework set by the United States, or even try to override the United States, which the United States would find unacceptable.US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin once publicly stated on the“Indo-Pacific deployment”of the British“Queen Elizabeth”aircraft carrier battle group that as an ally, it would be more helpful for the United States if Britain did not focus on Asia.47“Britain‘More Helpful’Closer to Home than in Asia, Says US Defence Chief,”Financial Times, July 28, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/7fb26630-a96a-4dfd-935c9a7acb074304.At the same time, the United States is also highly alert to the trend of“strategic autonomy”in Europe, and is especially worried that the independent development of weapons and equipment in Europe and the improvement of military science and technology may affect the ability of the US militaryindustrial complex to seize profits.48Wang Zhenling,“US Perceptions and Policy Positions on European Defense Autonomy,”Journal of International Relations,No.5, 2021, pp.24-44.Japan regards the Japan-US alliance as the“security base axis,”and the relevant Japan-Europe cooperation will have to practice“self-restraint”to avoid violating the interests of the United States.Therefore, the United States’strategic goals determine the upper limit of Japan-Europe security cooperation.

Trends of Japan-Europe security cooperation

Under the influence of the Ukrainian crisis, Japan took the opportunity to promote its policy of“normal nationalization,”while Europe faced the dilemma of its global security influence being questioned, its security resources being further controlled by Russia, and its security dependence on the United States being strengthened.Japan-Europe security cooperation is regarded by both sides as an important platform on which to publicize their security policies and manifest their“presence.”It can also be used to emphasize their determination to maintain“common values,”the“free and open order,”“free navigation at sea”and other relevant rules.On this basis,the two sides may choose several areas with strong symbolic significance and new“lower costs”as the focus of future cooperation.

The first is to carry out cooperation in space, cyber and other“high-frontier security”areas.As the western countries enter a transition period in their thinking on military theory and combat tactics under the leadership of the United States, France, Japan, Britain and other countries have successively put forward the theory and concept of synergizing the capabilities of various military services and fields to carry out joint operations, such as France’s“air-land operational bubble, Japan’s“Multi-Domain Defense Force,”Britain’s“Multi-Domain Integration,”etc.These new theories and concepts bring about new demands for space and cyber security control capabilities beyond the traditional field of combat, and can be combined with Japan and Europe’s respective R&D priorities, which is expected to become an important growth point of Japan-Europe security cooperation in the future.

In the field of space, Japan established a“Space Operations Squadron”under the Air Self-Defense Force in 2020, and the NATO Space Center was also established.In January 2022, NATO announced its Overarching Space Policy, claiming that it“engages with selected partners and relevant international organizations, as appropriate, and adds value to NATO’s core tasks.”49NATO,“NATO’s overarching Space Policy,”January 7, 2022.In May, the Japan-Europe Summit issued a joint statement announcing that the two sides will expand cooperation in scientific and technological research and development, including in space.50Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,“Japan-EU Summit 2022 Joint Statement,”May 12, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100343125.pdfIn the field of cyber, Japan, Britain and the EU respectively reached a consensus on“jointly building a secure and reliable fifth generation (5G) mobile communication system”and“jointly developing from April to May 2022 an application scheme for the sixth generation (6G) mobile communication system.”In the future, Japan, Britain and the EU will work together to seek cutting-edge technological advantages in the communications sector and jointly respond to cyber-attacks.

The second is to have cooperation on third-party security capacity building with a focus on the Indo-Pacific region.Both Japan and Europe look forward to transforming their“normative forces”into forces with real security impacts, and transferring their experience to developing countries in the Indo-Pacific region through joint training, personnel exchanges and exercises as an effective way to enhance their global“presence.”Cooperation in this sector can enable Japan and Europe to share their long-accumulated contact networks in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa, and expand their influence.A joint study conducted by the Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies and the Free University of Brussels suggested that Japan and the European Union could jointly launch the“Indian Ocean Maritime Capacity Building Initiative,”which includes the establishment of a mutual fund to support the two sides and“like-minded partners”to provide training for the naval and coastal security departments of the Indian Ocean coastal countries and the ASEAN countries, the provision of ships for coastal patrol to relevant countries, and the building of“Maritime Situational Awareness Center of Excellence”based in Djibouti where they can share relevant information and link with the Information Fusion Centers in Singapore and India, etc.51Luis Simón and Tomohiko Satake,“Rules-based Connectivity, Maritime Security and EU-Japan Cooperation in the Indian Ocean”; Elcano Royal Institute, May 14, 2020, https:// www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/rules-based-connectivity-maritime-security-and-eujapan-cooperation-in-the-indian-ocean/.

The third is to build a“small multilateral”security cooperation network with the United States and countries in the Indo-Pacific region.In recent years,the United States has adjusted the way of alliance and cooperation, and has built multiple groups of“small multilateral”mechanisms in different fields to avoid the low decision-making efficiency caused by the large alliance structure and to improve flexibility.Japan, Britain and France have all participated in several such“small multilateral”mechanisms, such as the“The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue”(QUAD) made up of the US,Japan, India and Australia, US, UK, besides, there are Australia’s“Trilateral Mechanism”(AUKUS), the US-UK-Japan Naval Cooperation Mechanism concluded in 2019 and the US-UK-French Naval Cooperation Mechanism in 2021.Japan and Europe will strengthen security cooperation, especially after Japan signs the“Reciprocal Access Agreement”with Britain and France in the future.Such small multilateral mechanisms will become an important platform for integrating Japan and Europe under the leadership of the United States.Some Japanese scholars said that Japan should join AUKUS to form“JAUKUS”or“Japan-US-UK-Australia Maritime Countries Alliance.”52“Another Reason for PM Kishida’s Visit to Southeast Asia and Europe,”Yahoo Japan, May 8, 2022,https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/8af23f3d741cdb4cf0bbb45f0a09dca4c7886293?page=1.Some French scholars have also proposed that Britain, France,and Germany can be pulled into the QUAD to form an“extended large version of the Quadrilateral mechanism.”53Bruno Tertrais and Michel Duclos,“After AUKUS: How Could France Reboot Its Indo-Pacific Strategy?”Institute Montaigne, October 4, 2021, https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/after-aukushow-could-france-reboot-its-indo-pacific-strategy.In addition, Britain and France also intend to establish a small multilateral mechanism of“Indo-Pacific”countries that is independent of the United States, and Japan may also be involved in the future.For example, in recent years, Britain has reactivated the“Five Power Defense Arrangements”(FPDA) mechanism with Australia,New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore.Japan is one of its observers, and may strengthen cooperation with FPDA in joint training, logistics supply and other aspects in the future54Shingo Nagata,“The Five-Party Defense Arrangement (FPDA) and Asia-Pacific Maritime Security: A Perspective on Anglo-Japanese Cooperation in Defense Equipment and Technology,”The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, October 12, 2017, https://www.spf.org/oceans/analysis_ja02/_1.html..In January 2021, the embassies of France and Japan in India and the Ministry of External Affairs of India jointly held the“Seminar on Indo-Pacific issues among France, India, and Japan”to discuss the tripartite cooperation in maritime security, digital connectivity and other fields.55Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,“List of French-Japanese Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,”July 24, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100216294.pdf.

Conclusion

Japan’s strengthened interaction and cooperation with Europe in the security sector is an objective reflection of the decline in the credibility of the United States’global security commitment, the shift of the international security pattern from“unitary”to“multipolar,”and the enhancement of the geostrategic significance of“Indo-Pacific.”However,Japan and Europe use“values”as the security cooperation link, which can easily“spill over”into an ideological confrontation of“West vs.Non-West,”and is motivated by the hegemonic competition strategy of the United States and Japan.That will have a negative impact on China’s peripheral security situation.

First, the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait issues would pose greater challenges to China’s sovereignty.Through the strategy of“Three Seas Linkage”and“Internationalization,”Japan has attracted Europe and other external forces to implement joint containment against China, making China face greater pressure in safeguarding sovereign security.Second, the regional security environment would become more complex.Japan and Europe help each other to become active“Indo-Pacific security participants,”improve the level of integration and interoperability with the US military in terms of equipment, logistics and combat operations,and bring countries in other regions into the security partnership network through“third-party capacity building,”which further improves the deterrent capability of the US military alliance system and causes security dilemmas.Third, the space for China’s overseas interests would be squeezed.The United States, Japan and Europe have generalized“security”issues to include scientific and technological innovation, infrastructure construction,international trade rules, supply chain and other economic fields, by exaggerating“the China Threat”and by implementing“joint checks and balances.”In this regard, expanding China’s overseas interests will face more fierce competition.

At the same time, it should also be noted that Japan and Europe’s economic dependence on China and the profound vigilance of relevant countries against the involvement of extraterritorial forces in regional security affairs, makes it difficult for Japan and Europe to really provoke a“camp confrontation”in the security sector.China should lead the development of China-Japan and China-EU relations from a strategic height, consolidate mutual benefit and win-win results through pragmatic cooperation, further carry out various forms of security dialogue and defense exchanges with Japan and Europe to enhance mutual trust and resolve miscalculations and doubts as much as possible.At the same time,we should also adhere to the principle of common security, improve the mechanism for participating in global security governance, actively promote and deepen regional security cooperation, maintain lasting peace and general security in the Asia-Pacific region through dialogue and consultation, and promoting the implementation of the“Global Security Initiative.”