Shaping the New Normal in China-US Strategic Competition

In its first year in office, the Biden administration has both inherited and adjusted the previous US policy toward China. It inherits the Trump administration’s strategic position and approach to China, and strives to formulate a competitive China strategy that is more beneficial and sustainable for the US. In fighting against US containment, suppression and provocation, China has demonstrated the strategic resolve and ability to shape the bilateral relationship. At the same time, it has been striving to shape the context and process of China-US interaction through active diplomacy. Against the backdrop of ongoing China-US strategic competition, both countries are strengthening their own strategies and policies to compete for dominance in the bilateral relationship and defend their national interests. Generally, the China-US strategic competition under Donald Trump’s tenure is characterized by uncertainty and conflict, while the Biden administration adopts a more predictable and manageable manner.Meanwhile, China hopes to further expand bilateral cooperation while maintaining benign competition and properly managing the divergences.Therefore, shaping the “new normal” in China-US strategic competition is an imperative agenda of great significance for both sides.

The Biden Administration’s China Policy

The Biden administration’s China policy has the following basic elements.As to the perception of China, the US identifies China as “the most serious competitor” and “the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.”1“Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” The White House, February 4, 2021,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-bidenon-americas-place-in-the-world/; The White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, p.8, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.With such a perception, the US policy toward China is prepared to address the challenges posed by an increasingly strong and confident China so as to maintain American hegemony and global dominance. The Biden administration’s China policy primarily focuses on competition, and considers confrontation where it deems necessary and cooperation where it is possible. Despite a Democratic government, it basically follows Trump’s China policy instead of Obama’s, which implies dramatic changes in the US political spectrum over the past several years. From a non-establishment perspective, the Trump administration’s China policy, which had been pushed by a strong intent to radically upend the conventional framework,was rather subversive. Biden’s China policy, in constrast, is influenced by several psychological and cognitive factors, such as the fear of being labeled a weak government and identified as a declining power by China, and being attacked by Republicans as playing weak on China. As a result, the Biden administration has reiterated that the US should deal with China from a position of strength, repeatedly emphasized China’s misjudgment of its decline, and shown a strong and tough posture toward China in both words and actions, which leads to Biden’s confrontational policy against China.

Throughout the first year in office, the Biden administration has contained, suppressed and deterred China comprehensively in the name of competition. In the ideological arena, the Biden administration has cooked up issues related to Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Shortly after taking office, the Biden administration forged the groundless accusation of “forced labor” and“genocide” in Xinjiang and posed sanctions on multiple Chinese officials for “human rights abuses.” Biden also signed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act that bans imports from Xinjiang. As for Hong Kong, the US imposed sanctions on several Chinese officials and together with its allies launched attacks on the outcome of the HKSAR’s 7th Legislative Council election. Besides, the Biden administration heaped pressure on China by announcing a diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics and staging a so-called “Summit for Democracy.” As for economy, trade and technology, the Biden administration has kept most of Trump’s tariffs in place, inherited the vile act of massive sanctions on Chinese high-tech enterprises, listed more Chinese entities to the US BIS Entity List, and even delisted some Chinese firms from US stock exchanges. As for geopolitics,the Biden administration has actively allied with the European Union and strengthened transatlantic coordination against China, gathered Japan,India and Australia to better cooperate on China issues, and established a new security partnership with Australia and Britain to build an Anglo-Saxon anti-China axis. In Southeast Asia, the Biden administration has been applying political pressure to drive wedges between China and its neighboring countries while touting closer relations with the US.Militarily, in addition to escalating the South China Sea tensions, the Biden administration has also stepped up deterrence on the Taiwan question. By intensifying military deployments, boosting military presence, elevating Taiwan’s defense capabilities and strengthening military cooperation with its allies, the US aims to prevent any change by force to the situation across the Taiwan Strait.

The Biden administration’s China policy contains features of a“quasi-Cold War,” with strategic competition with China aimed not only at ideological and institutional leadership but also at dominance in terms of strength and international influence. When China’s development achievements and efficient governance highlights its institutional advantage, the dysfunction of American political system has been exposed in stark contrast. Under such circumstances, the Biden administration is in urgent need to prove the superiority of the American system and outperform China in the institutional battle. Meanwhile, in order to safeguard American dominance in the world, the Biden administration is more bent on curbing China’s rising composite national strength and international influence accordingly. In implementing its China strategy,the Biden administration adopts the realpolitik approach, utilizing human rights, democracy and the so-called “global order based on democratic norms and institutions” as excuses to smear China and add to its own bargaining chips.

Compared with Trump, the Biden administration’s China policy places more emphasis on the role of allies and partners. The Biden administration believes that to maintain a competitive advantage over China, the US must “build back better” and improve relations with its allies. By utilizing platforms including the G7, NATO, the US-EU transatlantic alliance framework, the Quad cooperation mechanism,the Five Eyes Alliance, the Australia-UK-US Partnership (AUKUS), the US-ASEAN strategic partnership, and other bilateral or multilateral arrangements, the US has been rebuilding alliances and partnerships to win support for its China policy. In particular, the US has made utmost efforts to re-energize the transatlantic alliance. The US and the EU have engaged on a broad range of topics on China through the High-Level Meeting of the US-EU Dialogue on China and the US-EU Trade and Technology Council, indicating an increasingly enhanced transatlantic institutional coordination on China policy. Recognizing the Indo-Pacific as vital to its China strategy, the Biden administration has elevated the level of the Quad mechanism and enriched the four parties’ cooperation on China issues,while helping Australia acquire a nuclear-powered submarine capability within the AUKUS framework. Furthermore, the Biden administration has proactively boosted the expansion of Five Eyes Alliance cooperation on China through intelligence sharing, diplomatic engagement, and security coordination. At the preview of Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy, a senior US official stated that “We recognize the limitations in our ability to change China, and therefore seek to shape the strategic environment around China.”2“Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials Previewing the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific Strategy,” The White House, February 11, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2022/02/11/background-press-call-by-senior-administration-officials-previewing-the-u-s-s-indopacific-strategy.In particular, the Biden administration aims to reframe the geopolitical and economic architecture of the region through the Indo-Pacific strategy to “build a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favorable to the United States.”3The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.

Compared with previous administrations, the Biden administration’s China policy is much more distracted by the domestic environment. First,Trump’s China policy legacy is still haunting the Biden administration in terms of basic positioning of and approach toward China. Despite a shift in domestic agenda and various other foreign policies, Biden’s China policy has demonstrated remarkable continuity. Second, the Biden administration has been propagating the “China threat” in order to gain domestic support for his COVID-19 response, infrastructure development plan, and request for a higher budget in scientific and technological research. Third, Biden has utilized China as a bargaining chip to boost bipartisan recognition of his domestic agenda, as the Republicans prefer to deal with China with a tougher stance than the Democrats.4Craig Kafura and Dina Smeltz, “Cooperation, Competition, or Confrontation? Republicans and Democrats Split on China Policy,” The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, December 2021, http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/2021-12/Final%20China%20Brief.pdf.In the 2020 presidential election and after Biden’s inauguration, Biden has been constantly accused of going soft on China. As a result, Biden has to reach compromises with the Republicans’anti-China bills to win their support for his priorities.

Despite its flexibility and professionalism compared to that of the Trump administration, Biden’s China strategy has failed its original intention.

First, Biden’s China policy has received extensive castigation. During the 2020 election, Biden once lashed out at the tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, accusing them of impacting the US economy more than China’s. After taking office, however, Biden has kept the tariffs completely intact for fear of Republican attacks as well as anger of the labor unions that support him. There is also voice inside the administration to maintain the tariffs as a leverage for future negotiations. In contrast, Biden’s trade policy is opposed by the business community, who complain that it has subtantially raised the expenses to import from China. It is also widely acknowledged that the tariffs have contributed to the historic inflation in US history. Failing to propose a new China trade policy to improve the China-US relationship after a whole year in office, Biden has disappointed the American business community who lobbied for him during the 2020 election.

Second, from the perspective of national interests, few countries,US allies and partners alike, are willing to follow Biden’s lead on China policy. Although the Biden administration aims to revitalize its alliances and partnerships to initiate a broader competition with China, most allies and partners who benefit from economic ties with China have kept some distance from Washington. These countries can be classified into three groups. The first group consists of core US allies such as Australia,the United Kingdom and Japan, who closely coordinate with the US for a common stance on China. The second group, including Germany, France,South Korea and Singapore, have resisted choosing sides between the US and China. The third group, including the Philippines and Thailand, have maintained close cooperation with China. In general, the flawed Biden’s China policy has failed to fully consider the interests of allies and partners,which restricts Washington from re-energizing its leadership role among allies and partners.

Third, Biden’s China policy is staunchly resisted by China. The Chinese government strongly opposes the US positioning of China and the bilateral relationship, and rejects Washington’s trichotomic competitive, collaborative and adversarial rhetoric, demonstrating its resolute refusal to follow the US agendas. Furthermore, China has laid out three bottom lines and two lists of demands to set the guardrails for bringing China-US relations back on track.5“Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng Holds Meeting with US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman,”July 26, 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/bmz_679954/1206_680528/xgxw_680534/202107/t20210726_9183482.shtml; “Wang Yi: Underline Three Bottom Lines of China’s Relations with the United States,” July 26, 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/bmz679954/1206680528/xgxw_680534/202107/t20210726_9183479.shtml.Failing to open a new page in China-US relations, the Biden administration has to make tactical adjustments to its China strategy and respond to China’s concerns to some extent.6“President Xi Jinping Has a Virtual Meeting with US President Joe Biden,” November 16, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202111/t20211116_10448843.html.In the first year in office, the Biden administration has failed to establish a working mechanism or agree on a common agenda between the two countries, indicating that its diplomacy toward China has reached a deadlock.

China’s Response to Biden’s Policy

In response to the comprehensive strategic competition launched by the Trump administration, China has enriched its experience in countering US suppression. After Biden took office, China has further upgraded its US policy with strengthened strategic resolve and ability to shape, which exhibits three distinct features.

First, China has been strengthening its leading role in bilateral relations.Around the time of Biden’s inauguration, China sent a series of positive signals to the US. State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that Beijing and Washington should work out three lists regarding bilateral dialogue, cooperation and dispute management to provide a clear picture for bilateral relations; both sides should strive to resume dialogue, bring their relationship back on track, and rebuild mutual trust and a strategic framework for the stable and sound development of bilateral relations.Wang called on the US side to adjust its policies as soon as possible, remove unreasonable tariffs on Chinese goods, lift its unilateral sanctions on Chinese companies, research institutions and universities, and abandon irrational suppression of China’s technological progress.7“China and the US Can Work Out Lists of Dialogue, Cooperation, and Dispute Management,”December 7, 2020, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/bmz_679954/1206_680528/xgxw_680534/202012/t20201207_9361072.shtml; “Chinese FM Holds Video Meeting with US Asia Society,” December 19, 2020, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/bmz_679954/1206_680528/xgxw_680534/202012/t20201218_9361080.shtml; “Wang Yi Urges the US for Three Give-Ups,” February 22, 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/bmz_679954/1206_680528/xgxw_680534/202102/t20210222_10413468.shtml.Furthermore, Yang Jiechi,a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC)Central Committee and Director of the Office of the CPC Central Foreign Affairs Commission, pointed out that it is both a task for China and the US and the expectation of the international community to restore the bilateral relationship to a predictable and constructive track and interact under the consensus of peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation.8“Director Yang Jiechi Holds Online Dialogue with the National Committee on United States-China Relations,” February 2, 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/bmz_679954/1206_680528/xgxw_680534/202102/t20210202_9361095.shtml.In his first phone call with Biden, Chinese President Xi Jinping called on the two sides to focus on cooperation, meet each other halfway in the principle of mutual respect, and manage the divergences in a constructive way.9“President Xi Jinping Speaks with US President Joe Biden on the Phone,” February 11, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/202102/t20210211_9604419.shtml.In July of the same year, during the high-level talks between the two sides in Tianjin,China issued two lists of demands that urged the US to stop its wrongdoings and address its concerns with several key individual cases, while drawing three bottom lines in order to manage differences and prevent the bilateral relationship from spiraling out of control. In the phone call with Biden in September, President Xi encouraged his counterpart to demonstrate strategic courage and political resolve to bring China-US relations back to the right track of stable development.10“President Xi Jinping Speaks with US President Joe Biden on the Phone,” September 10, 2021,https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/bmz_679954/1206_680528/xgxw_680534/202109/t20210910_10413474.shtml.Later, in the virtual meeting with Biden in November, President Xi introduced China’s development path and strategic intentions, highlightd the three principles of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation in bilateral engagement, and identified four priorities that demand bilateral efforts.11“President Xi Jinping Has a Virtual Meeting with US President Joe Biden,” November 16, 2021.To conclude, China’s endeavor to achieve the leading role in bilateral relations demonstrates its sincerity in improving bilateral ties and its wisdom in handling the strained relationship.

Second, China is resolute to defend its national interests. Challenged by the confrontational and provocative approaches from the Biden administration, China has responded resolutely and safeguarded its own national interests. During the high-level strategic dialogue in Anchorage,China sharply rebuked the US bluff, exposed its narrative of presumptuously speaking on behalf of the international community, and castigated its interference in China’s internal affairs and the harm to China’s national interests. This tense and unusual diplomatic clash demonstrated the new normal of China’s US policy, which surprised and frustrated the US. During their talks in Tianjin, China revealed the US motive behind its trichotomic competitive, collaborative and adversarial rhetoric, refuted a series of statements and actions of the US government, and sternly warned the US not to dream of “doing bad things and still getting good results.”12“Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng Holds Meeting with US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R.Sherman.”All these moves of China further reminded the US that its self-righteous China policy will not work. When US Secretary of State Antony Blinken requested China’s cooperation when the US was embroiled in chaos following its hasty military withdrawal from Afghanistan, Wang Yi clarified that the US cannot count on China’s support and cooperation when it is still working hard to contain and suppress China and undermine its legitimate rights and interests. Such logic does not exist in international engagement.13“Chinese FM Talks with US Secretary of State over Bilateral Ties,” August 17, 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/bmz_679954/1206_680528/xgxw_680534/202108/t20210817_9183484.shtml.

As to the Taiwan question, President Xi has solemnly stated during his virtual meeting with Biden that the escalating tensions across the Taiwan Strait are heated up by the Taiwan authorities who are repeatedly seeking US support for their independence agenda as well as certain US legislators who are intent on using the Taiwan question to contain China. Xi pointed out that the US attempts on Taiwan are “playing with fire and will get burnt.”14“President Xi Jinping Has a Virtual Meeting with US President Joe Biden.”Moreover, China has demonstrated the determination and capabilities to counter “Taiwan independence” separatist forces and foreign interference. In 2021, the People’s Liberation Army has dispatched bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, and fighter jets to carry out normalized patrols around the Taiwan island, conducted multi-service routine joint combat readiness patrols, and held regular actual combat exercises on joint sea assault, joint land strike and joint air defense operations in the air and sea spaces around the island.15“PLA’s Patrols around Taiwan Decisive Acts against ‘Taiwan Independence’ Separatist Forces: Defense Spokesperson,” December 30, 2021, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2021-12/30/content_4902054.htm.In June 2021, the National People’s Congress of China enacted the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law to counter US sanctions, interference and long-arm jurisdiction against China over Hong Kong and Xinjiang issues. In July and December of the same year, China adopted reciprocal countermeasures on relevant persons according to the law. When the US attempted to politicize the tracing of COVID-19 origin and thus stigmatize China, China exposed the US political manipulation behind the origin-tracing, sharply pointed out the spotty track records of US bio labs at Fort Detrick, and urged the US to open relevant facilities for international investigation. In short, China has resolutely opposed the US practice of hegemony and power politics,safeguarded its sovereignty, security and development intersts, and further enriched the meaning of its major-country diplomacy.

Third, China has actively leveraged third-party factors. Given the fact that the US comes to rely more on third parties, especially its allies, in the strategic competition with China, China has placed more emphasis on strengthening and improving relations with third parties. The China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination has been continuously consolidated. In 2021, navies of the two countries organized joint maritime cruise in waters of the Western Pacific Ocean for the first time, and China invited the Russian forces to participate in its strategic military exercise “Joint Western 2021” for the first time. While the Biden administration is rallying its European allies to coordinate on China policy, China has firmly countered the EU policies that undermine its interests, but at the same time continued to improve relations with Europe and maintain stable relationships with major powers such as Germany and France. Despite the US trying to drive a wedge between China and ASEAN and lobby certain ASEAN countries to endorse its Indo-Pacific strategy, China and ASEAN celebrated the 30th anniversary of their dialogue relations and elevated it to a comprehensive strategic partnership, representing a significant step forward in their relations.Compared to the US, China’s ASEAN engagement outperforms in policy stability and cooperation effectiveness, as China actively works to ensure the effective and efficient implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), promotes the synergy between the Belt and Road cooperation and the priorities outlined in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, and sets up a new framework for comprehensive Lancang-Mekong cooperation. In the Middle East, China and Iran announced a 25-year agreement to expand cooperation in energy, security, infrastructure and cultural exchanges. Following Iran’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), cooperation between Iran and other SCO members have been enriched with new dimensions. Besides, China’s relations with African countries and with Latin American and Caribbean countries have been greatly improved. In response to US strategic competition with China on all fronts, China has been constantly expanding and deepening its cooperation with other countries and regions to foil US attempts and at the same time achieve its own broader diplomatic objectives.

In the past year, China’s policy toward the US has presented several new features, with the previous structure-oriented approach changed into an issue-oriented one. Conventionally, China strived to reach consensus with a new US administration on the positioning of bilateral relations and framework of their interactions, under which specific issues would be resolved later. Finding it difficult to achieve such consensus on bilateral cooperation with the Biden administration, China has adopted another approach to push the US into responding to its concerns. In addition,China has placed more emphasis on shaping a more favorable environment of international opinion. In the past, Washington possessed larger discourse power in the bilateral relationship, but this has been constantly challenged by China since the Anchorage dialogue. China has been boosting the quality and speed of information release and enhancing the interaction among its officials, media, experts and scholars, so as to improve its public image. These changes demonstrate the improvement of China’s diplomatic capability toward the US. In the future China-US engagement, China will adopt a more dynamic and customized diplomacy, actively shape the environment and course of China-US interaction, and effectively affect the domestic politics and foreign actions of Washington.

The Prospects of China-US Relations

In the years leading up to around 2030, the trajectory of China-US relations will be affected by two major structural factors. The first factor is the domestic politics of both sides. As to the US, the prevalence of hegemonic and geopolitical thinking, as well as ideological and racial prejudice in the American society will shape the mainstream perception of China in both the Biden administration and the Republican opposition, which leads to increased US hostility and hatred toward China. Political polarization and partisan divergence in the US will also contribute to politicization of the China issue as an instrument to serve the domestic political agenda,prompting both Democrats and Republicans to adopt a hawkish China policy as a political talisman and bargaining chip. As to China, with stronger pride and confidence in its development achievements and path, it has interpreted the US domestic governance capacity and international engagement in a more negative way, and has more resolutely criticized and countered the US hegemony and power politics. The second factor that will influence the direction of China-US relations is the dynamics of national power and interactions between the two sides. With a narrowing gap between the two countries’ overall national power, China’s capability in competing with the US will be further improved, which significantly increases Washington’s strategic anxiety. To preserve its global dominance, the US has adopted a more aggressive approach and systematically launched a ring of strategic encirclement against China. In contrast, China has consistently broken new ground in its major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics and adopted a strategy of proactive defense to counter the US strategic encirclement and suppression. In interactions between the two sides, the US is on the offensive and China is on the defensive in general, but their positions change according to aspects. However, the strategic competition between China and the US has not yet entered the stage of neck-and-neck rivalry as the gap between the two countries’ national power remains. The US will continue its offensive approach toward China, and the two major powers will witness continuous back and forth in more areas of their interactions while maintaining engagement. Against such a backdrop, the two countries’perceptions of each other will become more negative in the foreseeable future,which is likely to result in escalating confrontation, more intense competition and increasing risk of conflict.

In the near future, namely in the next three years or so, the China-US relations will exhibit the following features. First, there is little incentive for the US to improve bilateral relations. Despite Biden releasing several positive signals to improve relations with China in the second half of 2021, it is hard for him to translate that into concrete policies. Biden’s agenda is greatly influenced by domestic politics. Considering the forthcoming 2022 midterm congressional elections in particular, the Biden administration is unlikely announce major adjustments to its China policy, so as not to be criticized by the Republicans. A more conservative China policy can be expected if the Democrats lose control of one or both chambers of Congress in the midterm elections. Besides, Biden’s foreign policy team is basically tough on China and holds a negative attitude toward improving bilateral relations.16Wu Xinbo, “China-US Strategic Competition under the Biden Administration,” China International Studies, March/April 2021, pp.45-46.Moreover, Biden himself is hardly visionary with regard to China-US relations and has yet to demonstrate strong leadership so far. Based on a realistic assessment of the Biden administration’s China policy, China will be highly reluctant to make any compromises or trade-offs for the improvement of bilateral relations,17“Wang Yi Speaks with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on the Phone at Request,” January 27,2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202201/t20220127_10635268.html.which indicates that the relationship will remain gloomy for the next few years.

Second, tension will alternate with detente in bilateral relations. Given that the Biden administration’s line of thinking on China policy, its basic strategy and the foreign policy and security team’s tough stance toward China remain unchanged, US suppression, containment and even confrontation in the name of competition can be expected to continue in 2022. Washington might even take advantage of the occasion of the 20th CPC National Congress, during which China needs a secure and stable international environment, to blackmail China and even step up pressure and provocation against Beijing over the Taiwan question and the South China Sea issue.At the same time, there is every need for the US to cooperate with China to address climate change, the Iranian nuclear issue, the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and the Afghan issue, and coordinate with China in handling divergences in bilateral trade. Moreover, amid escalating tensions between the US and Russia over Ukraine, the US is attempting to drive a wedge between China and Russia to maximize the effect of its sanctions and isolation efforts.Based on the above considerations, the Biden administration’s China policy is double-faceted: it has to manifest toughness on China while avoiding making unsalvageable wrong decisions, sometimes even making overtures to China.Therefore, should China-US tensions accumulate to a certain point, the US would seek to ease the situation, thus resulting in a cycle of tension and detente in bilateral relations.

Third, the two sides will increase their engagement to some extent.Since the Clinton administration, the US has adopted a strategy of engagement toward China that aims to encourage China, often by means of exchanges, inducement and integration, to undertake important political and economic reforms and change its domestic and foreign policies. From Clinton to Obama, the engagement policy spawned over 100 bilateral dialogue mechanisms where Beijing and Washington had frequent exchanges that covered a wide range of topics. In particular, the annual China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue during the Obama era was held between high-level officials of both sides, with extensive participation and a wide range of topics covered, which highlighted the frequent and friendly interaction between the two countries. The engagement policy was changed to one of strategic competition under the Trump administration. After Biden took office, officials such as Kurt Campbell, the White House Indo-Pacific Coordinator, also publicly stated that the period in US policy toward China that was broadly described as engagement had come to an end.18The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf; “Biden’s Asia Czar Says Era of Engagement With China Is Over,” Bloomberg, May 27, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-26/biden-s-asia-czar-says-era-of-engagement-with-xi-s-china-is-over.However,although the US engagement policy with specific connotations is over, it is impossible to suspend engagement as a way of interaction between the two countries. Whether it is to promote cooperation, enhance coordination or manage divergences, communication, dialogue, coordination and negotiation between the two sides are always necessary. In the first year of Biden’s presidency, due to the unfinished evaluation of China policy and the tough stance on China under domestic political pressure, Biden adopted a coldhanded approach to China and maintained interaction with China at a low level. There was no high-level dialogue mechanism established in important fields such as economics and trade, diplomacy, and security. In 2022, the Biden administration, out of the pragmatic need to advance its domestic and foreign agendas, would probably enhance interactions with China.The launch of dialogue mechanisms in economics and trade, diplomacy,and military affairs can also be expected. In the new context, although engagement between the two sides will increase, it may not necessarily lead to warmer relations. Neither country will hold too high an expectation for the engagement, which will focus more on management of divergences and disputes than cooperation and coordination.

Finally, the two sides will strive to set a clear boundary for bilateral relations. The Biden administration’s China policy primarily focuses on competition, and considers confrontation where it deems necessary and cooperation where it is possible. In China’s view, there are both struggles and cooperation in bilateral relations. As a matter of fact, cooperation and competition are two fundamental elements in China-US relations. Given this, it is imperative for both countries to define a clear boundary for bilateral relations, namely, to explore how far their cooperation can go and determine the bottom line of their competition and confrontation. There are both objective and subjective factors behind the cooperation between China and the US. The former are reflected in the objective needs of the two countries and societies, such as trade and economic cooperation as well as people-to-people and cultural exchanges, while the latter are reflected in the understanding and preference of decision-makers. Before Trump took office, both China and the US regarded cooperation as a major staple of their bilateral relations, and both strived to promote cooperation, but the US turned to emphasize competition over cooperation under the Trump administration. The Biden administration, while acknowledging that cooperation is part of the relationship, has not considered it as a priority.In contrast, China advocates expanding cooperation and still regards cooperation as an important part of its relations with the US. Due to the changes in mutual perception and respective strategies and policies, the expectation for bilateral cooperation could hardly revert to the status before Trump. Instead, the two sides should pursue limited pragmatic cooperation with a cool-headed and objective attitude. The answers to questions including in which areas, to what extent, and under what conditions can China and the US cooperate will redefine the ceiling of China-US cooperation.

Based on the recognition of China as the United States’ most serious competitor, the Biden administration has spared no effort to contain and suppress China. Meanwhile, China has resolutely fought against US containment, suppression and provocation. As both sides find themselves at increasing risk of conflict, China and the US have realized that they need to tread carefully. China has proposed to manage the divergences and sensitive issues constructively in order to prevent bilateral relations from getting derailed or out of control, while the US has insisted that the two countries have no interest in letting competition veer into conflict, and suggested establishing guardrails to keep competition from spilling over into conflict. China has drawn three bottom lines on how to prevent the bilateral relationship from getting out of control, while the US has indicated that it does not seek to change China’s system, that the revitalization of its alliances is not targeting China, and that it has no intention to have conflicts with China. The US government has also reiterated its long-standing one-China policy and non-support for “Taiwan independence.”19“Wang Yi: Underline Three Bottom Lines of China’s Relations with the United States”; “President Xi Jinping Has a Virtual Meeting with US President Joe Biden.”While the high-level interactions between China and the US are increasingly focused on defining the bottom line of bilateral relations, it requires substantive dialogues to translate the principled statements into policy practices and reach a serious consensus that the bottom line will not be breached.

Conclusion

The adjustment of China policy initiated by the Trump administration has led to major changes in China-US relations. Due to its non-establishment nature, Trump’s policy team was inexperienced and often acted eccentrically and unreasonably. The Trump administration’s subversive China policy brought a high degree of uncertainty and conflicts into China-US relations, presenting an abnormal situation which was hardly sustainable.By contrast, Biden is from the establishment and leads a more professional and experienced team. His China policy pursues a competition-dominated relationship with China which is more predictable and manageable, so as to create a sustainable “new normal” that is in US interests.

Given the reality of China-US relations, it is an urgent and arduous task to shape a “new normal” of bilateral strategic competition. If the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was the most dangerous great-power confrontation, the current competition between China and the US is the most complex one. Against the backdrop of globalization and global governance, the high level of economic interdependence between the two countries, as well as the geopolitical, ideological and even cultural and racial tensions in their relations, have all made China-US competition of ever greater complexity. The bilateral relationship could hardly revert to the status before Trump. To prevent it from sliding into a “new Cold War,” it is necessary for both sides to foster a “new normal” in the face of increasing competition. Despite China’s opposition, the US would not easily abandon its position of viewing competition as the core of bilateral relations. Therefore, the focus of shaping the “new normal” is not to avoid or reduce competition but to set a good example of competition, which leaves room for cooperation and creates mechanisms to avoid conflict. Given that the momentum driving the bilateral relations in a negative direction is still strong, both sides should pay more attention to establishing and holding the bottom line rather than raising the ceiling.

The evolution of China-US relations over the past year shows that the Biden administration has yet to bring about significant improvement in bilateral relations, and the scenario is highly unlikely during his presidency.However, the Biden administration has provided an opportunity for the improvement and adjustment of bilateral relations to some extent. If the two countries can work together to increase the stability and predictability of their relations, facilitate healthy competition and reduce the risk of conflict,it will be a positive and constructive exploration that could bring meaningful progress.