China-ASEAN Cooperation and the Optimization of Regional Order

The study of regional cooperation between China and its neighboring countries after the Cold War is an emerging and important topic in China’s foreign relations studies. Since the end of the Cold War, China has carried out a series of fruitful regional cooperation activities in its neighborhood, which have contributed to the development of diplomatic strategies with Chinese characteristics and regional cooperation theories in international relations. These include China’s long-term, multi-level and wide-ranging cooperation with Southeast Asia, which has yielded remarkable results and has been hailed by President Xi Jinping as the most successful and dynamic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides have built a valuable foundation of trust, and accumulated rich cooperation experience and institutionalized results. The year 2021 marked the 30th anniversary of China-ASEAN dialogue relations. Leaders from both sides held a commemorative summit on November 22, summarized the successful experience of cooperation, upgraded bilateral ties from a strategic partnership to a comprehensive strategic partnership, and issued a joint statement on future cooperation.

In recent years, the Chinese academic community has made notable progress in the study of China-ASEAN cooperation, which, among others,explains the long-lasting success of this regional cooperation. Based on the current research findings, this article attempts to systematically explain how and why China-ASEAN cooperation can optimize the regional order in East Asia by elaborating its process, performance, causes, mechanisms,and development trend. This article provides a concise and comprehensive analytical framework with the following key point: China and ASEAN can continually overcome the divergence between concepts and practices in the process of regional cooperation, and thus promote the optimization of East Asian regional order.

This is principally about a process in which China and ASEAN continue to address issues concerning the concepts and practices of regional cooperation.Conceptsrefer to how China’s perception of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia evolves, andpracticesrefer to the development of China’s regional cooperation strategy in Southeast Asia.Both sides have been overcoming conceptual and practical contradictions in an effort to promote cooperation and optimize the regional order.Secondly, this article introduces for the first time the pattern of China-ASEAN cooperation, which is multi-level with ASEAN as the benchmark.Thirdly, China has gradually formed a basic framework for regional cooperation based on ASEAN, including developing regional awareness,improving regional strategy, expanding regional responsibilities, and advancing regional governance. Fourthly, there are three main mechanisms for China-ASEAN cooperation to optimize the order in East Asia:promoting the recognition of ASEAN centrality in East Asian regional cooperation, enriching East Asian cooperation by encouraging major countries to participate in competitive interaction, and improving the “ASEAN plus” structure in East Asian cooperation. Finally, in the context of intensified China-US strategic rivalry and the rise of an Indo-Pacific order, China-ASEAN cooperation faces renewed divergence between concepts and practices, namely, whether the two sides can expand cooperation to cope with and optimize the emerging Indo-Pacific order. This article argues that China and ASEAN can further strengthen cooperation under the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific framework to optimize a broad and inclusive Indo-Pacific regional order.

The ASEAN Benchmark in China-Southeast Asia Cooperation

During the Cold War, China’s overall perception of and diplomatic practices towards Southeast Asia were shaped by the US-Soviet rivalry. After the Cold War, China rapidly and consciously deepened its general understanding and diplomatic practices in relation to Southeast Asia. Historically speaking,cooperation between China and Southeast Asia, with ASEAN as the benchmark, can be divided into three levels: with ASEAN, within ASEAN,and beyond ASEAN. The “ASEAN benchmark” refers to China’s perception of and cooperation with ASEAN as a regional organization; “within ASEAN” refers to bilateral and sub-regional cooperation between China and Southeast Asian countries; “beyond ASEAN” refers to the regional and trans-regional cooperation within East Asian cooperation frameworks established by ASEAN, as well as cooperation between China and ASEAN on a global scale.

Bilateral cooperation between China and ASEAN countries

In 1991, China established, restored, or normalized relations with all Southeast Asian countries. In December 1997, the first informal China-ASEAN summit was held in Malaysia. The two sides agreed to establish a good-neighborly partnership of mutual trust for the 21st century, which has become the guiding principle for deepening bilateral relations between China and ASEAN countries. Since the beginning of the 21st century, China’s relations with all ASEAN countries have evolved, and various forms of partnerships have been established. In 2013, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the Indonesian parliament, in which he expressed for the first time China’s willingness to conclude a treaty of good-neighborliness, friendship and cooperation with ASEAN countries. In 2019, China signed the Action Plan on Building a Community with a Shared Future with Cambodia and Laos. During President Xi Jinping’s visit to Myanmar in January 2020, China and Myanmar reached a critical consensus on building a China-Myanmar community with a shared future. Over the past 30 years, China and ASEAN countries have achieved fruitful results in their cooperation at the bilateral level.

Sub-regional cooperation between China and Southeast Asia

Sub-regional cooperation between China and Southeast Asia is carried out on land and sea respectively. The Cambodia negotiations in 1991 completely eased the strategic situation in land-based Southeast Asian states,and China’s coordination with ASEAN countries during the negotiation process also laid the foundation for cooperation with several maritime Southeast Asian countries. In 1992, China participated in the Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation Program (GMS) led by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), marking the beginning of China’s subregional cooperation. In September 2021, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said at the seventh GMS summit that “the GMS economic cooperation program has maintained a momentum of steady development since its inception nearly 30 years ago. It has been an enabling factor for economic and social development, the betterment of people’s lives, and stability and prosperity in the wider region.”1“Speech by Premier Li Keqiang at the Seventh GMS Summit,” Xinhua, September 9, 2021, http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2021-09/09/c_1127845778.htm.

In 2014, China launched the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC),a new-type sub-regional cooperation mechanism sponsored and built by China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. It aims at deepening good-neighborly friendship and pragmatic cooperation among the six Lancang-Mekong countries, bolstering socio-economic development of the sub-regional countries, forging the Lancang-Mekong Economic Development Belt, and building a community with a shared future for Lancang-Mekong countries. Furthermore, it intends to promote the building of an ASEAN community with close regional integration to advance South-South cooperation and implement the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and also maintain durable peace, development,and prosperity in this region.2“Lancang-Mekong Cooperation,” December 13, 2017, http://www.lmcchina.org/node_1009503.html.

In terms of the maritime sub-region, the Guangxi Autonomous Region of China launched the Pan-Beibu Gulf Economic Cooperation for maritime ASEAN countries around 2006. With the Nanning-Singapore Economic Corridor as the axis and the Greater Mekong Subregion Cooperation Zone and Pan-Beibu Gulf Economic Cooperation Zone as the wings, a new pattern of regional economic cooperation between China and ASEAN was established. In addition, the Chinese government has actively promoted cooperation between China and the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area(BIMP-EAGA). During his visit to the Philippines in 2018, President Xi Jinping pledged to increase input into BIMP-EAGA. At the 17th China-ASEAN Expo and China-ASEAN Business and Investment Summit in November 2020, he proposed to deepen cooperation between China and BIMP-EAGA.3“Remarks by President Xi Jinping at Opening Ceremony of the 17th China-ASEAN Expo, Business and Investment Summit,” November 27, 2020, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2020/content_5567744.htm.At the 24th China-ASEAN summit held in October 2021, Premier Li Keqiang indicated that China will continue to work with ASEAN and deepen cooperation with BIMP-EAGA to contribute to ASEAN integration.4“Speech by Premier Li Keqiang at the 24th China-ASEAN Summit,” Xinhua, October 26, 2021, http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2021-10/27/c_1128003173.htm.In general, land-based sub-regional cooperation between China and ASEAN countries is ahead of their maritime subregional cooperation.

Regional cooperation between China and ASEAN

In 1991, China and ASEAN formally started their dialogue process.Over the past 30 years, China-ASEAN relations have developed by leaps and bounds and made remarkable achievements, bringing tangible benefits to more than two billion people in 11 countries. Historic breakthroughs were made in 1991 when the two sides established dialogue relations and China began to view the ASEAN region as a totality. In 1995,Vietnam joined ASEAN and was recognized by China, which marked not only a transformation of ASEAN but also a dramatic shift in China’s perception of the organization. Since then, the importance of ASEAN as a whole in China’s foreign strategy has been increasing. In 1996, China and ASEAN established a dialogue partnership, marking the beginning of institutionalized cooperation between the two sides. After the Asian financial crisis broke out in 1997, the Chinese government shouldered the responsibilities of a major country and played a constructive role in helping ASEAN countries overcome the difficulties, which provided opportunities for closer bilateral relations. In December of the same year, the first China-ASEAN summit issued a joint declaration, affirming the establishment of a good-neighborly partnership of mutual trust looking forward to the 21st century.

At the sixth China-ASEAN summit in November 2002, China and ASEAN signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, which set the goal of establishing the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) by 2010. At this meeting, China and ASEAN countries also signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), the first political document on the South China Sea issue signed by China and ASEAN. The DOC is of great and positive significance for safeguarding China’s sovereignty, maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea, and enhancing mutual trust between China and ASEAN.

In 2003, China was the first ASEAN dialogue partner to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), establishing a strategic partnership for peace and prosperity with ASEAN. Since then, the two sides have held several commemorative summits for the establishment of dialogue relations and strategic partnership, which has consistently helped strengthen political mutual trust and achieve fruitful results through practical cooperation in various fields.

The 16th China-ASEAN summit in 2013 established a “2+7”cooperation framework5The “2+7” cooperation framework, proposed by Premier Li Keqiang in 2013 at the China-ASEAN summit in Brunei, emphasizes a two-point political consensus, namely enhancing strategic trust and promoting economic cooperation, and seven cooperation fields including trade facilitation, interconnectivity and security exchanges, among others.for the next decade, reflecting the commitment of the Chinese government to making ASEAN its priority in its neighborhood diplomacy. At the end of the same year, the two sides issued the Joint Statement Commemorating the 10th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership. In November 2015, the two sides signed the Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Certain Agreements thereunder between China and ASEAN, marking conclusion of the negotiations on upgrading the CAFTA. In November 2018, China and ASEAN issued the China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership Vision 2030, which laid a foundation for maintaining regional peace and stability, enhancing mutual trust and confidence, and upgrading cooperation.In November 2019, leaders of China and ASEAN countries issued the Joint Statement on Synergizing Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC)2025 and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), encouraging both sides to take steps toward high-quality BRI cooperation and injecting new impetus into the region’s comprehensive connectivity. On November 22, 2021, President Xi Jinping presided over a summit commemorating the 30th anniversary of China-ASEAN dialogue relations. Leaders of the 11 countries upgraded the China-ASEAN strategic partnership to a comprehensive strategic partnership and issued a joint statement.

China-ASEAN cooperation within East Asian frameworks

In 1994, China joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an ASEAN-led Asia-Pacific security dialogue mechanism, which marked China’s recognition of ASEAN as the leading voice in the regional security dialogue. In October 2010, ASEAN established the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) to strengthen security and defense cooperation with its eight dialogue partners, and to promote peace, stability and development in the region. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis,economic cooperation between China and ASEAN within East Asian cooperation frameworks rose rapidly: from 1997 to 2001, the “10+1”and “10+3” East Asian cooperation frameworks were initially established;from 2001 to 2005, the East Asian cooperation frameworks developed rapidly; from 2006 to 2010, the frameworks of “10+3”, “10+6” and later the East Asia Summit (“10+8”) emerged. During this period, Australia,New Zealand, India, the United States, and Russia joined the East Asia Summit. After 2010, ASEAN launched the MPAC, hoping that significant countries would support infrastructure development in the region. In the face of pressure from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), ASEAN launched negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership(RCEP) in 2012, which China actively promoted.

After 2013, China gradually aligned its BRI with the MPAC 2025. In response to the launch of their respective Indo-Pacific strategies by the US,Japan, India, Australia and other countries after 2017, which largely aimed at competing with the BRI, ASEAN launched the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) in 2019, explicitly proposing to maintain ASEAN’s centrality in the Indo-Pacific strategy and emphasizing inclusive regional cooperation. The joint statement of the summit commemorating the 30th anniversary of China-ASEAN dialogue relations reaffirmed the principles in the AOIP. In his speech at the summit, President Xi Jinping mentioned that China sought high-quality Belt and Road cooperation with ASEAN and coordination between the BRI and the AOIP.

China-ASEAN cooperation at the global level

In 1997, China was the first to propose cooperation with ASEAN at the global level. The Joint Statement of China-ASEAN Summit issued in December of that year mentioned that it encouraged China and ASEAN countries to work closely with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and international regulatory institutions. China has long appreciated and supported ASEAN in playing a positive role in international and regional affairs. ASEAN also believes that a peaceful, stable, and prosperous China is a crucial factor for long-term peace, stability and development of the Asia-Pacific region and the world.

In 2004, the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity opened a separate chapter about cooperation between the two sides in international and regional affairs. Since then, China and ASEAN have carried out extensive cooperation at the global level.

First, under the United Nations framework, the two sides have conducted dialogue and cooperation on UN reform, counter-terrorism,development and other issues of common interest. The permanent representatives of China and ASEAN member states to the UN have held regular meetings for close coordination. Second, within the WTO, the two sides have worked together to advance the Doha Development Agenda negotiations, and have strived to make the WTO fully reflect the interests and concerns of developing countries by improving the principle of special and differential treatment, expanding technical assistance to developing countries, and supporting Laos and Vietnam’s accession to the WTO. Third,on the trans-regional front, in addition to maintaining close coordination at the ASEAN Regional Forum, China and ASEAN have strengthened cooperation in energy, agriculture, finance and other areas to jointly advance the process of Asian cooperation dialogue. The two sides have stepped up coordination and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and other platforms, and implemented South-South cooperation through mechanisms such as the Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC) and Asia-Africa sub-regional cooperation.

In response to the rising trend of trade protectionism and antiglobalization in recent years, both sides have expressed firm opposition in the China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership Vision 2030, stressing active integration into economic globalization to achieve the long-term goal of establishing an East Asian community. On implementing the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, as recognized by their joint statement at the Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations in 2021, the Global Development Initiative proposed by China and the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 have both reinforced the UN 2030 Agenda. Deepening regional and international cooperation is a core component of China-ASEAN comprehensive strategic partnership for peace, security, prosperity, and sustainable development.The two sides will work together to build an international system based on the principles of the UN Charter and international law that follows the concepts of openness and inclusiveness, transparency, mutual respect, fairness and justice, and win-win outcomes, while strengthening communication and cooperation on global issues such as climate change,public health, biodiversity conservation, food and energy security.

It is evident that China’s regional cooperation with Southeast Asia,taking ASEAN as the benchmark, has made significant progress at bilateral,sub-regional, regional, trans-regional, and global levels. Despite differences in content, these cooperation activities are developing increasingly in unison, forming a multi-level, multi-channel and multi-process cooperation model for China in Southeast Asia. This has been a rarity in China’s globally oriented regional cooperation in the post-Cold War era. The reason ASEAN is chosen as the benchmark is that it is a consolidated organization and a regional body representing the whole of Southeast Asia (except East Timor),which also reflects China’s respect for ASEAN. This is also manifested in the Chinese leader’s official statement, “I wish to reaffirm that China will unswervingly take ASEAN as a high priority in its neighborhood diplomacy,unswervingly support ASEAN unity and ASEAN Community building,unswervingly support ASEAN centrality in the regional architecture, and unswervingly support ASEAN in playing a bigger role in regional and international affairs.”6“Speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations,” November 22, 2021, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-11/22/content_5652461.htm.

Overcoming Conceptual and Practical Contradictions in Regional Cooperation

China’s cooperation with Southeast Asia has emerged in the process of resolving contradictions in diplomatic practices and strategic thinking.

Practical and conceptual challenges in China-ASEAN cooperation

China’s regional cooperation with Southeast Asia has progressed rapidly and can be regarded as the best practice of China’s foreign strategy,especially its neighborhood strategy. It’s worth noting that every progress in cooperation is made after overcoming difficulties in diplomatic practices.Behind these difficulties in diplomatic practices are mostly differences in ideas and thoughts and the conflicting interests behind them. For example,China had not yet accumulated any ready-to-use experience when joining the GMS to promote sub-regional cooperation and strengthen cooperation with ASEAN. Although theories such as regionalism and new regionalism already existed at the time to support such practices, they were not fit to keep pace with the fast-developing situation and could not be applied directly.

In China’s regional cooperation practices in Southeast Asia, several contradictions have existed throughout the process. First is the challenge to keep a balance between bilateral and multilateral cooperation, which is in essence a problem of resource distribution and coordination. Whereas bilateral cooperation is indeed crucial as the basic foundation, the rise of regional cooperation has highlighted the importance of multilateral cooperation platforms. In practice, the overlapping of bilateral and multilateral cooperation has raised the question of which activities should be conducted at the bilateral level and which at the multilateral level.

Second, is a more united ASEAN or a divided ASEAN more favorable to China? Essentially, the issue is how China views and responds to the integration and integrity of ASEAN. Most scholars believe that“unity is better than division,” while fewer scholars believe that “division is better than unity,” and some believe that it depends on the circumstances.China’s consistent policy is to support the construction of ASEAN integration. However, China’s greater engagement with Mekong countries is often seen as a move to split ASEAN, which partially explains the slow progress in sub-regional cooperation between China and maritime ASEAN countries.

Third, there is the question of how to deal with ASEAN’s variability and invariability, i.e., how to address the ever-changing regional cooperation strategy of ASEAN. Invariability means that ASEAN is a fixed group of countries, and only East Timor is likely to be admitted as a member in the foreseeable future. Variability refers to the constant changes in ASEAN’s cooperation architecture and the expansion of ASEAN’s regional strategic outlook from East Asia to the Indo-Pacific. China needs to constantly adapt to the ever-changing situation and adjust its own cooperation strategy accordingly.

Fourth, there is the contradiction between major-power competition for regional dominance and the ASEAN centrality, which concerns how the regional order would be constructed. ASEAN centrality is an emerging diplomatic concept specifically in response to traditional greatpower competition for regional dominance. Currently, major countries,including China, respect ASEAN’s dominance, but at the same time they are promoting their respective regional cooperation models, such as China’s BRI and the US Indo-Pacific strategy. Of course, there will be more such contradictions in the development of China-ASEAN relations, but the two sides have always been able to overcome these problems and promote cooperation.

China’s ASEAN-based framework for regional cooperation

To overcome difficulties in regional cooperation, China and ASEAN have gradually formed a basic framework for promoting cooperation and improving regional order. First, as mentioned above, China has developed a regional awareness with ASEAN as the benchmark. Second, China has formulated a regional cooperation strategy based on ASEAN. ASEAN has its role in different dimensions of China’s all-round diplomacy: it is not only the priority direction of China’s neighborhood diplomacy, and a critical arena of major-country competition and cooperation, but also an important partner in China’s relations with the vast developing countries, and an essential regional platform in China’s multilateral diplomatic presence.Third, China has shouldered due responsibilities in Southeast Asia. Whether it’s the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the SARS epidemic in 2003, the global financial crisis in 2008, or the COVID-19 pandemic from 2020, China has assumed the responsibility to ensure prosperity and development in Southeast Asia, and has become a driving force for regional cooperation by turning crises into opportunities in the process of coping with challenges.Fourth, China has focused its regional governance engagement on ASEAN. In recent years, regional governance has become a new trend in global governance. China and ASEAN have gradually established regional governance mechanisms in response to non-traditional security issues such as SARS, avian influenza, the COVID-19 pandemic and ecological environment.

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, China and Southeast Asia have been cooperating in public health governance. China and ASEAN held an Extraordinary Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on February 20,2020, and put forward nine proposals on jointly responding to the epidemic and promoting the regional economy. The Special “10+3” Summit on COVID-19 in April and the Special “10+3” Economic and Trade Ministers’Meeting on COVID-19 in June reaffirmed coordination of regional cooperation, and emphasized cooperation on financial stability, connectivity,unimpeded industrial chains, and tourism recovery. Since then, China has established and continuously improved the platform of “China-ASEAN Vaccine Friends” and put forward a series of cooperation initiatives during the third Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting and the 52nd East Asian Foreign Ministers’ Meeting to promote the institutionalization of public health governance cooperation in Southeast Asia within the ASEAN framework.

Leadership role and stakeholders in China-ASEAN cooperation

Since 1991, various stakeholders from China and ASEAN countries have been constantly involved in regional cooperation, including national leaders, government officials, entrepreneurs, strategic thinkers, and professional researchers. They have made concerted efforts to achieve the goal of regional cooperation. While this may not immediately lead to an ideal state of harmony between concepts and practices, it is the beginning of a process of overcoming contradictions and coordinating interests. With different identities, interests, and viewpoints, the different stakeholders must compromise and solve problems in practice. On some significant issues, especially controversial ones, leaders need to set the strategic direction and take the lead. Meanwhile, practitioners from different sectors provide their experience and insights, researchers contribute academic support, while central and local government agencies are responsible for decision-making and policy implementation. Taking the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area as an example, all parties had recognized the importance of regional economic cooperation when then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji expressed the hope to start negotiations. In the negotiation process, the less developed status of some ASEAN countries was taken into account and the Early Harvest Program was put forward to accommodate the concerns of these countries. Given that other countries have successively signed highlevel economic and trade agreements with ASEAN and that China-ASEAN trade and economic cooperation has also witnessed substantial development,Premier Li Keqiang proposed an upgraded version of CAFTA in a timely manner. With the implementation of RCEP, leaders of the two sides further decided to promote the construction of CAFTA 3.0 at the Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations in November 2021.

China-ASEAN Cooperation and East Asian Regional Order

The positive strategic effect of China-ASEAN cooperation on the construction of regional order is not limited to the two sides. It has also contributed to optimizing the order throughout East Asia amid great changes regionally and globally. This is mainly reflected in the following three aspects.

Promoting recognition of East Asian cooperation

The recognition of East Asian cooperation mainly revolves around ASEAN and its central role in the region. After its founding in 1967,ASEAN as an organization established dialogue and negotiation mechanisms with Western countries, which achieved some results. The formation of the initial “ASEAN+” structure strengthened ASEAN’s identity and the idea of regional integration. However, despite officially recognizing the integrity of ASEAN, some major countries have failed to deliver their commitments in policy-making and diplomatic practices. Although China has been a latecomer as ASEAN’s dialogue partner, the cooperation between China and ASEAN under the framework of East Asian cooperation have gradually been playing a leading role. On the one hand, ASEAN has to strengthen its own identity and continuously enhance the integration process to respond as a unity to cooperation offers from China. On the other hand, China’s practices have led other major countries to recognize and cooperate with ASEAN.

In the 1997 Asia financial crisis, ASEAN’s dialogue partners, such as the US and the EU, did not play a substantive role, which stimulated ASEAN to create the “10+3” cooperation framework and optimize the“ASEAN+” structure. Before East Asian cooperation was formally launched,major countries barely recognized ASEAN, with limited strategic resources invested and substantive cooperation conducted in the region. In contrast,China has actively promoted cooperation with ASEAN within the East Asian framework and played an innovative and leading role. In the early 21st century, China took the lead in building an FTA with ASEAN,acceded to the TAC, established a strategic partnership with ASEAN,signed the DOC, and strengthened non-traditional security cooperation.These conceptual breakthroughs and practical innovations boosted the development of East Asian cooperation.

Since then, countries including Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, the US and Russia have followed suit and strengthened cooperation with ASEAN, leading to a situation in which all parties duplicated each other’s cooperation policies with ASEAN and competed with each other for influence on ASEAN. After China’s accession to the TAC, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Australia, the EU and the US successively joined the treaty. In 2005, the US and ASEAN issued the Joint Vision Statement on the ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership, and the two sides signed the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) the following year. In response to the growing willingness of major countries to cooperate, ASEAN has continuously strengthened its own integrity and identity and enhanced its centrality. In January 2007, the Cebu Declaration was signed at the 12th ASEAN summit, in which leaders affirmed their strong commitment to accelerate the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015.

Without China’s efforts, there would be no East Asian cooperation and ASEAN centrality, which has largely overcome the dilemma of regional cooperation in East Asia. Major countries have found it difficult to dominate East Asian regional cooperation, whereas ASEAN, as a regional organization composed of small and medium-sized countries, have succeeded in leading regional cooperation, because all parties regard ASEAN as a whole, clearly recognize ASEAN centrality and jointly promote regional cooperation in East Asia. In this mutually enhancing process, if one party is unwilling to cooperate with ASEAN, it will be regarded as disrespecting ASEAN centrality and fall into ASEAN’s “moral trap.” For example, in 2007, the absence of then US President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice from several important ASEAN meetings drew immediate criticism from all sides. “Cancelling a meeting here or there may not seem like a big deal, but the slights are piling up,” and “To anyone watching from Asia, they point past the current position of the United States to a future without it,” said Walter Lohman, then Director of the Asian Studies Center at Washington-based Heritage Foundation.7“Cancellation of Bush Visit Disappoints Southeast Asia,” The Dawn, July 13, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/256059/newspaper/newspaper/column.

Enriching the content of East Asian cooperation

The institutionalized cooperation between China and ASEAN is improving day by day, and driving forward the development of institutionalized cooperation in the broader East Asian region. First,cooperation has been expanding from traditional to emerging fields. In the initial stage, the two sides mainly focused on economic cooperation. Later,traditional and non-traditional security cooperation were quickly carried out to manage differences in the South China Sea. The two sides have also successfully conducted cooperation on education and culture, topics concerning women and children, maritime issues, connectivity, digital economy, green and low-carbon economy, public health, international development, science and technology, etc.

Second, China and ASEAN have established many cooperation mechanisms under multiple ASEAN-led dialogue platforms and frameworks, which on the side of China involve almost all ministries and commissions under the State Council. In addition, as the regional situation changes, new cooperation mechanisms and platforms have been established.For example, after the outbreak of COVID-19, the two sides set up a platform to strengthen construction of regional supply chains.

Third, both China and ASEAN advocate win-win cooperation,which can be divided into hard connectivity, soft connectivity, and peopleto-people connectivity. Hard connectivity is about infrastructure, soft connectivity concerns institutions and rules, while people-to-people connectivity entails popular perception and public opinion. Overall,cooperation between China and ASEAN, which are working together to build an even closer community with a shared future, is generally tighter than China’s ties with other regions. For example, according to the Belt and Road Infrastructure Development Index Report 2021, Southeast Asia enjoys a strong momentum of infrastructure development, ranking first among all regions.8“The Belt and Road National Infrastructure Development Index Have Recovered,” July 22, 2021, http://www.comnews.cn/article/bizworld/202107/20210700082079.shtml.China has signed cooperation documents with standardization institutions of ASEAN countries such as Singapore, the Philippines and Malaysia. The entry into force of the RCEP will further deepen the China-ASEAN cooperation mechanism on rules and standards, and promote the soft connectivity of standards and the hard mechanisms of economic cooperation. Peking University’s “Five Connectivity Index” for countries along the Belt and Road shows that the overall level of people-to-people connectivity between China and ASEAN is ahead of other regions.9Zhai Kun and Wang Lina, “A study of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in the Perspective of the People-People Bond Index between China and ASEAN,” Journal of Yunnan Normal University (Humanities and Social Sciences Edition), No.6, 2016, p.58.

Indeed, cooperation between China and ASEAN has often served as a model for other countries, leading to similar content, platforms,and types of cooperation between ASEAN and all of its other partners.Such cooperation is long-term in nature, founded on institutionalized mechanisms, and covers comprehensive areas. In fact, the various“ASEAN+1” groups are nowadays competing with each other, particularly in some emerging areas of cooperation. For example, ASEAN has stepped up its rules-making efforts on the digital economy in recent years. Following the establishment of China-ASEAN partnership on digital economy cooperation in 2020, the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the EU have also strengthened their digital economy cooperation with ASEAN.

Improving the structure of East Asian cooperation

Propelled by China-ASEAN cooperation, an ASEAN-centered“ASEAN+” regional cooperation framework has been taking shape,changing the regional structure which in the past used to be dominated by major powers. Under the framework of East Asian cooperation, a regional cooperation system has been created with ASEAN at the center, multiple pairs of “10+1” as sub-systems, and “ASEAN+” as the structure.

The “ASEAN+” structure plays the following roles in optimizing the regional order of East Asia. First, it helps ease the rigid structure of majorpower strategic competition. The “ASEAN+” structure makes Southeast Asia a more resilient place for competition and cooperation. Faced with possible interventions by major powers into the region, ASEAN’s consideration is to introduce new extraterritorial forces and expand the scope of East Asian cooperation to hedge against any potential damage to its independence and autonomy.10Zhai Kun, “An Analysis on the Fluctuation of ASEAN’s Leadership in Promoting East Asia Cooperation(1997-2017),” Teaching and Research, No.6, 2017, p.52.In late 2005, ASEAN created the East Asia Summit, which brought India, Australia and New Zealand to form the “10+6” mechanism.In 2011, ASEAN further invited the US and Russia to join the East Asia Summit, thus expanding the cooperation mechanism to “10+8.”

Second, major countries have been gradually adapting to their changing roles. China, the US, Japan, South Korea, India and Australia have all recognized ASEAN’s central role and are willing to be partners rather than leaders in the “ASEAN+” structure. This represents a strategic adaptation to optimize the regional order, which is beneficial to further institutionalization and moralization of the “ASEAN+” structure. In a competitive situation, major powers will have consider the support for ASEAN centrality as a minimum requirement of their respective regional policies, otherwise they will be considered unacceptable. The US has increasingly recognized ASEAN centrality, which was reiterated by the Trump administration in its Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. India, the EU,the UK and France have all reaffirmed their support for ASEAN centrality in their respective Indo-Pacific strategies.

Third, ASEAN has helped shape the regional economic and security architecture. Currently, the economic cooperation functions of the“ASEAN+” structure have witnessed more successes relatively. The RCEP has realized further integration of East Asian economic cooperation, but it has yet to incorporate the US and the EU into the system. In terms of security, the cooperation functions of the “ASEAN+” structure have been steadily evolving. At the 28th ARF foreign ministers’ meeting in August 2021, China’s State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed the commitment of the Chinese side, amid the impact of COVID-19 and the resurgence of geopolitics, to practice real multilateralism, maintain regional peace and stability, and jointly respond to challenges in the five areas of COVID-19, non-traditional security, geopolitical confrontation,power politics and regional hotspot issues through enhanced solidarity and cooperation.11“Wang Yi Attends the Foreign Ministers' Meeting of the 28th ASEAN Regional Forum,” August 6,2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/chn/wjbxw/202108/t20210806_9071861.htm.

Promoting an Inclusive Regional Order under the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific

With intensified competition between China and the US in Southeast Asia and the launch of different Indo-Pacific strategies by various parties, will China and ASEAN be able to promote an inclusive regional order through further cooperation? Addressing the fresh challenge of China-ASEAN cooperation calls for innovative models of bilateral cooperation and an improved regional order. China’s recognition and promotion of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is in line with the new trend in the evolution of regional order, and will in practice contribute to easing the strategic competition between China and the US.

Southeast Asia at the intersection of Indo-Pacific strategic competition and cooperation

At present, the Indo-Pacific region has been regarded by the US,Japan, India, Australia, the UK, France, Germany as well as ASEAN as a geostrategic priority for building a regional order. However, the scope,content, and attributes of their respective Indo-Pacific strategies differ from each other. Most of the Indo-Pacific strategies seek to balance against China,an objective which is usually to be fulfilled by wooing ASEAN. The Quad dialogue mechanism composed by the US, Japan, Australia and India, for example, aims to rally ASEAN countries and target China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The Indo-Pacific strategies of France, Germany and the UK have also prioritized ASEAN. For Russia, the Greater Eurasian strategy it has put forward in recent years also includes ASEAN in its Greater Eurasian Partnership plan and aims to deepen strategic partnerships between the two sides in politics, security, technology, tourism, disaster management, and epidemic response.

The fundamental difference between the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and the various Indo-Pacific strategies of the above-mentioned countries is that it is not directed at any third party, but aims to establish an inclusive regional order that accommodates all parties. China’s Belt and Road Initiative also covers the Indo-Pacific region. According to the Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative issued by the National Development and Reform Commission and the State Oceanic Administration in 2017, two of the three blue economic passages first pass through Southeast Asia. When chairing the Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations, President Xi Jinping pointed out that high-quality Belt and Road cooperation requires alignment with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. This is the first time that China has publicly proposed cooperation with the AOIP.

As the strategic choices and diplomatic practices of the abovementioned countries have clearly demonstrated, Southeast Asia is the intersection of the Indo-Pacific strategies of the US and other countries,the ASEAN-led East Asian cooperation, and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In other words, Southeast Asia is where the various Indo-Pacific strategies overlap, and an area where competition and cooperation of these countries mostly take place, while ASEAN is the connecting point of various regional strategies. At present, given major countries’ respect and support for the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, it is possible that different parties can coordinate their Indo-Pacific strategies within this framework.

ASEAN centrality in the construction of Indo-Pacific order

The emerging Indo-Pacific order is a complex system of competition and cooperation with several prominent characteristics. First, it has evolved over a long period and in a complex and dynamic manner. The order has emerged in a context where major powers are gathering in this region and the global political and economic center is shifting further eastward.It covers a vast space that extends to Eurasia and Africa, and involves the interconnection of diverse issues such as geopolitics, security, economy,culture, society, science and technology, ecology and environmental protection. Second, the diversity of strategic actors and the differences between them are significant. Among them, there are not only China and the US, but also regional powers such as Japan, India, Russia, and European countries such as the UK, France and Germany, next to medium-sized countries such as South Korea and Australia, and ASEAN and its member states, whose interactions form a complex and volatile grand game in the Indo-Pacific. In a new round of mutual adaptation, different parties have constituted a self-organizing system through continuous learning,exploration, competition and cooperation. Third, a variety of complex regional structures coexist under the order. While the US and China are leading various regional structures respectively, the role of the “ASEAN+”structure is becoming more prominent.

Specifically, the coverage of the “ASEAN+” structure has now expanded from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific, making it the biggest common denominator for all parties to shape the Indo-Pacific order. Moreover, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific has also been recognized as a general blueprint for the construction of the Indo-Pacific order. Therefore, the strategic interactions in the Indo-Pacific are in essence a strategic game with Southeast Asia located at the core of competition and cooperation, which will have profound implications for the construction of a regional order.Without a consensus on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and sufficient strategic coordination among different parties, ASEAN centrality would be gradually undermined. For example, the United States’ promotion of the Quad mechanism and the trilateral security partnership between the US, the UK and Australia (AUKUS), which aims at establishing a security architecture of its own in the Indo-Pacific region, has weakened ASEAN centrality.12“Professor Khong Yuen Foong: The Core Role of ASEAN Weakened by US Indo-Pacific Strategy,”January 7, 2022, https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/singapore/story20220107-1230362.Only if all parties accept and align themselves with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, can ASEAN centrality be sustained and strengthened within the new Indo-Pacific framework and play an essential role in the future construction of the Indo-Pacific order. In particular,the joint support of China and the US for the AOIP will provide an opportunity for ASEAN to mediate and coordinate China-US relations,alleviate the conceptual conflicts between the two countries, and facilitate a pattern for their coexistence.

AOIP’s role in coordinating strategic interests of all parties

Among the various versions of Indo-Pacific strategies, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific enjoys the broadest consensus and can be widely accepted by all countries. In contrast to the version of “rulesbased order” aimed at balancing and containing China which the US and Japan promote, the definition of the Indo-Pacific concept, the key areas of cooperation, and relevant statements in the AOIP are relatively neutral,emphasizing inclusiveness and opposing targeting and excluding China.The “rules-based order” in the AOIP mainly contains four components:an ASEAN-defined geographical and economic space of the Indo-Pacific;the adhenrence to traditional “ASEAN way” rather than legal documents or treaties; the adoption of existing ASEAN norms and mechanisms, such as the TAC, the EAS, the ARF, the ADMM Plus, the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) and other mechanisms of “ASEAN+”; and the respect for international law, such as the UN Charter, the ASEAN Charter and other ASEAN treaties and agreements. Committed to driving the reconstruction of regional order with its own concepts, ASEAN has proposed in the AOIP to “guide and shape the regional economic and security architecture,” “maintain ASEAN centrality in the evolving regional architecture,” and “take ASEAN centrality as the fundamental principle to promote Indo-Pacific cooperation.”13“ASEAN Outlook on The Indo-Pacific,” ASEAN, January 2022, https://asean.org/asean2020/wpcontent/uploads/2021/01/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf.Altogether, the AOIP integrates existing strategic initiatives in the region, and strikes a balance between innovation and connectivity. It follows the principle of winwin cooperation, emphasizes openness instead of exclusivity, and focuses on development rather than security. It promotes the building of the ASEAN Community, and brings ASEAN integration to a higher level in infrastructure connectivity, trade and economic cooperation, financial stability, and sustainable development. To sum up, the AOIP not only echoes ASEAN’s concerns about changes in the regional order, but also reflects ASEAN’s independent thinking and comprehensive consideration in building a regional order of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.

China-ASEAN cooperation as main pillar of AOIP

An Indo-Pacific order is already well underway, and ASEAN's major partners are all trying to align their strategies with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. After 30 years of development, the relationship between China and ASEAN have matured through mutual understanding and cooperation. To become each other’s most important supporter, the two sides need to further coordinate their positions on some major strategic issues. Given the smooth development of institutionalized cooperation between China and ASEAN, it is natural for the two sides to expand their cooperation under the AOIP framework for even more benefits. First, based on the Asia-Pacific concept it has long upheld, China can coordinate its position with ASEAN and show support for the ideas proposed in the AOIP.China can carry out dialogue and cooperation with ASEAN and relevant countries within the AOIP framework, and strive for strategic initiative in the process to ease regional tensions. Second, China can further strengthen its cooperation with ASEAN under this framework to encourage more strategic input from other major countries in this region, and help ASEAN gain more initiative in major-power strategic competitition and consolidate its unity. Third, given that the AOIP covers political, economic and security fields, China can first establish special working groups with ASEAN to jointly improve the content and paths of economic cooperation. For example, it could explore the approaches to advancing broader economic cooperation in the post-RCEP era and coordinate with the CPTPP and the US-initiated Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. In addition, the two sides could focus on deepening cooperation in the blue economy and promote the spillover of cooperation outcomes to traditional and nontraditional security areas such as the peaceful settlement of disputes and maritime security, which would significantly contribute to regional stability and prosperity. Fourth, calling for upholding the rules-based regional architecture while attaching importance to the ASEAN way of addressing regional issues, the AOIP is in contrast to the interpretation of rules by the US, Japan, India and Australia, which provides space for negotiation and cooperation between China and ASEAN to discuss and establish common rules in the Indo-Pacific. China can work with ASEAN to shape new and inclusive regional rules, and support open and inclusive regional cooperation initiatives of all kinds, and make joint efforts to prevent a division of camps or a situation where ASEAN countries would be forced to choose sides.