Transatlantic Policy Coordination on China and Its Limitations

China policy has become a core issue on both the United States’and the European Union’s foreign policy agendas. The US identified China as a strategic rival， while the EU is also pushing for an integrated China strategy. With the continuous rise of China and the transformation of EU and US policies toward China， the China factor has acquired increasing importance in transatlantic relations and become a major concern for both sides. Since Joe Biden took office， his foreign policy has been characterized by a return to alliances and multilateralism， and in this context the EU and the US have accelerated coordination of their China policies. In view of the warming transatlantic relations， the EU has become a key variable in China-US competition， and thus EU-US coordination of their China policies is critical to the changes in the international power configuration and the direction of the China-US-EU trilateral relationship. It is of great practical significance for China to understand the new developments and new characteristics of transatlantic coordination on China and to analyze the underlying motivations and potential trends， in order to grasp the evolution of the China-US-EU triangle and to formulate its own overall strategic thinking.

New Developments of EU-US Coordination on China

As allies， the EU and the US have the tradition of consultation and cooperation on foreign policy， and therefore it is not unusual for them to coordinate their China policies. In the Cold War era， the US and its European allies established the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls （COCOM） to impose embargoes on socialist countries， including China. At the beginning of the 21st century， the two sides also had some early interactions in response to China’s rise in East Asia.1 However， China was not traditionally a core issue in transatlantic relations， and the US and Europe were more preoccupied with the Middle East， the Russia threat， and global challenges such as climate change. In recent years， in the context of China-US rivalry and the EU’s adjustment of its China policy， the China factor has gradually become an important variable in transatlantic relations. Some scholars point out that the China issue， together with climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic， collectively characterized as the so-called“3C，” have become three key drivers for strengthening of the transatlantic relationship.2

The China issue was long a source of disagreement in transatlantic relations， even triggering tensions between the two sides.3 However， as China becomes a more mainstream issue in EU-US relations and transatlantic discussions on the China issue become more inclusive， there has been more consensus between the two sides to coordinate and cooperate on their policies toward China. This consensus is reflected at multiple levels between governments， think tanks and peoples. At the official level， there has been an increased consensus on transatlantic cooperation on China policy. In November 2020， the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations released the report “A Concrete Agenda for Transatlantic Cooperation on China，”pointing out that cooperation on China between the United States and its allies is the most important foreign policy issue at present， and proposing specific areas of cooperation.4 In December of the same year， the European Commission released a new policy document “A New EU-US Agenda for Global Change” as a blueprint for strengthening transatlantic cooperation after the US election， including policy cooperation on China.5 At the level of think tanks， the consensus between the EU and the US on the socalled “China challenge” has increased， and “the China challenge in the transatlantic relations” is becoming a hot topic in transatlantic think tank discussions. For example， a joint report of the US Asia Society and the Bertelsmann Foundation of Germany concluded that China poses real or potential challenges to both the EU and the US in seven areas， including traditional areas such as economy and trade， human rights and security， as well as in emerging issues such as technology， connectivity， overseas influence and global governance.6 At the public opinion level， the perception of China in the EU and the US has become more negative. According to relevant polls， people in most countries on both sides of the Atlantic perceive China as “more a competitor than a partner” and support a tougher stance against China， especially on issues such as human rights， climate change and cybersecurity.7

As consensus on China grows， EU-US policy coordination on China has become more institutionalized and comprehensive. Now， the EUUS Dialogue on China is a unique institutionalized platform for policy coordination，8 which covers comprehensive and extensive topics involving ideology， trade and investment， technological innovation， geopolitics and global governance.

Ideology： breakthrough point for policy coordination on China

Similar systems， cultures and values are the strongest bonds between Europe and the United States， and criticism of and precaution toward China’s ideology is their biggest consensus. Therefore， ideology has become the breakthrough moment for their policy coordination on China. Especially since Biden came to power， ideology and values have returned to the core of Washington’s China policy， and the US has spared no effort to persuade the EU into joining a value-based coalition against China. In the realm of ideology， EU-US policy coordination on China mainly focuses on the following two aspects.

The first is to strengthen “human rights diplomacy” toward China and coordinate on human rights sanctions. In terms of human rights diplomacy， the EU and the US have gradually moved away from the traditional dialogue-based approach and more frequently adopted confrontational sanctions， coordinating with each other and promulgating bills related to human rights sanctions. Since Biden took office， the EU and the US have imposed more pressure on China and interacted with each other more often on human rights issues， especially Xinjiang， Tibet and Hong Kong. In March 2021， the EU， the US， the UK and Canada jointly imposed sanctions on officials and entities in China’s Xinjiang region， despite grave concerns and warnings from the Chinese government. This was the first EU sanctions on China in more than 30 years， and best reflected the transatlantic policy coordination on China in the Biden era， in which human rights issues have become a major point of convergence.

The second is to strengthen the bond of values for a so-called “democracy alliance.” In recent years， EU-US policy coordination on China has become more ideology-based， and gradually shifted from “reserving differences”to “seeking disagreements，” deliberately highlighting China’s ideological differences and even concocting the “China threat.” This actually reflects their defensive mindset in response to the so-called “systemic rivalry” of China. For this purpose， they have begun to strengthen their ties of shared values in an effort to forge a “democracy alliance” with common strategic， economic and political visions.9 As an important path to building the “democracy alliance，”the “Summit for Democracy，” initiated by Joe Biden， was held in December 2021 with the participation of the EU， which attempted on the one hand to strengthen the bond of shared values for a “democracy alliance，” and on the other hand to alienate China ideologically and simplify its relationship with China in the framework of so-called “democracy vs. authoritarianism.”

Economics： overcoming internal disputes and strengthening policy tools against China

Trade and investment are the core issues in the EU-US policy coordination on China. Despite their common concerns in the fields of market access， fair competition， intellectual property protection， technology transfer， government subsidies and investment security， coordination between the EU and the US on these issues was insufficient. The trade disputes provoked by the Trump administration even paralyzed transatlantic economic and trade coordination for some time. The announcement by Chinese and EU leaders of the conclusion of negotiations on the China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment in December 2020 also led the US to question the effectiveness of transatlantic policy coordination.10 In this context， the Biden administration has made it a priority to coordinate its economic and trade policy with the EU. In March 2021， the Office of the US Trade Representative released the first trade agenda of the Biden administration. It was stressed in the report that the administration would partner with friends and allies to put pressure on the Chinese government to stop unfair trade practices.11 In the field of trade and investment， the EU-US policy coordination on China has exhibited two new trends.

The first is to coordinate their trade disputes with a view toward dealing with China. The China factor is used as a means of promoting settlement of the EU-US trade disputes in order to meet the competition from China. Shortly after publishing his first trade agenda， Biden spoke on the phone with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen， announcing the suspension of the multi-billion-dollar tariffs related to their aircraft subsidies dispute for four months and vowing to work toward resolving the 16-year-long issue at the World Trade Organization （WTO）.12 The EU and the US agreed to work out a comprehensive and lasting solution through negotiations， taking into account the competition from China.13 After the summit in June 2021， the two sides reached the “Airbus-Boeing agreement”to exempt aircraft tariffs worth up to $11.5 billion for five years， and expressed their intention to “collaborate on addressing non-market practices of third parties that may harm their respective large civil aircraft industries.”14 The easing of EU-US trade disputes has also laid a foundation for their economic and trade policy coordination on China.

The second is to strengthen economic and trade policy instruments against China. At the EU-US Trade and Technology Council （TTC） meeting held in Pittsburgh in September 2021， the two sides emphasized the intention to “maintain a particular focus on using and coordinating the use of our trade policy tools” to deal with the global trade challenges.15 In December 2021， the second meeting of the EU-US Dialogue on China focused on economic and trade issues such as enhancing economic resilience， promoting supply chain diversification， and responding to “economic coercion.” In particular， countering “economic coercion” has become the focus of economic and trade policy instruments against China. In October and December 2021， the US and the EU respectively launched bills to address “economic coercion.”16 By empowering their governments to retaliate against “economic coercion” from third parties， the bills may bring new challenges to the stability of China’s economic and trade relations with the US and Europe.

Technology： new direction of policy coordination on China

The Biden administration clearly places technological competition at the core of China-US relations， and the EU， in its new strategic document， also regards China as an economic competitor pursuing technological leadership. Therefore， technology has become a new direction for EU-US policy coordination on China. In view of China’s huge market capacity and its capability of allocating resources to develop key technologies， the EU and the US have come to realize that it is increasingly difficult to deal with China’s technological challenges alone. In light of this， some scholars suggest that countries with shared values establish a “Tech 10” consortium of countries who share values to coordinate national postures on technology development， use， and access.17

In the domain of technology， the TTC is becoming an institutionalized platform for transatlantic policy coordination on China. In December 2020， the EU called for a “common technology agenda” with the US in its policy document “A New EU-US Agenda for Global Change” and proposed the TTC’s establishment.18 The initiative was adopted at the EU-US summit in June 2021 and became one of the most notable outcomes of the summit. According to EU and US official statements， the TTC will be a platform for the two sides to coordinate global trade， economic， and technological issues， and ten special working groups will be set up to work out consensus in specific areas， including technical standards cooperation， climate change and green technology， supply chain security， information security， digital governance， export control， investment review， etc. Among these， technology is the TTC’s top priority.

The TTC is regarded as a litmus test for transatlantic coordination on China，19 and its first meeting was largely focused on this. In September 2021， the first TTC meeting was held in Pittsburgh. The EU and the US reached preliminary consensus on strengthening cooperation in five areas， including investment review， export control， artificial intelligence， semiconductors， and addressing global trade challenges such as nonmarket trade practices. Valdis Dombrovskis， Vice President of the European Commission， said before the meeting that the TTC was not aimed at any third parties. China was not deliberately referred to in the Pittsburgh statement， but competition against China can be read between the lines given China’s rising influence in the technological field. The European People’s Party （EPP）， the largest group in the European Parliament， underlined the importance of the meeting， saying that given the challenges by China in a way unseen before it is “key to renew the technology alliance between Europe and the United States in order to succeed in this fight，”20 which was a direct expression of the TTC’s target.

The EU and the US cooperate with each other at multiple levels in their technological competition with China. First， they have adopted a so-called strategy of “small yard， high fence” to protect their technological advantages， especially in key fields such as artificial intelligence， 5G broadband， semiconductors and quantum computing. Enhancing a technological blockade against China and strengthening the export control regime has become the new focus of their policy cooperation. Soon after Biden took office， senior officials in his administration expressed the intention to work with allies to impose “new targeted restrictions” on “supplying highly sensitive technology that can advance China’s military capabilities.”21 Second， the EU and the US have cooperated to strengthen their innovation capabilities. In recent years， both sides have increased investment in scientific and technological research and development， and coordinated their industrial policies and capabilities to maintain competitiveness in strategic industries. Third， they have been working together to set rules and standards. Technological competition is also about competition of setting standards and rules. The EU and US are trying to maintain their voices and competitive edge in technology by jointly formulating rules and standards of key technologies that reflect their values.

Global governance： cooperating to address Chinese influence

Multilateralism and global governance have become important areas for China-US competition and EU-US coordination. “America is back”， as Biden announced in a high profile to the European allies at the 2021 Munich Security Conference，22 is regarded as an important signal of the US returning to multilateralism and the alliance system， and restoring US leadership in global governance is an important characteristic of Biden’s foreign policy. With the rise of its comprehensive strength， China is moving closer to the center stage of the world and playing an increasingly important role in global governance. European and American scholars have different opinions on whether China seeks to systematically reshape the global governance system， but they generally believe that China has been playing a more active role in global governance， at least as a moderate reformer.23 Therefore， one priority of transatlantic coordination is to deal with China’s influence in global governance.

The EU and the US have adopted a more proactive attitude to global governance. The Biden administration has begun to return to a number of international organizations and agreements that the Trump administration withdrew from， and has worked with the EU to promote reform of international organizations from within. The EU and the US have also paid more attention to investment in international organizations， especially in the United Nations system， to compete with China and strengthen their leadership in these bodies. As the Belt and Road Initiative （BRI） is perceived as China’s tool to pursue an alternative governance model and expand its influence in developing countries， the US has called for joint efforts of its allies， including EU countries， to launch an alternative scheme， and strengthen economic， technical and political aid to compete for influence in developing countries. At the June 2021 summit， the Group of Seven（G7） led by the US and Europe announced the launch of a new global infrastructure initiative， “Build Back Better World” （B3W）， to “help narrow the $40+ trillion infrastructure need in the developing world.”24 Although the B3W in the G7 statement did not directly refer to China， public opinion generally regards it as a Western version of the BRI， with strong intention to compete with the Chinese initiative.

The transatlantic policy coordination on global governance also involves a series of issues on which they can cooperate with China， especially climate change， global public health， and nuclear non-proliferation. As a rising power， China plays an irreplaceable role in addressing these global challenges. In addition， aware of the complicated and multi-faceted nature of their respective China policies， the EU and the US have put their China policy coordination under the framework of jointly addressing global challenges. On climate change， both sides are open to cooperation with China， focusing on working with China to implement the climate change commitments in the Paris Agreement and to achieve carbon neutrality goals. At the UN Climate Change Conference in Glasgow in November 2021， China and the US reached a joint declaration on strengthening climate action， providing a major breakthrough for the success of the conference.

Motivations of EU-US Policy Coordination on China

There are far-reaching strategic considerations behind the new trend of EUUS policy coordination on China. For Europe and the United States， the rise of China has become a key issue in defining transatlantic relations and the international order of the 21st century. Strengthening policy coordination on China is a prerequisite if they wish to respond jointly to China’s rise， close the gap between the two sides on their policies toward China， consolidate the transatlantic alliance， and maintain their dominant position in the international order.

Strengthening competitive advantages to cope with China’s rise

From the perspective of the US， as China grew rapidly， the ChinaUS relationship gradually moved to one of strategic competition during the Bush and Obama administrations， which was then fully reinforced in the Trump era.25 Since Biden took office， the US strategic outlook on China has not fundamentally changed. In his first foreign policy speech， Biden referred to China as “our most serious competitor.”26 Competition remains a core concept in the Biden administration’s thinking on China， the organizing principle of its China policy， and the keynote in its handling of the relationship with China.27 For the US， European allies are its core asset in this strategic competition， and are therefore placed in an important position on the American strategic chessboard vis-a-vis China and considered by the Biden administration as the key to a successful China policy. The US， by strengthening coordination with the EU， is building a united front against the rise of China in order to maximize its advantages in the China-US competition. This is also the meaning of what US Secretary of State Antony Blinken meant， when he issued the call to “engage China from a position of strength.”28

With regard to Europe， the EU is also faced with competition with China and the question of taking sides in the China-US relationship. The EU’s strategic positioning of China has moved from “strategic and cooperative partner” to a multi-faceted definition that combines partnership， competition and systemic rivalry. While the EU still puts cooperation first， it has increasingly emphasized the competitive side of China-EU relations. Especially in von der Leyen’s efforts to build a“geopolitical Commission”， the EU increasingly views China-EU relations from a geopolitical perspective， and regards China as a competitor and challenge. Previously， due to the Trump administration’s unilateralist foreign policy approach， the EU often felt lonesome when dealing with its relations with China. Therefore， restraining the unilateralist tendency of the US and jointly strengthening their advantages in the competition with China has become an important motivation of the EU to cooperate with the US on China policy. As a matter of fact， the EU-US dialogue mechanism on China was first proposed by the EU as an active choice to address the China-US rivalry. At the press conference announcing the proposal， EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell said that close transatlantic cooperation is very important to jointly address issues that the two sides face together in relationship to China.29

Consolidating relations to revive the transatlantic alliance

The pragmatic policy of “America First” and the “brute power”diplomacy adopted by the Trump administration weakened the trust between the United States and Europe， and also brought the transatlantic alliance to its lowest point since World War II.30 After Biden was elected， both the EU and the US expressed strong willingness to renew transatlantic relations. The European Commission took the initiative and quickly released “A New EU-US Agenda for Global Change” to actively shape the transatlantic cooperation agenda. As the document noted， the change of US government presents “a once-in-a-generation opportunity to design a new transatlantic agenda for global cooperation.”31 Biden also sees reviving the transatlantic alliance as one of his top priorities. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2021， Biden sent a clear message that “America is back” and “the transatlantic alliance is back.” He emphasized that the transatlantic alliance had a strong foundation “on which our collective security and our shared prosperity are built. The partnership between Europe and the United States， in my view， is and must remain the cornerstone of all that we hope to accomplish in the 21st century.”32

Although the election of Biden made it possible to renew transatlantic relations， both the EU and the US realize that it is difficult for the relationship to simply return to the past. In a speech congratulating Biden’s inauguration， European Council President Charles Michel bluntly pointed out， “The EU and US， we have our differences. And they will not magically disappear. America seems to have changed. How it is perceived in Europe and the rest of the world has also changed.”33 Biden also indicated that the return of transatlantic alliance does not mean looking backward but rather looking forward together. In other words， the EU and the US seek not only to restart or resume transatlantic relations， but more importantly to reshape the transatlantic alliance with a new agenda. Therefore， the two sides need to identify new common ground and create incremental cooperation in their relationship， and in this context China has become an important external factor for building a new transatlantic agenda and bridging transatlantic gaps. By coordinating policies toward China and placing China issues on the core agenda of transatlantic relations， the EU and the US hope to consolidate to a certain degree their relationship， once damaged by the Trump administration， and provide new impetus to reinvigorate the transatlantic alliance.

Strengthening rules-making capacity and maintaining dominance in the global order

The current global order was established by the US-led West after World War II. This order is based on Western-dominated international rules and guaranteed by American hegemony. After the end of the Cold War， the West used its advantageous position to further dominate the formulation of international rules， and strongly advocated the so-called “rules-based global order.” Though including non-Western countries， such an order largely reflects the values and preferences of the West desirous of maintaining its international political and economic dominance. Since the beginning of the 21st century， however， the global order and international landscape have undergone profound changes. On the one hand， as emerging countries， represented by China， rise collectively， their influence in international affairs and global governance increases as well. On the other hand， as populist forces represented by Trump weaken the unity within the West， the Western-dominated international rules and global order is also under attack， with French President Emmanuel Macron even lamenting the end of Western hegemony. The 2020 Munich Security Conference annual report described the world as “Westless，” stating that “The world is becoming less Western. But more importantly， the West itself may become less Western， too.”34 It profoundly reflects the uneasiness and restlessness of Europe and the US over the transfer of international power and the transformation of the global order.

As the world is undergoing major changes unseen in a century， the global order and governance system is faced with more profound adjustments and changes. In particular， the COVID-19 outbreak has an impact comparable to that of a world war， making the current international order unsustainable.35 Therefore， rediscovering the West and reinvigorating its leadership in the global order has become the common goal of Europe and the US， and the rise of China and the international power transfer are regarded as the main challenge to Western world leadership. The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance issued by the Biden administration in March 2021 claimed that China “is the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic， diplomatic， military， and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.”36 In its document “EU-China： A Strategic Outlook”， the EU also asserted that“China’s engagement in favor of multilateralism is sometimes selective and based on a different understanding of the rules-based international order.… Selectively upholding some norms at the expense of others weakens the sustainability of the rules-based international order.”37 The 2020 Munich Security Conference annual report more directly pointed out that “China in particular has invested in ‘parallel’ institutions that partly complement，but partly challenge， institutions traditionally dominated by the West.”38 Under the framework of the EU-US Dialogue on China， multilateral global governance has become a major topic of their cooperation， with the purpose of containing China’s influence at the multilateral level and strengthening their capacity to shape international rules and standards， thus maintaining their dominance in the multilateral international order.

Limitations of EU-US Policy Coordination on China

There is some convergence in European and US policies toward China in terms of its effectiveness. In December 2021， during the second round of the EU-US Dialogue on China， senior officials of the Biden administration said that the two sides would publish a joint statement to demonstrate the “increasing convergence” in their analysis of China’s challenge.39 This convergence is not simply the result of the EU moving closer to the US， but the result of the two moving closer to each other. From the EU’s perspective， it still regards China as a partner of cooperation and negotiation， but in the course of China-US rivalry， the EU has gradually tuned in to Washington’s competitive policy on China. Since Biden took office， the US has achieved some results in winning over Europe and building more consensus on their China policies. From the perspective of the US， the Biden administration’s China policy is also moving to converge with that of the EU. In March 2021， in the statement of his first meeting with Borrell， Blinken expressed that the US and the EU “acknowledged a shared understanding that relations with China are multi-faceted， comprising elements of cooperation， competition， and systemic rivalry.”40 This shows that the US has， to a certain extent， converged with and accepted the understanding of the EU in positioning its relationship with China. Nevertheless， the transatlantic policy coordination on China will still be a lengthy process， with its direction and prospects constrained by a series of structural factors.

Differences between EU and US perceptions of China

Although the EU and the US have built more consensus on China， there are still differences across the Atlantic in the perception of and response to the “China challenge，” which is difficult to resolve in the short term. In keeping with its role as a “hegemonic power，” the US traditionally tends to regard China’s rise as a geopolitical and security challenge. Containing China’s development is a priority of Washington’s China policy in order to maintain American global hegemony. At present， the US perception of the “China threat” has two new features. The first is its primacy in policy-making， i.e. China is considered the primary threat to the United States. Biden’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and the 2021 Annual Threat Assessment published by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence both listed China as the major challenge. The second is its comprehensive nature. The US regards its competition with China as comprehensive， embracing economic and trade relations， ideology， geopolitics and international mechanisms.

The EU regards China neither as a primary threat nor as a comprehensive rival. Its strategic perception of China is multi-dimensional and multi-faceted， “a cooperation partner， a negotiation partner， an economic competitor and a systemic rival.”41 Under the US influence， the EU has come to pay more attention to security issues and competitiveness in China-EU relations. However， geopolitics and security are not its primary concerns， and economic interests still play an influential role. In addition， the EU’s perception of China is deeply influenced by its commitments to multilateralism. It regards China as an important force to address global challenges in the multilateral international system.

Differences between EU and US policies toward China

The US and EU policies toward China are driven respectively by geopolitics and geo-economics， and there is a tension between the two. Driven by the thinking of strategic competition， the US government has strengthened its containment against China in a “whole-of-government” approach， and adopting a hardline policy on China has become a bipartisan consensus as well as an agreement between the administration and the Congress.42 The US emphasizes that it has no intention of starting a “new Cold War” with China， but in practice， its China policy is marked clearly with Cold War mentality. In comparison， the EU has made it clear that it does not want to see a “new Cold War” between China and the US， nor is it willing to fully involve itself in the US-dominated great-power competition.43 Consistent with its multi-faceted perception of China， the EU’s China policy is composed of both cooperation and competition underlined by mutually beneficial economic ties.

In a fundamental sense， the differences in the two transatlantic powers in terms of policy toward China is the difference between strategic and tactical policies， reflecting the respective characters of the EU and the US. The US policy toward China reflects a classical “grand strategy” thinking， and “greatpower strategic competition” is the dominant philosophy of Washington’s current China policy. This paradigm can be found in a good number of policy areas including trade， investment， technology， security， and human rights. Despite regarding China as a “systemic rival，” there is not yet an EU-wide consensus for a completely hardline China policy. The EU does not have a “grand strategy”toward China in the classical sense， but rather attempts to manage cooperation， competition and rivalry tactically. For this reason， compared to the consistent China policy of the US， the EU behaves more inconsistently on China， often making seemingly contradictory decisions between different areas of China-EU relations. The imposition of human rights sanctions on China after the completion of negotiations on the China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment is a direct example of this contradiction.

Constraints from the EU’s strategic autonomy

Strategic autonomy is the mainstream policy discourse and long-term strategic goal of the EU. In spite of reduced anxiety after Biden entered the White House， the EU realizes that with the ongoing China-US strategic competition， the focus of American foreign policy will continue to be on the Indo-Pacific， and accordingly the EU will continue to pursue strategic autonomy. An example can be seen when the EU announced the completion of negotiations on the China-EU investment agreement even after Biden was elected， despite warnings from would-be US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan.44 Though transatlantic consensus on China policy has been building up since Biden took office， the EU is unlikely to give up the principle of strategic autonomy. The US military pullout from Afghanistan and the establishment of the US-UK-Australia （AUKUS） security alliance have made the EU realize the limits of US policy adjustments regarding the EU， and reinvigorated the debate on strategic autonomy within the EU.45

Under the guidance of strategic autonomy， the EU-US policy coordination on China now differs from a “leader-follower” model often seen in past transatlantic relations. On China policy and the broader transatlantic policy agenda， the EU no longer acts as a “lesser partner” that allows the US to set the agenda， but rather a more equal agenda-setting partner.46 The EU will form its own China policy agenda based on its interests and values， and will have a greater say in the transatlantic China policy coordination. In February 2021， at a symposium hosted by the US Atlantic Council， French President Emmanuel Macron said that the EU should not gang up on China with the US even if it stands closer to Washington by virtue of shared values， as this could be counterproductive.47 This is a European voice in the pursuit of strategic autonomy on China policy. In June 2021， following a hardline statement on China at the NATO summit， then German Chancellor Angela Merkel emphasized that while China should not be overlooked， NATO should not exaggerate the China threat. “China is a rival on many issues， but China is also a partner on many issues.” On China， she proposed NATO adopt a double approach， “on the one hand， deterrence and self-defense， and on the other hand， willingness to talk.”48 Looking from their statements regarding China， most European leaders have chosen to keep a distance from Washington’s new Cold War-style China policy and reserve space for European strategic autonomy while strengthening cooperation with the US.

Constraints of Trump’s legacy

The election of Trump as US president in 2016 was largely a result of political and economic differentiation within the US population in the context of globalization. This differentiation is reflected in the economic gaps between rich and poor as well as in partisan political disputes， but it also exists between different races， skin colors， genders， religious groups and regions. The Trump administration failed to close this divide， but rather intensified the division. Although Trump lost the 2020 election， the 74 million votes he received means his popular support remains strong. This also means that populism， conservatism and economic nationalism still have fertile soil in the US with farreaching influence beyond Trump’s personal appeal. The economic and social roots of the “Trump phenomenon” persist， and “Trumpism without Trump”will remain a heavy legacy for the US in the years to come.

The legacy of Trumpism will constrain transatlantic policy coordination on China in two ways. At home， it will influence the Biden administration’s policy agenda and priorities. The political， economic and social problems in the US， which have been explicitly exposed by Trumpism， will force the Biden administration to prioritize domestic issues， especially investment in technology， education， medical care and infrastructure， as well as social issues such as wealth polarization and racial discrimination. Biden promised to invest in America first and not to “enter any new trade agreement with anybody until we have made major investments here at home and in our workers.”49 On foreign policy， the Biden administration’s efforts to rebuild American leadership will continue to be hampered by domestic populism as domestic support for the US role as a global leader declines. Biden’s announcement of withdrawing US troops from Afghanistan in July 2021 followed the agreement made under the Trump administration， and reflected a continuation of Trump’s “America First” policy. Externally， the legacy of Trumpism will affect the EU’s trust in the US. The lingering effects of Trumpism raise concerns in Europe that similar US politicians may come to power again and deal another blow to transatlantic relations. Shocked by Trump supporters’ attack on the Capitol Hill in January 2021， Europe came to realize the lasting influence of Trumpism and the divisions in US domestic politics and society. In other words， Trumpism is only the epitome of the political and social contradictions in the US， and will not disappear simply as a result of Biden’s rise to power. Therefore， despite Biden’s claim that “America is back，” the EU does not have full confidence in the sustainability of the Biden administration’s policies.

Conclusion

The strengthening of transatlantic policy coordination on China is one of the most significant changes in the China-US-EU trilateral relationship in recent years， and may have a profound impact on this relationship. In the process of coordination， there has been some convergence in European and American perceptions of and policies toward China. In the domains where the two sides have consensus and common interests， such as ideology， supply chain security， export control and connectivity， the EU and the US have begun to build“issue-based coalitions” against China， placing China under greater pressure on specific issues. Under US coercion and influence， there are also uncertainties in the direction of the EU’s China policy. Nonetheless， their current policy coordination is more likely to lead to a tactical issue-based coalition， rather than a strategic alliance against China. This is determined by a number of structural constraints between the two sides as well as the characteristics of the current international system and China’s development path.

Following the path of peaceful development， China is deeply integrated with the European and American markets and the entire international system economically. Based on this fact， it makes the transatlantic cooperation difficult to replicate the containment strategy on the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Continuing the Cold War mentality of alignment and containment today will not only fail to realize the goals they intend to achieve， but will also jeopardize their own interests， splitting the world into different blocs and camps. In the virtual meeting between Chinese and US leaders in November 2021， President Xi Jinping responded to the concept of coexistence proposed by Biden， emphasizing that the two countries should respect each other， coexist in peace and pursue win-win cooperation.50 These three principles offer new ideas for the development of China-US-EU trilateral relations， and point out a correct direction for transatlantic policy coordination on China. As key forces in the international system， China， the US and the EU have great responsibilities in maintaining the stability of the international system and responding to global challenges. Transatlantic China policy coordination must focus on tripartite coexistence and cooperation， and work to bridge differences through cooperation with China， instead of seeking rivalry and confrontation， and attempting to weaken cooperation through intensified competition.

1 Zhao Huaipu， “Post-Cold War US-Europe Strategic Interaction in East Asia，” Chinese Journal of European Studies， No.1， 2014， pp.53-70.

2 Gesine Weber， “Biden’s China Challenge Starts in Paris and Berlin，” The German Marshall Fund of the United States， March 3， 2021， https：//www.gmfus.org/blog/2021/03/03/bidens-china-challenge-starts-parisand-berlin.

3 Julie Smith et al.， “Charting a Transatlantic Course to Address China，” The German Marshall Fund of the United States， October 2020， p.2， https：//www.gmfus.org/news/charting-transatlantic-course-address-china.

4 The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations， “A Concrete Agenda for Transatlantic Cooperation on China，” November 2020， p.7， https：//www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CPRT-116SPRT42155/ CPRT-116SPRT42155/context.

5 European Commission， “A New EU-US Agenda for Global Change，” JOIN （2020） 22 final， Brussels， December 2， 2020， https：//ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_2279.

6 Bernhard Bartsch et al.， “Dealing with the Dragon： China as a Transatlantic Challenge，” Asia Society， June 2020， https：//asiasociety.org/center-us-china-relations/dealing-dragon-china-transatlantic-challenge.

7 Irene Braam and Alexsandra Scheffer， “Transatlantic Trends 2021： Transatlantic Opinion on Global Challenges，” The German Marshall Fund of the United States， 2021， pp.29-34， https：//www.gmfus.org/ news/transatlantic-trends-2021.

8 This mechanism was initiated by the EU on June 15， 2020 and activated on May 26， 2021. It is the first official dialogue mechanism on China between the EU and the US.

9 Antony Blinken and Robert Kagan， “‘America First’ is only Making the World Worse. Here is a Better Approach，” Brookings， January 4， 2019， https：//www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/04/ america-first-is-only-making-the-world-worse-heres-a-better-approach/.

10 Steven Erlanger， “Will the Sudden EU-China Deal Damage Relations with Biden？” The New York Times， January 6， 2021， https：//www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/world/europe/eu-china-deal-biden.html.

11 United States Trade Representative， “2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report，” March 1， 2021， https：//ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2021/2021%20Trade%20Agenda/Online%20PDF%20 2021%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202020%20Annual%20Report.pdf.

12 “Readout of President Joseph R. Biden， Jr. Call with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen，” The White House， March 5， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/03/05/readout-of-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-call-with-european-commission-presidentursula-von-der-leyen.

13 Philip Blenkinsop and David Lawder， “US， EU Agree Tariff Freeze in Aircraft Dispute， Eye China，”Reuters， March 6， 2021， https：//www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-eu-idUSKBN2AX22A.

14 “EU and US Take Decisive Step to End Aircraft Dispute，” European Commission， June 16， 2021， https：//ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_3001.

15 “EU-US Trade and Technology Council Inaugural Joint Statement，” European Commission， September 29， 2021， p.3， https：//ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_21_4951.

16 “Countering China Economic Coercion Act，” US Congress， October 15， 2021， https：//www.congress. gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5580/text； “EU Strengthens Protection against Economic Coercion，”European Commission， December 8， 2021， https：//ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ IP_21_6642.

17 Bernhard Bartsch et al.， “Dealing with the Dragon： China as a Transatlantic Challenge，” p.24.

18 European Commission， “A New EU-US Agenda for Global Change，” pp.5-7.

19 Rebecca Arcesati and Grzegorz Stec， “EU-US Trade and Technology Council Will be a Litmus Test for Transatlantic Coordination on China，” Merics， June 30， 2021， https：//merics.org/en/short-analysis/eu-ustrade-and-technology-council-will-be-litmus-test-transatlantic-coordination.

20 “We Have to Renew the Technology Alliance between Europe and the Unites States to Face China，”EPP Group， September 28， 2021， https：//www.eppgroup.eu/newsroom/videos/we-have-to-renew-thetechnology-alliance-between-europe-and-the-united-states-to-face-china.

21 “US to Look at More Restrictions on Tech Exports to China，” Reuters， February 11， 2021， https：//www. reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-biden-trade-idUSKBN2AB075.

22 “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference，” The White House， February 19， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/19/remarks-bypresident-biden-at-the-2021-virtual-munich-security-conference.

23 Bernhard Bartsch et al.， “Dealing with the Dragon： China as a Transatlantic Challenge，” p.30.

24 “President Biden and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back Better World （B3W） Partnership，” The White House， June 12， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/factsheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-launch-build-back-better-world-b3w-partnership.

25 Wu Xinbo， “On China-US Strategic Competition，” World Economics and Politics， No.5， 2020， pp.104-111.

26 “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World，” The White House， February 4， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-onamericas-place-in-the-world.

27 Wu Xinbo， “China-US Strategic Competition under the Biden Administration”， China International Studies， No.2， 2021， p.9.

28 Antony Blinken， “A Foreign Policy for the American People，” US Department of State， March 3， 2021， https：//www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people.

29 EEAS， “Video Conference of Foreign Affairs Minister： Remarks by HR/VP Josep Borrell at the Press Conference，” June 15， 2020， https：//eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/80898/Video. 30 Zhao Chen， “Trump’s ‘Brute Power’ Diplomacy and US-Europe Relations，” World Economics and Politics， No.11， 2020， p.72.

31 European Commission， “A New EU-US Agenda for Global Change，” p.1.

32 “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference.”

33 “Speech by President Charles Michel at the European Parliament on the Inauguration of the New President of the United States，” European Council， January 20， 2021， https：//www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ press/press-releases/2021/01/20/speech-by-president-charles-michel-at-the-european-parliament-on-theinauguration-of-the-new-president-of-the-united-states.

34 “Munich Security Report 2020： Westlessness，” Munich Security Conference， February 2020， https：// securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2020.

35 Yuan Peng， “The COVID-19 Pandemic and Great Changes Unseen in a Century，” Contemporary International Relations， No.5， 2020， p.1.

36 The White House， “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance，” March 2021， https：//www. whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.

37 European Commission， “EU-China： A Strategic Outlook，” p.2， https：//ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/ files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf.

38 “Munich Security Report 2020： Westlessness，” p.16.

39 “Previewing the US-EU Dialogue on China，” US Department of State， December 1， 2021， https：//www. state.gov/previewing-the-u-s-eu-dialogue-on-china.

40 “Joint Press Release on the Meeting between High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell and the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken，” US Department of State， March 24， 2021， https：//www.state.gov/ joint-statement-by-the-secretary-of-state-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-eu-high-representativefor-foreign-affairs-and-security-policy-vice-president-of-the-european-commission.

41 European Commission， “EU-China： A Strategic Outlook，” p.1.

42 Zhao Minghao， “An Analysis of US Competitive Strategy toward China”， Contemporary International Relations， No.10， 2019， pp.13-14.

43 Liu Zhen， “Europe Doesn’t Want to See a New Cold War between China and US，” South China Morning Post， April 20， 2021， https：//www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3130350/europedoesnt-want-see-new-cold-war-between-china-and-us.

44 Steven Erlanger， “Will the Sudden EU-China Deal Damage Relations with Biden？”

45 Pol Morilla， “Afghanistan， AUKUS and European Strategic Autonomy，” Joint Brief， No.4， October 2021.

46 Yan Shaohua， “EU Strategic Autonomy and New Thinking of China’s EU Strategy，” Journal of the Fudan University （Social Science Edition）， No.6， 2021， p.130.

47 Rym Momtaz， “Macron： EU Shouldn’t Gang up on China with US，” Politico， February 7， 2021， https：// www.politico.eu/article/macron-eu-shouldnt-gang-up-on-china-with-u-s.

48 “Merkel Wants NATO Dialogue with China，” Spiegel， June 14， 2021， https：//www.spiegel.de/ politik/deutschland/nato-gipfel-angela-merkel-will-nato-dialog-mit-china-a-9fe94bc0-c0fd-42a4-87e5-1f11c139f948.

49 Thomas Friedman， “Biden： We are Going to Fight like Hell by Investing in America First，” The New York Times， December 3， 2020， https：//cn.nytimes.com/opinion/20201203/biden-interview-mcconnellchina-iran/dual.

50 “President Xi Jinping Had a Virtual Meeting with US President Joe Biden，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China， November 16， 2021， https：//www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202111/ t20211116_10448843.html.