The Implications of Brexit for Transatlantic Relations

Zhang Bei

Transatlantic relations have witnessed profound changes in recent years. While the United States has tarnished relations with Europe under the “America First” slogan during Donald Trump’s presidency， the succeeding Joe Biden administration has so far invested much to reshape transatlantic ties from the perspective of major-power competition. With profound global changes taking place， the world is paying continuous attention to the direction the relationship is taking. Currently， most academic research in this regard has focused on US domestic political changes and foreign policy adjustments， analyzing how these have affected transatlantic relations. However， the influence of internal factors within Europe on its relationship with the US is pending further discussion. The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union， or Brexit， undoubtedly ranks among Europe’s biggest events in recent years， and hence an analysis of how Brexit has reshaped the EU and then impacted US-Europe relations is of major significance. Admittedly， Brexit is far from the only variable in the transitioning European landscape but given the UK’s special position between Europe and the US and the profound impact of Brexit on European integration， the influence of Brexit on transatlantic relations deserves particular attention.

The UK’s Special Role in US-Europe Relations

Part of the reason for the importance of Brexit for transatlantic relations lies in the United Kingdom’s special role in the US-Europe relationship. As one of the major powers in Europe and a former world empire， the UK shares time-honored historical and cultural ties with the United States， which it once colonized. In the post-WWII era， the UK， losing the title of global hegemon， began to treat the UK-US special relationship as the key driver for maintaining its great-power status. Since the UK joined the European Community， the predecessor of the European Union， in the 1970s， its influence in Europe and its special relationship with the US have been mutually enhanced， which has increasingly put it into a unique position in US-Europe relations. The UK’s special role is mainly reflected in the following three dimensions.

The close ties between the UK and the US

Since former UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill proposed “a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States” for the first time in his 1946 Fulton， Missouri speech， the term has been used to define the UK-US relationship. Despite the fact that the UK and the US both have important allies respectively， the UK’s bonds with the US are still far closer than to any other European country within the transatlantic alliance.

First， there is a closely knit intelligence and security cooperation between the UK and the US. As early as 1946， the two countries signed a bilateral agreement on intelligence cooperation that laid the foundation for the later Five Eyes alliance. According to revelations by Western media， the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters （GCHQ） and the US National Security Agency （NSA） have access to each other’s important databases and have agreed not to eavesdrop on each other’s government， which is in stark contrast to long-time US wiretaps on its other major allies like France and Germany.1 The UK is also the country that shares the most classified intelligence about nuclear weapons with the US. Based on the 1958 UK-US Mutual Defense Agreement and the 1963 UK-US Polaris Sales Agreement， the two countries set up 17 joint working groups that are responsible for coordination and collaboration in different specific areas regarding nuclear weapons. In September 2021， the UK and the US， together with Australia， announced the establishment of a trilateral security partnership， or AUKUS， to conduct cooperation on nuclear submarines. It was reported that the UK took advantage of its special position in the US-led nuclear network to facilitate the tripartite deal as an intermediary.2 Besides their cooperation under the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization （NATO）， bilateral military exchanges between the UK and the US are also very close. The two countries hold regular joint exercises and train each other’s military officers， while British staff officers are present in all combatant commands in continental United States. Therefore， the UK has had a larger influence on the formulation of US military strategies than any other American ally.3 For many years， the UK has been closely following the strategic deployment of the US military， sending troops to overseas operations including the Gulf War， the War in Afghanistan， and the Iraq War.

Second， the UK and the US are highly interdependent in terms of trade and economic ties. As a major indicator for the closeness of economic relations， investment is the core component of UK-US economic ties. The US is the UK’s largest source of foreign investment， with American direct investment in Britain reaching ￡381.6 billion in 2019 and accounting for 24.5 percent of the UK’s total incoming foreign investment in the same year. This far surpassed the investment of the Netherlands， which stood at ￡167.2 billion.4 The UK is the second largest source of foreign investment， only after Japan， for the US. British investment in the US in 2019， at US$505.1 billion， was much higher than that of Canada， the Netherlands and Germany.5 In the area of trade， the US is the largest trading partner of the UK while the UK is the US’s fifth largest export destination after Canada， Mexico， China， and Japan.6

Third， similar socio-economic development models of the UK and the US have led to consistency of their policies. In the 1980s， then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and then US President Ronald Reagan carried out “Thatcherism” reforms and “Reaganomics” as their respective landmark economic policies. Rooted in their age-old individualistic and liberal traditions， the policies of the UK and the US both advocated a socio-economic development model of free competition， low taxation， deregulation， minimum government and maximum market， which has over time represented the typical Anglo-Saxon economic philosophy and modus operandi.7 This model is quite different from the “Rhineland model”mostly adopted by continental European countries， which is based on free competition but also moderated by state regulation and protected by a social safety net.8 For the UK and the US， the similarity in their socio-economic development models has led to similar views on the relationships between the state and society and between government and the market， and resulted in their converging positions on competition regulations， state subsidies and industrial policies， which is in stark contrast to those of continental European states like France and Germany.

The UK’s influence within the European Union before Brexit

The UK was long regarded as a “reluctant European” and an “awkward partner” within the European Union， with various exceptions granted to it in terms of the monetary union， the Schengen Agreement， the judiciary and internal affairs. However， this was not in contradiction with the country’s tremendous influence and policy-shaping power in the EU. Research shows that the EU’s trajectory in core policy areas such as economics and security was highly consistent with the evolution of the UK’s own domestic preferences， which was testimony to London’s strong policy-shaping capability in Brussels.9 Several objective factors contributed to the UK’s influence. According to statistics in 2016， the UK had 12.8 percent of the EU’s total population， accounted for 16 percent of the EU’s economic size， and took a 27 percent share of the EU’s defense expenditure.10 This gave the UK a larger say in the EU’s policy-making process. It is equally important that the UK， representing a major faction in the EU’s internal debate over its direction， was actively using its own influence to shape the EU’s policy. It was even an informal leader for many small EU states to rely on in terms of policy formulation.

Since the Thatcher era， successive British governments have held widely consistent views on the EU’s development direction. The UK advocates a path of European integration in the form of inter-governmental cooperation， and harbors deep-seated caution against the trend of federalism. It supports deepening the EU’s internal free trade area， reducing government intervention， and arresting the EU’s protectionist tendency. It calls for European defense to be oriented towards supporting NATO and sharing the United States’ burden.11 Under these principles， successive UK governments have left a powerful impression on the formulation of EU economic， foreign and defense policies.

In the economic sphere， the UK was an active promoter of liberal reforms within the EU and advocated in-depth development of the single market. In the 1980s， Thatcher appointed former cabinet minister Francis Arthur Cockfield as the European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services. In 1985， Cockfield drafted the famous white paper “Completing the Internal Market，” proposing nearly 300 measures that drew a clear roadmap for a true internal common market. Thatcher herself also played a crucial role in the negotiations for the Single European Act.12 The British governments after Thatcher， together with Nordic countries such as Finland and Denmark， also usually called for a more liberal direction in economic policy at the EU level， with a clear priority on completing the single market.13 In 2014， the UK won the post of the European Commissioner for Financial Stability， Financial Services and the Capital Markets Union， an important position on which London could further promote the liberalization of European capital markets.14

In foreign and security policy areas， the UK also held significant policy shaping power. In the 1990s， there were once different opinions within the EU regarding its eastward enlargement. Compared to the cautious approach of Germany and France， the UK was an active supporter of eastward enlargement， a process which was formally launched in the first half of 1998 when the UK held the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union.15 The UK also played a decisive role in the development of EU common foreign and security policy. Following the outbreak of the Kosovo crisis， the UK determined to invest more in European defense. In December 1998， then UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and then French President Jacques Chirac issued the Saint-Malo Declaration， which laid the foundation for EU common security and defense policy. However， out of concern that this would undermine NATO’s dominant position in European security affairs， the UK later frequently blocked relevant cooperation initiatives， which was why European defense cooperation had witnessed little substantial progress over many years.

The UK’s critical role in mediating transatlantic disputes

Because of their similar views on a variety of issues， the policies which the UK advocated in the EU were usually consistent with US preferences. On the issue of defense budgets， the UK is one of the few European countries whose military spending exceeds 2 percent of its gross domestic product （GDP）， which sets an example for other US allies in Europe. At the 2014 NATO summit， the UK， in the capacity of host country， facilitated the adoption of the “NATO Benchmark，” which urged member countries to increase their defense spending to 2 percent of their respective GDPs within a decade. On European defense affairs， the UK has also taken into consideration US concerns about European initiatives for military integration， championing NATO as the primary provider of European security and frequently blocking the EU’s efforts to build a common security and defense identity.

On trade and economic issues， the UK supported a dispute settlement approach that was beneficial to the US， even though it sometimes sided with the EU on certain disputes with the US such as subsidies for Airbus and EU banana imports. The UK and the US also jointly fought for an extensive watering-down of the European Commission’s proposal for registering， evaluating， and authorizing chemicals.16 When the US pushed forward the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership （TTIP） under the Barack Obama administration， the UK was also actively lobbying for it in the EU and playing a major supporting role.17

Besides， the UK was able to coordinate transatlantic positions and facilitate consensus between the EU and the US on various issues. In the Iraq War， the UK fought with the US and kept the European Union’s common foreign policy from slipping into an openly anti-American stance.18 In the wake of the September 11 attacks， the UK mediated between European countries to activate Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. After the global financial crisis broke out in 2008， then British Prime Minister Gordon Brown shuttled between European capitals and brought both the European powers and the US on board to support a financial stimulus package at the 2009 G20 summit.19

Considering the above examples， before Brexit， the UK was able to facilitate transatlantic communication and ensure that the EU’s policy development would not conflict with US interests. In turn， successive US governments， from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama， had shown consistent support for and even required the UK to play a leading role in the European integration process， given that the UK could accommodate US concerns and help align US-European interests within the EU.

An EU Reshaped after Brexit

On June 23， 2016， UK voters made the historic decision to withdraw from the EU through a referendum， and the exit formally came into effect on January 31， 2020. Brexit is rooted in the UK’s sense of exceptionalism towards of Europe but is also the aftereffect of the EU’s multiple crises.20 It is an outcome produced jointly by internal and external factors， and by historical and contemporary issues. The UK’s departure from the EU family has tremendous implications for the EU， dealing a major psychological blow to the EU’s ruling elite who once earnestly believed in the prospect of a closer union. Without British participation and contribution， the EU’s future evolution will be largely different from the past. Generally speaking， Brexit has facilitated the EU’s reshaping in three main aspects.

Changes in the EU’s internal power structure

Whether in demographic and economic terms or looking at the indicator of influence， the UK is undoubtedly a major European power and had a large say in EU decision-making. With distinct positions on the EU’s internal and external policies， the UK was the leader of various informal coalitions within the EU. As the UK withdrew from the EU， the original balance of power within the organization was also upset， which brought about the following consequences.

First， the strength of the Atlanticist forces within the EU was weakened because of Brexit. The divergence between Atlanticism and Europeanism has always existed within the EU， with the former advocating a transatlantic alliance based on US-Europe cooperation， and the latter seeing integration as the future of Europe. Gaullism， named after Charles de Gaulle， WWII French Resistance leader and founding President of the Fifth French Republic， represented one form of Europeanism. Although these two political concepts are not diametrically opposed， and coexist in every European country to different degrees， there is still a distinction between Atlanticist states and Europeanist states in the EU. Typical Atlanticist countries include the UK， Denmark， and some member states admitted after 2004 such as Poland， the Czech Republic， and the Baltic states， while France is an example of a Europeanist country. Despite its deep-rooted Atlanticist tradition， Germany is also a staunch supporter of Europeanism. There are obvious policy differences between these two types. In foreign and security policy， there were only eight EU countries supporting the US-launched Iraq War， while Germany and France put forward a different European position. In terms of trade and economic policy， Atlanticist countries have shown more support for the USEurope TTIP.21 In particular， the UK was the most entrenched proponent of Atlanticism in the EU， for which reason de Gaulle once rejected the UK’s application to join the European Community. Besides， the UK is also a major ally and partner of other Atlanticist countries， and Brexit has significantly undermined the Atlanticist faction’s power in the EU.

Second， the economically liberal forces within the EU witnessed a decline after Brexit. There has been a divergence between economic liberalists and protectionists in the EU， with the former， represented by Germany， the UK， the Netherlands， and Denmark， advocating market openness and opposing excessive regulation， and the latter， represented by France， Spain， and Italy， taking a more protectionist approach to the internal market. With Brexit taking effect， the proportion of population in economically liberal states to the entire EU shrank from 35 percent to 26 percent， which is below the 35 percent demographic threshold to block the formation of a qualified majority at the Council of the European Union. In comparison， the demographic share of the EUMED Group or “Club Med” countries， including France， Greece， Italy， Portugal， and Spain， rose from 25 percent to 44 percent， with the proportion of population in France， Italy and Spain alone increasing from 34 percent to 39 percent. Such changes would grant these countries more flexibility when forming coalitions in EU Council voting， and expand the influence of countries inclined to adopt economically interventionist measures and active industrial policies on EU decision-making.22 Admittedly， other economically liberal countries in the EU have responded to this by creating new informal coalitions such as the “Hanseatic League” and the “Frugal Four，”23 while the Netherlands has pledged to become a convenor of economically liberal members of the EU. However， these countries’ collective GDP is only onefifth the size of the EU’s economy， and their efforts can hardly make up for the impact of Brexit.24

Third， the influence of France and Germany in the EU was further strengthened in the wake of Brexit. It was Franco-German cooperation which marked the very beginning of European integration， and the two countries’joint leadership has provided enduring momentum to the integration cause.25 However， the UK’s accession to the European Community effectively balanced the “Franco-German axis，” and prevented the two continental powers from overly dominating the EU’s development. For this reason， the UK became an important ally for smaller EU members to rely on in the organization’s policymaking.26 Since the Brexit referendum， the UK’s influence in the EU has seen a rapid decline. Other potentially more important European countries such as Italy and Poland are plagued by their respective internal problems， and are far from becoming the UK’s replacement， which makes the influence of France and Germany even stronger. This trend has become more prominent since Emmanuel Macron was elected French President and Angela Merkel won another term as German Chancellor. Despite the asymmetry of their power and their disagreement on issues about EU reform， France and Germany have been playing a crucial role in maintaining EU solidarity， coping with various crises， and pushing forward the EU’s agenda， which is especially reflected in the Brexit negotiations， European industrial policy initiatives， and the EU Covid recovery fund. In foreign， security and defense policy areas， the positions of France and Germany on safeguarding the EU’s strategic interests are also converging. In January 2019， the two countries signed the Aachen Treaty to deepen their diplomatic， defense and security cooperation. A nonpaper was also released jointly by the two sides on holding a Conference on the Future of Europe， which would address all issues at stake to guide the future of Europe with a view to making the EU more united and sovereign.

The above-mentioned changes Brexit brings to the EU’s internal power structure， namely the ascent of Europeanist forces， the weakening of the economically liberalist group of countries， and the consolidation of the Franco-German axis， are all more or less reflected in the EU’s adjustment of its economic governance and its foreign and security policy， ushering in a more economically protectionist and more strategically autonomous EU.

A more interventionist and protectionist EU economic policy

Brexit symbolizes a major breakthrough of Eurosceptic sentiments in EU member countries， and marks the first major setback of European integration， which is why the EU regards it as “an existential crisis.”27 Under such a profound sense of crisis， the EU has extensively and deeply reflected on the causes of Brexit and the future direction of European integration.28 In general， the EU attributes Brexit to the anti-globalization movement and blames itself for failing to effectively address the negative effects of globalization. This was also the focus of different remarks made by European leaders after the Brexit referendum. Portuguese Prime Minister António Costa said that failing to regulate globalization was one of the EU’s most serious mistakes. Former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta and President of Germany’s Bundesbank Jens Weidmann both agreed that the EU had become the “Trojan horse of globalization.”29 In the Reflection Paper on Harnessing Globalization published by the European Commission after the Brexit vote， the EU pointed out the necessity of acting on the reality and improve the methods of steering economic policy to better protect the interests of European citizens and the EU in the process of globalization.30

Through this reflection process on Brexit， the EU has come to realize the urgency of more firmly safeguarding its economic governance model and defending its globalization interests in order to protect the accomplishments of European integration and maintain the EU’s institutional appeal. This realization became the theoretical justification for the EU to adjust its economic governance model and take all necessary measures to advance the above-mentioned objectives.

Internally， the EU has adopted more protectionist and interventionist practices. The EU’s recently launched industrial policy and the European Green Deal aim to maintain the bloc’s industrial competitiveness by using green and digital technologies. The EU has also upgraded its trade defense instruments including anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations， enabling it to impose higher tariffs on allegedly dumped imports.31 Moreover， the EU has set up a screening mechanism for foreign direct investment to reinforce the protection of its strategic assets. In the field of digital and next-generation technologies， the EU has taken comprehensive measures to facilitate the growth of European enterprises with greater government intervention. For example， the EU has proposed the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act， punished Google and other tech giants with record high fines， protected European enterprises in the name of fair competition， and approved the Important Projects of Common European Interest to support battery production and other emerging areas.In addition， the EU has put forward the idea of a carbon border tax to prevent companies in countries with lower environmental standards from gaining competitive advantages over EU enterprises.32

Externally， the EU has been conducting a more active economic diplomacy， with the intention of reshaping global economic and trade rules in a way that favors the EU’s economic model. In bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations， the EU has put more emphasis on a “level playing field”and demanded reciprocity. Taking advantage of its status as the largest trading bloc in the world， the EU has vowed to renew the international rules in areas such as digitalization and trade and close relevant loopholes. Moreover， the EU continues to expand its model of external trade by promoting its own standards in bilateral trade agreements.33 The EU has also accelerated the process of negotiating and signing free trade arrangements with other economies： it has reached free trade deals with Japan， Vietnam， Singapore and the Southern Common Market （Mercosur）， launched free trade talks with Australia， New Zealand and Chile， renewed the agreement with Mexico， and finalized negotiations on a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China.

Progress in European defense integration

The implications of Brexit are also reflected in the domain of European security. Because of Brexit， the EU’s overall defense capacity was undermined. As a traditional military power with nuclear weapons in Europe， the UK was one of only two European countries， the other being France， that possess almost full-spectrum military power with abundant resources in intelligence， counterterrorism and conflict prevention. Before Brexit， the UK accounted for no less than a quarter of the defense expenditure of the EU28 and provided 10 percent of the total troop numbers.34 Given this， the British military resources were once heavily relied on by the EU to exert influence. For example， the UK participated in multiple EU military operations such as the EU Training Missions in Mali and Somalia， and once hosted the operational headquarters of the European Union Naval Force Somalia， or Operation Atalanta， off the Horn of Africa.

More importantly， Brexit served as a direct stimulus for the EU’s common security and defense policy （CSDP）. The EU’s external security situation had been deteriorating since the Ukraine crisis. This factor， coupled with President Trump’s shaky commitment to NATO and European security， forced the EU to rethink its security policy. In the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy released in June 2016， the concept “strategic autonomy” was first proposed when the EU said， “An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders.” As the UK withdrew from the EU， a major barrier was removed for the reactivation of CSDP， which marked a big step forward for EU strategic autonomy.

Despite EU members’ different interpretations of strategic autonomy， one basic consensus in terms of security and defense is that Europe must possess the ability to act without the United States whenever and wherever necessary.35 For a long time， the UK had perceived European defense and transatlantic relations through a zero-sum-game lens. It diminished the role of CSDP， by not only blocking significant autonomous military operations under CSDP but also opposing an increase of budget for EU defense institutions.36

European defense integration has accelerated since the Brexit referendum. At the first informal EU summit after the Brexit vote in September 2016， there were intense discussions about a roadmap of defense integration， including the establishment of a permanent joint European military headquarters. Leaders of EU27 pushed for the establishment of a European defense alliance， as well as a joint military force and a military command of the EU. In December 2017， 25 EU members agreed to set up the Permanent Structured Cooperation（PESCO） format to encourage the development of joint defense capabilities among member countries. In the EU’s multiannual financial framework for the period of 2021-2027， the European Defense Fund （EDF） launched by the European Commission was endowed with €7 billion to support joint research and procurement programs. The Directorate-General for Defense Industry and Space was also established under the European Commission to regulate activities in the defense industry. In 2017， the EU initiated the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense （CARD） to coordinate defense investment between member states and bridge the gap in European military capability. At the same time， the EU also spent €1.5 billion for improving military mobility， by investing in infrastructure projects to make it easier for forces to cross borders. Moreover， negotiations over a European Peace Facility （EPF） were underway among member states， which would help them finance joint operations and allow the EU to provide weapons for foreign militaries.37

Apart from capacity building， European countries have also been making efforts in discussing collective deployment and common strategic vision. In 2017， President Macron proposed the European Intervention Initiative aimed at promoting a shared European strategic concept and enhancing the ability of its members to act together on missions as part of NATO， the EU， or other ad hoc coalitions. When Germany assumed the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of 2020， the EU initiated the Strategic Compass project to facilitate a common perception of the threats it faces and the choices for a collective response. The project is expected to be adopted when France holds the rotating presidency in the first half of 2022. As a practical and strategic guide for the EU’s future action， the Strategic Compass will deliver new thrust to EU defense cooperation for some time to come.38

Even though the EU’s strategic autonomy in the defense sector is still in a nascent stage， undeniable progress has been made after Brexit， as reflected in PESCO， CARD and the EDF. These mechanisms， once fully utilized， will become collective capacity-building platforms for EU countries， marking a major step toward the EU’s objective of strategic autonomy.

Post-Brexit Transatlantic Relations under Challenge

Given the UK’s long-time special role between the US and Europe， traditional patterns of transatlantic interaction will be significantly affected by Brexit. As a watershed moment in the EU’s history， Brexit has triggered profound policy adjustments， whose implications will inevitably spill over to US-Europe cooperation and coordination. The influence of Brexit on transatlantic relations is basically manifested in the following three aspects.

Increased difficulties in trade and economic policy coordination

Brexit has pushed the EU to resist the negative effects of globalization with a more protectionist and interventionist approach. This is similar to the changes taking place in the United States， where the average Americans’ sense of economic deprivation significantly contributed to Trump’s election victory. Trump’s overtly protectionist economic and trade policy under the “America First” philosophy attacked international rules whenever they did not serve US interests. This form of economic nationalism is still visible in the current Biden administration，39 which has proposed the concept of “foreign policy for the middle class”， remarkably toned down the support for free trade， frequently stressed the need to compensate American workers， and actively advanced the“Buy American” policy. Such a more economically nationalistic United States is colliding with a European Union which has turned more protectionist internally and more assertive externally.40 Consequently， transatlantic economic and trade relations have become increasingly competitive and even confrontative， creating more obstacles for their policy coordination.

Looking from the standpoint of internal frictions， traditional USEurope disputes over agricultural products and subsidies for Boeing/ Airbus remain complicated and intractable. Trump viewed the EU as a rival， claiming that the EU was formed to take advantage of the US and embroiling the two economies in a tit-for-tat tariff war. Biden had intended to moderate the trade conflict with the EU after taking office. At the USEU summit in June 2021， the two sides agreed to suspend for five years retaliatory tariffs they had initiated against one another in the course of their long-standing dispute over subsidies for Airbus and Boeing respectively. At the G20 summit in October of the same year， they reached an agreement on steel and aluminum tariffs. However， due to pressure from domestic interest groups， the temporary settlement did not fundamentally resolve the disputes between them. Transatlantic disagreement in terms of trade and economics remains deep-seated with the crux of the matter being the issues of government subsidies and regulatory standards. Rising protectionism on both sides of the Atlantic obviously does no help to overcome the contradiction.

The EU’s new protectionist and interventionist measures in its economic governance will in many ways aggravate divisions between the US and Europe. In recent years， the EU’s industrial policy and the FrancoGerman initiative for producing European champion industries have aroused misgivings and discontent in the US.41 In the digital area， the EU’s strengthened legislative and executive actions over privacy protection and market regulation have substantially impacted the operations of US tech giants， which the US deems has undermined its internet business models.42 During Trump’s presidency， the US and the EU had experienced multiple phases of sharpening competition on the digital front. The tense atmosphere has faded to some degree after Biden took office， but Europe remains concerned about increasingly becoming a “digital colony” of American tech giants in the new era and losing its own competitiveness. Transatlantic bargaining over the digital tax and privacy is expected to drag on.43

The above-mentioned disputes create obstacles for the EU and the US to jointly reshape global economic and trade rules. On different occasions， the two sides have both committed themselves to updating international trade rules and rectifying China’s allegedly unfair trade practices with new measures， to prevent China from gaining a greater say in the rules-making of new domains such as digital governance， scientific and technological innovation， and green economy. Compared to the unilateral approach under the Trump administration， Biden’s new government has reached consensus in principle with the EU， setting the reshaping of global trade rules as a common objective.44 However， transatlantic cooperation may encounter difficulties because of disputes and frictions between the two sides over economic governance. For example， Germany and France’s push for a “European industrial strategy” seems to have complicated the EU’s discussions with the US and Japan on strengthening existing World Trade Organization （WTO） rules on industrial subsidies and is a likely reason why the trilateral discussions stalled at one point.45 The US-Europe frictions over steel and aluminum have also damaged the two sides’ ability to invoke WTO rules on subsidies to pressure other countries over industrial overcapacity.46 Moreover， Europe’s self-positioning as a regulatory powerhouse has affected its cooperation with the US on regulatory standards in the green economy， science and technology， and the digital area， delaying their joint initiative for international standards. Given the current situation regarding transatlantic trade and economic cooperation， a joint reshaping of international trade rules by the US and Europe is not an easy task to achieve.

Instead of passively waiting for cooperation initiatives from the US， the EU chooses to engage in global trade bargaining and reshaping of rules in a proactive manner. A good case in point is China. Although the Biden team had explicitly expressed their opposition to the China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment （CAI） and vowed to address China’s unfair trade practices with the EU at the end of 2020， the EU still managed to conclude in principle the negotiations on the CAI with China.

Mounting internal challenges in transatlantic security relations

The cornerstone of US-Europe relations is the transatlantic security ties with NATO. Although NATO remains active at the operational level， its internal strain has become more apparent in recent years. The dissatisfaction of successive US governments with European countries’ defense burden sharing turned into vitriolic attacks on NATO during Trump’s presidency. In turn， Europe’s misgivings about the credibility of US security commitments have prompted Macron to declare NATO “brain dead.” In this context， the departure of the United Kingdom， as a major military power in Europe， from the EU provides an opportunity for the organization to step up its defense buildup with the goal of reaching strategic autonomy. This will exacerbate the existing internal challenges in transatlantic security relations.

Brexit has worsened the imbalance of capabilities and resources within NATO between the US and Europe. After Brexit， non-EU member states became responsible for 80 percent of NATO’s defense spending，47 and only one EU country， namely Germany， commands a NATO battalion in Eastern Europe， which gives non-EU countries a dominant position in NATO’s military commands.48 Brexit has also complicated the relationship between NATO and the EU. During the Cold War， the two organizations had a clear division of labor. However， with the gradual formation of the EU’s common security and defense policy， competition has begun to coexist and intertwine with cooperation in NATO-EU relations.49

The UK was once an important channel for effective communication and coordination between NATO and the EU. The two sides have in recent years often worked in tandem in international affairs， such the air strikes on Syria by the US， the UK and France under the NATO framework， which the EU endorsed and in which the UK played a major facilitating role. Brexit means the loss of a crucial connection between the EU and NATO， which will undermine their coordination and make their future cooperation even more difficult.50 In addition， Brexit has widened the gap between “EU security”and “European security.” Although NATO still stands at the very center of the European security architecture for now， the EU has gradually adopted a hedging strategy after Brexit， stepping up its defense integration while calling for cooperation with NATO.51 The appeal of EU strategic autonomy reached a new high following the United States’ hasty military withdrawal from Afghanistan and the announcement of the AUKUS partnership.52

All this will lead to severe internal challenges for transatlantic security relations. Even though the US has urged EU countries to enhance their defense capabilities and shoulder more security responsibilities， it has always seen EU defense and NATO from a zero-sum-game perspective and remains vigilant against EU defense cooperation.53 The US does not want to see EU defense overlap with NATO’s existing mechanisms and take away NATO’s resources. It opposes the EU’s protection of European military industries in the name of defense cooperation， which it deems to create barriers for American exports and will not stand idly by when any European initiative is seen to threaten American leadership.54 The internal contradiction was seen most clearly during the Trump era. In a letter from then US UnderSecretary of Defense to the EU’s then High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini， the US accused European Defense Fund rules of containing “poison pills” that would discriminate American companies and called greater military cooperation between EU countries “a dramatic reversal” of transatlantic relations.55

After taking office， Biden adjusted the US position on EU defense to some extent. To placate the EU over its dissatisfaction with AUKUS， Biden even verbally recognized the importance of a stronger and more capable European defense，56 and agreed to hold a US-EU security and defense dialogue， although the internal strain in transatlantic security relations is not going to fade away easily. Former US presidents like George W. Bush also made supportive statements on EU defense， but still came out against relevant EU actions. The principle of “no decoupling， no duplication and no discrimination” on the division of labor between NATO and EU defense， proposed by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright， is still the mainstream opinion of US military and political circles. In September 2021， NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg once again warned of parallel command structures between the EU and NATO.57 More importantly， in an era of major-power competition， NATO， given its dominant position in European security， holds the key for the United States to mobilize support from European allies for its global strategy.58 To maintain its leadership and control over Europe， the US has been safeguarding the dominance of NATO in European security， and this is in sharp contradiction with the EU’s defense integration efforts aimed at achieving strategic autonomy.

More US investment needed in alliances with European countries

For the US， the essence of transatlantic relations is to manage and maintain its network of alliances with European countries， and to properly handle affairs such as military cooperation， cost sharing and mediating internal disputes among allies. A more important task is to keep its allies in line with US policies on most， if not all， international and regional issues， thus fortifying US global strategy.59 Alliances management has been a crucial mission as well as a major challenge for successive US governments， and this is also the case for the Biden administration.

The Biden government has proposed the renewal and modernization of US’ system of networks of alliances， which it considers an effective tool for achieving its global strategic objectives. As the most valued ally in the eyes of Biden， Europe has been requested to be in line with the US on trade and economics， science and technology， as well as policies toward China， in order to “strengthen the strategic position of the West as a whole for the unfolding era of intensified competition with China.”60 This sets an overarching goal for the US handling of its alliances in Europe.61

However， Brexit has posed new challenges to this task. The UK offered the most help to the US in its management of European alliances. Before Brexit， the UK took advantage of its favorable position in the EU to explain to Washington the organization’s complicated operational system and help the US identify those EU policies that might be of American concern. In the EU， the UK helped mobilize the forces supportive of the US and block the policies the US opposed. Even though the US has in place smooth communication and cooperation channels with the EU and many European states， the role of the UK， as its most reliable and effective supporter in the EU， was irreplaceable.

All this has changed with Brexit becoming a reality. After Brexit， the UK lost its formal decision-making power in the EU， and the space for the UK to exert influence from the outside has narrowed as it chose “hard Brexit”and refrained from building institutionalized ties with the EU in foreign and security affairs.62 In addition， Brexit has severely undermined the UK’s relationship with the EU. Years of Brexit negotiations witnessed frequent mutual recriminations， which has greatly consumed their amity and mutual trust. After the Covid-19 pandemic broke out， the two sides were further embroiled in a battle for vaccines and once reached a stalemate over the implementation of the Brexit agreement. The discord was even made public at the G7 summit in June 2021. The rapid decline of the UK’s influence in the EU has not only damaged the US’ leverage and shaping power over the organization， it also created new obstacles for the US to integrate its European allies due to the massive disagreements and hostilities between the EU and the UK over the Brexit process. While from the EU’s perspective， the series of changes taking place after Brexit will lead to a more balanced and symmetric transatlantic partnership，63 there is no doubt in Washington’s opinion that it would increase the cost of managing the alliances network in Europe.

From early on， the American strategic community has foreseen the challenges Brexit would pose for the US and its management of the transatlantic alliance. Before and after the Brexit referendum， several American political figures had indicated in various forms that Brexit was a challenge to US strategic interests.64 During the Brexit negotiations in 2019 and 2020， the US Congress even publicly took a stand on the Northern Ireland border issue. Richard Haass， President of the US Council on Foreign Relations， argued before the Brexit vote that one reason why the US values its ties to the UK so much is the UK’s role in Europe， and that a decision by the UK to exit the EU would be highly undesirable for the US.65

To repair the damage done by Brexit to its management of alliances in Europe， the US will to some extent step up its input in the alliances network and adjust its management posture. First， the US has to engage in European internal affairs more deeply， and actively mediate UK-EU disputes to avoid a wider gap between the two sides. When the UK and the EU were at odds over the implementation of the Brexit agreement， the Biden administration intervened and exerted influence on the British government to prevent the controversy from escalating.66 Second， to restore its influence on the EU which was lost because of Brexit， the US also needs to invest more resources into the consolidation of ties with EU institutions and member states. In recent years， the US has substantially strengthened dialogues with France and Germany， and enhanced communication with sub-areas of the EU such as the Baltic and the Central and Eastern European region， to gather more information about the EU and steer EU policy in a direction more favorable to the US. More importantly， the Biden administration is trying to integrate the economic and technological resources of the transatlantic alliance to support its strategy of major-power competition. Since the UK， as a technological and economic powerhouse of Europe， is no longer involved in the EU architecture after Brexit， there has been suggestions from American think tanks that the US government build new transatlantic dialogue and cooperation mechanisms that include the UK to achieve effective coordination with European allies in multiple areas.67

In a nutshell， Brexit has brought new challenges to transatlantic relations， with the consequence that the US needs to invest more in the alliances system in Europe if it wants to maintain its leadership in the transatlantic alliance. As former US politician Henry Kissinger argued， the post-Brexit transatlantic partnership should be “more relevant to the emerging world，”68 and the US should transform the “setback” of Brexit into an “opportunity” to reform its leadership in Europe.69 Eventually， the adjustment of transatlantic relations is inevitable amid the current profound global changes. Brexit merely adds new variables to the further evolution of the transatlantic relationship.

Conclusion

As a major turning point in the Western bloc’s recent history， the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union has not only reshaped the EU but also posed a series of challenges to US-Europe relations. In a sense， it is testimony to the complexity of the adjustment of transatlantic relations amid the epochal changes in the world situation. Although this relationship remains highly resilient based on security and economic ties as well as value-based connections， the complex internal disputes and negotiations restrain the effectiveness of coordination to some extent， and prevent the US from reshaping the transatlantic alliance in the interest of great-power competition. Though Biden repeatedly highlighted the value of European allies， the transatlantic relationship has been impacted successively by the US military withdrawal from Afghanistan and the establishment of AUKUS. In the highly volatile global situation， both the US and Europe will redefine their own interests and adjust their respective internal governance approaches and external strategies. Under the impact of several variables， US-Europe relations will undergo transformations as their interaction evolves.

For China， it is necessary to objectively view the commonalities and differences between the US and Europe， as well as the merits and shortcomings of the transatlantic alliance. On the one hand， the Biden administration is expected to further mobilize European support for its strategic containment against China. Certain forces within Europe are catering to US interests and have consequently defined rising China as a systemic rival while promoting alternative models of governance. From that standpoint， it is inevitable that Europe will make a partial， if not full， contribution to Washington’s actions against China. On the other hand， the inherent contradictions and heterogeneity between the two sides of the Atlantic determine the difficulty and limits of US-Europe coordination on China. Given US efforts to garner the support of its European allies and ramp up the momentum and leverage in its competition with China， China should stick to the overarching direction and keynote of its relationship with the EU from a strategic vantage point. Through concrete actions， China should work to expand the content of its mutually beneficial cooperation with the EU and continuously explore the endogenous dynamics of ChinaEU ties.

1 David Whineray， “How Transatlantic Foreign Policy Cooperation Could Evolve After Brexit，” Carnegie Endowment， September 3， 2019， https：//carnegieendowment.org/2019/09/03/how-transatlantic-foreignpolicy-cooperation-could-evolve-after-brexit-pub-79758.

2 “AUKUS： How Transatlantic Allies Turned on Each Other over China’s Indo-Pacific Threat，” Financial Times， September 24， 2021， https：//www.ft.com/content/06f95e54-732e-4508-bc92-c3752904ba67.

3 Hai Jing， “Three Pillars of UK-US Special Defense Relationship，” PLA Daily， February 4， 2021， p.11.

4 “Foreign Direct Investment （FDI） Statistics，” UK House of Commons Library， December 23， 2020， https：//commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8534.

5 “Countries with Highest Foreign Direct Investment （FDI） Position in the United States in 2019，” Statista， June 24， 2021， https：//www.statista.com/statistics/456713/leading-fdi-countries-usa.

6 “Trade and Investment Core Statistics Book，” UK Department for International Trade， April 20， 2021， https：//assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/978496/ Trade-and-Investment-Core-Statistics-Book-2021-04-20.pdf.

7 Christopher J. Nock and Catherine Coron， “Post-Crisis Anglo-Saxon Capitalism，” Literature， History of Ideas， Images and Societies of the English-speaking World， No. 2， 2015.

8 Ding Chun， “The Anglo-Saxon Model vs. the Rhineland Model： Analyzing the Economic Performance of Germany/France and Britain/United States since the 1980s，” Forum of World Economics & Politics， No.4， 2007， p.41.

9 Anand Menon and John-Paul Salter， “Britain’s Influence in the EU，” National Institute Economic Review， Vol.236， May 2016， pp.7-13.

10 “EU Population up to Slightly over 510 Million at 1 January 2016，” Eurostat， July 8， 2016， https：// ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7553787/3-08072016-AP-EN.pdf； “Share of Member States in EU GDP，” Eurostat， April 10， 2017， https：//ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20170410-1； “How Much is Spent on Defence in the EU？” Eurostat， June 7， 2017， https：//ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/EDN-20170607-1.

11 Margaret Thatcher， “Speech to the College of Europe，” Thatcher Archive， September 20， 1988， https：// www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332.

12 Helene Von Bismarck， “Margaret Thatcher： the Critical Architect of European Integration，” UK in a Changing Europe， May 4， 2016， https：//ukandeu.ac.uk/margaret-thatcher-the-critical-architect-of-europeanintegration.

13 David Henig， “Sweden， UK and the EU： Managing Post-Brexit Relations and Defining a New Agenda for European Competitiveness，” European Centre for International Political Economy， February 27， 2019， https：//ecipe.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ECI_18_UK-TradePolicy_1-2019_LY03.pdf.

14 “Lord Hill Wins Financial Services Post in New European Commission，” The Telegraph， September 9， 2014， https：//www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/11086631/Lord-Hill-wins-financial-servicespost-in-new-European-Commission.html.

15 Charles Grant， “Europe’s Blurred Boundaries，” Centre for European Reform， October 2， 2006， https：// www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/p_696_boundaries_grant_29-881.pdf.

16 Michael Calingaert， “The Special Relationship—Economic and Business Aspects： American Perspective，” Europe： Financial Crisis and Security Issues， 2006， p.199.

17 David Henig， “Sweden， UK and the EU： Managing Post-Brexit Relations and Defining a New Agenda for European Competitiveness.”

18 Tomas Valasek， “Europe in the US-UK Special Relationship，” Centre for European Reform， August 2， 2007， https：//www.cer.eu/insights/europe-us-uk-special-relationship.

19 Philip Gannon， “The Bridge that Blair Built： David Cameron and the Transatlantic Relationship，”British Politics， No.2， 2014， pp.210-229.

20 Jin Ling， “Will Brexit Matter： A Probe into Its Reasons， Influences and Tendencies，” China International Studies， No.5， 2016， p.66.

21 Aleksandra Sojka， Jorge Díaz-Lanchas and Federico Steinberg， “The Politicization of Transatlantic Trade in Europe： Explaining Inconsistent Preferences Regarding Free Trade and the TTIP，” European Commission， 2019， https：//ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/jrc117871.pdf.

22 Ulrich Krotz and Joachim Schild， “Back to the Future？ Franco-German Bilateralism in Europe’s PostBrexit Union，” Journal of European Public Policy， Vol.25， No.8， 2018， pp.1174-1193.

23 Daniel F. Schulz and Thomas Hen？kl， “New Alliances in Post-Brexit Europe： Does the New Hanseatic League Revive Nordic Political Cooperation？” Politics and Governance， Vol. 8， No. 4， 2020， pp.78-88； Pepijn Bergsen， “The Frugal Four exhibit a British attitude to European integration，” LSE Blog， June 23， 2020， https：//blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/06/23/the-frugal-four-exhibit-a-british-attitude-to-european-integration.

24 “A Daunting Task for the EU’ s Economic Liberals，” Financial Times， April 12， 2018， https：//www. ft.com/content/f30fadea-3d79-11e8-b7e0-52972418fec4.

25 Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol， “Rethinking Franco-German Relations： A Historical Perspective，” Bruegel， November 2017， https：//www.bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/PC-29-2017.pdf.

26 Charles P. Ries， “Will Brexit Change the European Union？” National Interest， August 2， 2020， https：// nationalinterest.org/feature/will-brexit-change-european-union-165959.

27 “State of the Union 2016，” European Commission， September 14， 2016， https：//ec.europa.eu/info/ priorities/state-union-speeches/state-union-2016_en.

28 The EU reflection process after the Brexit referendum included the informal meeting of the 27 heads of state or government （EU27） in June 2016， the EU27 informal meeting in Bratislava in September 2016 and the Bratislava Declaration and Roadmap agreed on at the meeting， and the Rome summit in 2017 for the 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties. The European Commission also released a series of reports aimed at stimulating internal debate， including the White Paper on the Future of Europe in March 2017， which was viewed as a major brainstorming on the institutional architecture of post-Brexit EU. Other documents included the Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of Europe， the Reflection Paper on Harnessing Globalization， the Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union， the Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defense， and the Reflection Paper on the Future of EU Finances published in April to June 2017.

29 Eszter Zalan， “EU Must Protect its Citizens，” EU Observer， August 2， 2016， https：//euobserver.com/ institutional/134546.

30 “Reflection Paper on Harnessing Globalization，” European Commission， May 17， 2017， https：// ec.europa.eu/info/publications/reflection-paper-harnessing-globalisation_en.

31 Guillaume Van der Loo and Michael Hahn， “EU Trade and Investment Policy since the Treaty of Lisbon，” Centre for European Policy Studies， October 11， 2020， https：//www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/eutrade-and-investment-policy-since-the-treaty-of-lisbon.

32 Kate Abnett， “EU Considers Tax， Emissions Trading for Carbon Border Plan，” Reuters， July 23， 2017， https：//www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-change-eu-carbon/eu-considers-tax-emissions-trading-forcarbon-border-plan-idUSKCN24O1IM.

33 Ferdi De Ville and Gabriel Siles-Brügge， “The Impact of Brexit on EU Trade Policy，” Politics and Governance， Vol.7， No.3， 2019， pp.7-18.

34 Sven Biscop， “Brexit， Strategy and the EU： Britain Takes Leave，” Egmont， January 31， 2018， https：// www.egmontinstitute.be/brexit-strategy-and-the-eu-britain-takes-leave.

35 Sven Biscop， “European Strategic Autonomy： The Right Level of Ambition，” Encompass， September， 2016， https：//encompass-europe.com/comment/european-strategic-autonomy-the-right-level-of-ambition.

36 Sven Biscop， “The UK and European Defence： Leading or Leaving？” International Affairs， Vol.88， No.6， 2012， pp.1297-1313； Ulrich Krotz and Joachim Schild， “Back to the Future？ Franco-German Bilateralism in Europe’s Post-Brexit Union.”

37 Sophia Besch and Luigi Scazzieri， “European Strategic Autonomy and a New Transatlantic Bargain，”Centre for European Reform， December 11， 2020， https：//www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policybrief/2020/european-strategic-autonomy-and-new-transatlantic-bargain.

38 Niklas Nováky， “The Strategic Compass Charting a New Course for the EU’s Security and Defence Policy，” Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies， December 2020， https：//www.martenscentre.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/CES_POLICY-BRIEF_TheStrategicCompass-V1.pdf.

39 James Traub， “Biden Is Getting Ready to Bury Neoliberalism，” Foreign Policy， August 27， 2020， https：//foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/27/biden-is-getting-ready-to-bury-neoliberalism.

40 Jin Ling， “Reshaping the US-European Relations： From Alliance to a More Balanced Partnership，”China International Studies， No.2， 2021， p.99.

41 Adam S. Posen， “Rebuilding the Global Economy，” Peterson Institute for International Economics， February 2021， https：//www.piie.com/publications/piie-briefings/rebuilding-global-economy.

42 Kati Suominen， “On the Rise： Europe’s Competition Policy Challenges to Technology Companies，”Center for Strategic and International Studies， October 26， 2020， https：//www.csis.org/analysis/rise-europescompetition-policy-challenges-technology-companies.

43 Tara Varma and Jeremy Shapiro， “The European Offers America Cannot Refuse，” War on Rocks， November 2020， https：//warontherocks.com/2020/11/the-european-offers-america-cannot-refuse.

44 Mark Linscott， “For WTO Reform， Most Roads Lead to China. But Do the Solutions Lead Away？”Atlantic Council， March 17， 2021， https：//www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/for-wto-reformmost-roads-lead-to-china-but-do-the-solutions-lead-away.

45 Marianne Schneider-Petsinger， “Reforming the World Trade Organization： Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation and the Global Trade System，” Chatham House， September 2020， https：//www.chathamhouse. org/2020/09/reforming-world-trade-organization/07-challenges-transatlantic-partnership.

46 Adam S. Posen， “Rebuilding the Global Economy.”

47 Naz Gocek， “Brexit Impact on NATO and European Security，” NATO， April 8， 2019， https：// natoassociation.ca/brexits-impact-on-nato-and-european-security.

48 Jamie Shea， “European Defence after Brexit： A Plus or a Minus？” European View， Vol.19， No.1， 2020， pp.88-94.

49 Robert E. Hunter， “The European Security and Defense Policy： NATO’s Companion or Competitor？”RAND Corporation， 2002， https：//www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1463.html.

50 Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters， “Brexit’s Implications for EU-NATO Cooperation： Transatlantic Bridge No More？” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations， Vol.23， No.4， 2020， pp. 576–592.

51 Maria Eleni Koppa， “The Relationship between CSDP and NATO after Brexit and the EU Global Strategy，” Foundation for European Progressive Studies， April 2019， https：//www.feps-europe.eu/ attachments/content/relationship_cspd_nato_after_brexit.pdf.

52 Zachary Paikin， “AUKUS and the Strategic Compass Towards a European ‘Third way’ in the IndoPacific？” Centre for European Policy Studies， December 2， 2021， https：//www.ceps.eu/aukus-and-thestrategic-compass.

53 Sven Biscop， “The Future of the Transatlantic Alliance： Not Without the European Union，” Strategic Studies Quarterly， Vol.14， No.3， 2020， pp.81-94.

54 Sven Biscop， “Come on， Biden， Let’s Talk！” Egmont Institute， October 13， 2021 https：//www. egmontinstitute.be/40384-2.

55 Guy Chazan and Michael Peel， “US Warns Against European Joint Military Project，” Financial Times， May 15， 2019， https：//www.ft.com/content/ad16ce08-763b-11e9-bbad-7c18c0ea0201.

56 Daniel Kochis， “Did Joe Biden Just Give a Green Light to an EU Army？” The Heritage Foundation， September 27， 2021， https：//www.heritage.org/europe/commentary/did-joe-biden-just-give-green-light-euarmy.

57 Jacopo Barigazzi， “Stoltenberg： European Allies were Consulted over Afghanistan，” Politico Europe， September 11， 2021， https：//www.politico.eu/article/afghanistan-europe-nato-stoltenberg-allies-consulted.

58 Stephen M. Walt， “Exactly How Helpless Is Europe？” Foreign Policy， May 21， 2021， https：// foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/21/exactly-how-helpless-is-europe.

59 Liu Feng， “The United States’ Management of Alliances and Its Implications for China，” Foreign Affairs Review， No.6， 2014， pp.90-106.

60 A. Wess Mitchell， “Biden Team’s Embrace of Europe Falls Short on Content，” Foreign Policy， March 31， 2021， https：//foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/31/biden-blinken-europe-trans-atlantic-alliance-nato-chinarussia-strategy.

61 Katrina Mulligan， Jordan Link and Laura Edwards， “The Road to a Successful China Policy Runs Through Europe，” War on Rocks， December 2020， https：//warontherocks.com/2020/11/the-road-to-asuccessful-china-policy-runs-through-europe.

62 Alice Billon-Galland and Richard G. Whitman， “Towards a Strategic Agenda for the E3，” Chatham House， April 2021， https：//www.chathamhouse.org/2021/04/towards-strategic-agenda-e3.

63 A. Wess Mitchell， “Biden Team’s Embrace of Europe Falls Short on Content.”

64 Katrina Mulligan， Jordan Link and Laura Edwards， “The Road to a Successful China Policy Runs Through Europe.”

65 Richard Haass， “Brexit and the Special Relationship，” The Jordan Times， February 29， 2016， https：// www.jordantimes.com/opinion/richard-n-haass/brexit-and-special-relationship.

66 A. Wess Mitchell， “Biden Team’s Embrace of Europe Falls Short on Content.”

67 Charles P. Ries et al.， “After Brexit： Alternate Forms of Brexit and Their Implications for the UK， the EU and the US，” RAND Corporation， December 2017， https：//www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/ RR2200.html.

68 “Henry Kissinger Says Brexit Will Bring Britain Closer to the US，” The Guardian， June 27， 2017， https：//www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/27/henry-kissinger-says-brexit-will-bring-britain-closer-tothe-us.

69 Henry A. Kissinger， “Out of the Brexit Turmoil： Opportunity，” The Wall Street Journal， June 28， 2016， https：//www.wsj.com/articles/out-of-the-brexit-turmoil-opportunity-1467151419.