Value-based Diplomacy:The Diplomatic Axis of the New German Government?

Xiong Wei & Jiang Hao

The three ruling parties of the new German government released the coalition agreement in November 2021 as a guidance for administration. What deserves special attention in the agreement is the emphasis on the importance of values in the foreign policy of the new government. The agreement states： “Germany’s international politics is based on values and rooted in Europe. Germany is in close coordination with like-minded partners while holding a clear opposition to international rulebreakers. We will strengthen the sovereignty of the European Union （EU） and expand strategic solidarity with democratic partners. We are committed to an EU that protects its values and the rule of law， both internally and externally.”1 In addition， leaders of the three parties have claimed on several occasions that Germany’s diplomacy is based on values.

Despite this， many analysts still insist on drawing upon extensive experience to predict the direction of German foreign policy. They believe that the emphasis on the core position of values in diplomacy when the relevant parties are not formally in office will soon give way to the consideration of real interests， and the parties will abandon the value-based diplomacy that they have upheld once taking power. Therefore， the new German government will give up or weaken the momentum of value-based diplomacy sooner or later， and will eventually shift from value-based diplomacy to pragmatic diplomacy.However， the foundation for establishing and strengthening the value-based diplomacy during the Merkel government determines that the value-based diplomacy committed by the new German government is an inevitable result of Germany’s successful transformation of national identity as a postmodern and post-nation state. Germany’s domestic political environment， the transformation of international order， and positive incentives of Merkel’s practice of value-based diplomacy will promote the new German government to accelerate value-based diplomacy with German characteristics.

The key to understanding and predicting the impact of Germany’s valuebased diplomacy on the international order and China-Germany relations is Germany’s identity as a post-nation state with its particular value system. It is not proper to understand German diplomacy only from the perspective of traditional diplomacy premised on nation states， let alone simply equate value-based diplomacy with ideological diplomacy. The challenge brought by Germany’s value-based diplomacy to China-Germany relations is not ideological confrontation or conflict of values， but the narrow space for ChinaGermany political cooperation， and the restriction on the spillover effect of economic and trade cooperation on political cooperation. At the same time， Germany’s value-based diplomacy is also a reflection of its pursuit for building the global order beyond the shaping of European order. It is both an opportunity and a challenge to China’s vision of building a new type of international relations， and requires our in-depth understanding and serious response.

Origins and Causes of Germany’s Value-based Diplomacy

Value-based diplomacy is not simply synonymous with foreign policy containing value elements or influenced by values， because the diplomacy of any country in any era inevitably has certain value tendencies and components， even in the era of power politics. Value-based diplomacy refers to a form of diplomacy that applies values and norms as the starting point in foreign policy decision-making and the code of conduct in diplomatic practice， which is different from diplomacy based on realistic material national interests. In value-based diplomacy， values are the defining factor of national interests， and national interests are internalized in values diplomacy. A nation’s value system thus shapes the definition of national interests and the foreign policy preferences of citizens and policymakers.

Germany is a regional power in transition to a global power. The value-based diplomacy is not only the internal declaration and external demonstration of German values and identity， but also the result of Germany’s mutual construction and dynamic shaping with the international order. German diplomacy has raised the issue of values as the ultimate purpose of state power. First， the primary purpose of state power is to protect human dignity and security， and it is not exclusive. Germany has assumed international obligations that transcend the borders of sovereign states to protect human dignity and security. Second， Germany is willing to cede sovereignty to supranational EU institutions and promote a post-nation-stateoriented European policy. Third， Germany supports the international legal order and multilateralism， but places greater emphasis on the rules-based order.

Germany’s value-based diplomacy differs fundamentally from the US value diplomacy， which is driven by neoconservative sentiments especially during the George W. Bush administration， and defines US national and global interests by its so-called core values. As a hegemonic power， the US often imposes its own values on other countries， and its value diplomacy is in fact a kind of ideology-based diplomacy which labels countries with different ideologies and political systems as rivals or “others.” Unlike the United States， Germany’s value-based diplomacy stands on explicit norms and rules that reflect its values， and responses to violations of these rules are made on a caseby-case basis. Although value-based diplomacy cannot be strictly separated from ideological diplomacy since the core of any ideology is also a set of values， they are still quite different. Value-based diplomacy is not implemented in a holistically confrontational manner. In practice， values often serve as the subtext and will not affect every foreign policy decision. They often play a bigger role during a crisis when decision makers are facing tough choices.

When former German Chancellor Angela Merkel was in office， she proactively promoted value-based diplomacy in pursuit of a rules-based international order. At present， the term “rules-based order” in official German diplomatic texts has replaced the long-standing emphasis on “international legal order” or “international law.” The German government has never formally defined rules-based order， nor has it specifically explained whether and to what extent it differs from the traditionally emphasized international legal order. Judging from the context in which the term appears， the “rules”are the generalization and “post-nationalization” of international law. They are no longer limited to international law but include “soft laws” such as nonbinding political commitments， and rules developed by non-state actors in the course of their transnational collaboration. The shift from international law to a rules-based order in fact requires states to comply with rules they have not consented to. Under the rules-based order， states are bound not only by the existing international legal order， but also by rules established by non-state transnational actors.2 Thus， the rules-based order implies not just that an existing set of rules must be followed， but equally that the norms and values behind the rules have to be accepted. It includes building a multi-actor security community， promoting free trade and unimpeded international capital flows， and consolidating and spreading Western-style democracy. Values here refer to Western liberal democratic principles and norms.3 In essence， Germany hopes to highlight the diplomatic concept and consciousness of “post-nationalism”and shape a post-nationalist international order with the help of non-state actors， which is different from the Westphalian order based on territorial sovereignty.

Merkel has been a key practitioner of value-based diplomacy. However， the concepts and behaviors of politicians are not only determined by personal ideas and preferences； they are influenced to a greater extent by the trend of the times. The beginning of German value-based diplomacy has historical and practical roots that go beyond the individual role of politicians. The collective learning experience of Germany’s construction of a post-nationalist identity after the Second World War and Germany’s role as a leading advocate for values in Europe are the basis of its value-based diplomacy.

After the Second World War， the identity and collective values of the Federal Republic of Germany experienced a special construction process. When the Federal Republic of Germany was first established， political elites chose to identify with Western values and institutions. The choice was inevitably shaped by geopolitical conditions of the time as West Germany was defeated and occupied by Western powers and had to reject not only its past but also “the East.”4 By joining the Western system， Germany gained the trust of other Western countries with its self-binding commitment. This decision brought enormous economic benefits to Germany， facilitated political cooperation and societal exchanges between Germany and other Western countries， and reinforced Germany’s identity as a Western country. Moreover， European integration offered an alternative supra-national European identity， which steadily transformed Germany from a defeated nation to a member of the EU. At the same time， German citizens sought their identity as “being good Europeans.”

Since the 1970s， the attribute of post-nation state coined by Jürgen Habermas has additionally impacted the identity of Germany. According to Habermas， the state as an imagined community is not tied to specific territory of a sovereign nation， but is based on constitutional culture and on Western democratic values. It is in nature an identity defined by values.5 Dolf Sternberger， dissertation advisor of former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl， wrote in his famous 1979 article that “The national sentiment remains wounded； we do not live in a full Germany. But we live in a full constitution， a fully constitutional state， and that itself is a kind of fatherland.”6 This new identity found great resonance in Germany. The mainstream political elites in Germany agreed with this concept and regarded it as a great achievement for Germany to accept and develop Western liberalism. Germany hence became a representative of post-nationalist liberalism.

After German reunification， the country remained its post-nationalist identity even with its sovereignty fully restored. As former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer put it， “The irony is that just as we have inherited the classic form of the nation state， it is no longer big or powerful enough to decide the fate of the peoples of Europe. If Europe wants to play a strong role in the 21st century， we must change the integration principles.”7 Postnationalist liberalism establishes a set of “universal values” that are supposed to pave the way for an integrated world and a unified humanity. In this context， Germany’s political elites are defining the country’s international status and national interests not simply in terms of traditional power politics， but rather in reference to historical responsibilities and “moral” diplomatic objectives based on the identity as a post-nation state.

The rise of new political leaders in Germany has also contributed to the development of the post-nationalist liberalism. Unlike the generations that had experienced the war or were born right after the war， the political consciousness and values of those elites who were born after the 1970s and received their university education after the end of the Cold War and German reunification were formed in a very different social context. They experienced the high tide of globalization and European integration for much of their youth and generally identify themselves strongly with globalization and interdependence. As Jan-Werner Müller， a renowned political philosopher and professor of politics at Princeton University， points out， while countries such as Britain and France began as nation states and settled on liberal democracies， Germany started with a blind acceptance of Western values and subsequently developed a nation-state constitution. This difference led to a unique prioritization of political values for German political elites. They first place their constitutional principles in a transnational and open environment， attach importance to universal values， and advocate that national sovereignty can be transferred for maintaining value， while traditional national identity based on national cultural traditions takes a secondary role.8

Since the global financial crisis in 2008， European countries， including Germany， have faced multiple crises. When Germany’s leadership was tested under conditions of the economic crisis， it showed that the country’s national interests were largely defined by values， and although the foundation for its value-based diplomacy was its strong economy， Germany did not resort to traditional state power while promoting their values. The refugee crisis in 2015 is another striking example of how European values were directly challenged in what turned out to be the biggest crisis facing the EU to date. As German politician Ursula von der Leyen， who is now European Commission President， pointed out， it not only shattered the solidarity among EU member states， but also overshadowed the entire European model of freedom and humanistic values with increasing xenophobia and nationalism.9 At that time， the Merkel government insisted on opening its borders to welcome refugees， despite internal and external difficulties， to defend the European values upon which this decision was based. Such a value-based policy choice is significant for Germany’s leadership in the EU. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier stated in his speech at the 2016 Munich Security Conference，“When we spoke for the first time here at the Security Conference two years ago about Germany’s growing international responsibility， some called this debate abstract， aloof or even presumptuous. That was wrong even then. And today there is no more talk of it. Because at the latest refugee crisis， the question of international responsibility does not sound abstract to us Germans， but rather very concrete and immediate.”10

During the refugee crisis， public opinion in Germany has once again demonstrated how values have influenced people’s definition of national interests. In its initial phase， German society showed great enthusiasm for helping Syrian refugees and strong engagement for human dignity， both of which is based on values rather than economic or security interests. Even Germany’s best-selling newspaper BILD， which always panders to the vulgar， called for Germany to open its borders with a prominent headline. The highly consistent collective value inspired by Germany’s domestic society is extremely special among European countries， but it is a natural response given the longterm development of Germany’s domestic political and social environment as a post-nation state. Merkel’s decision to open the borders at the end of August 2015 had a solid foundation of public opinion， and her famous phrase— “Wir schaffen das （We can do this）”—became the Leitsatz （mission statement） of her chancellorship.11

As news about refugee-related crimes and other negative information emerged， the German society became divided on the refugee issue. Nevertheless， Merkel’s value-based diplomacy had a wide range of supporters even in the most difficult times. They were convinced that Europe’s treatment of refugees reflects how it generally treats the fundamental values of humanity. Although Merkel’s decision was attacked by populists and some of her party’s opponents， her robust popular base allowed her to emphasize unapologetically that the refugee issue was not a crisis but was about the dignity and value of human beings. Merkel did not need to present a realistic analysis on this issue to win additional support.12 With such strong popular support， the German government under Merkel never once changed its position but was instead pushing for a holistic approach to the refugee crisis within the EU.13

The Ukraine crisis in 2014-2015 highlighted that the way Germany conducts diplomacy is not confined to issues within the EU or to “low politics”spheres. Rather， Germany’s consistent application of values even in geopolitical crises has been a clear indication that the value-based diplomacy represents its overall approach rather than merely specific diplomatic arrangements. The Ukraine crisis plunged the West into a full-blown economic， political， and diplomatic conflict with Russia， during which Germany surprisingly led the EU in imposing tough economic sanctions on Russia that were contrary to Germany’s interests. It is self-evident that the economic ties between Germany and Russia are extremely close， and that those sanctions would cause huge losses to the German economy， especially the pharmaceutical and automotive industries. Furthermore， the Ukraine crisis did not threaten the security of Germany’s borders.

There were disputes among EU countries over whether to impose sanctions on Russia， which would cause great harm to the economic interests of some EU countries. For example， Italy， Greece and Hungary were strongly opposed to sanctions. The main driving force that eventually made concerted action possible was the leadership of Germany， who resorted to common European values to convince EU member states to act as one. Germany’s approach was to insist on maintaining the rules-based order and valuebased norms. On the one hand， all EU countries share a consensus on the basic principles of international law. They all considered Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as unacceptable and urged that Ukraine’s human rights and the right of its citizens to self-determination had to be respected. On the other hand， Germany focused on the EU’s responsibility to maintain the European order. Although the crisis in Ukraine did not infringe on security interests within the EU， both Germany and the EU felt they had a moral obligation to protect human rights even beyond its borders.

Furthermore， the way Germany led the EU in imposing sanctions on Russia reflects a significant difference between value-based diplomacy and ideological diplomacy. Germany has set the conditions for lifting sanctions， indicating that the economic punishment against Russia would be removed once Russia meets the EU’s requirements. This also reflects that the rules are targeting specific behavior instead of a country. Germany believes that Russia’s behavior threatens common EU values， but the sanctions are not ideological； they aim only at Russia’s “illegal” behavior， not at promoting Western values. Therefore， for Germany’s value-based diplomacy， conflicts are between specific behavior and rules， rather than between states. The rules represent criteria for making judgments instead of being employed as a weapon for attacking other countries.

Looking from the above cases， Germany has not yielded to its own national interests， but has based its crisis management on the values it upholds， thus boosting its identity as a post-nation state. Contrary to conventional wisdom， German values have helped to address crises at a practical level and demonstrated the efficacy of its value-based diplomacy. Germany’s successful defense of value-related policies has substantially strengthened its leading authority within the EU. Western media even described Merkel as “the last leader left standing in Europe” and declared that “Merkel has the responsibility to speak for the West as we have known it for the last 70 years.”14 These cases have further reinforced Germany’s value-based approach to diplomacy.

Continuation and Evolution of Value-based Diplomacy under the New German Government

Germany’s value-based diplomacy was not merely tied to Chancellor Angela Merkel’s political mandate， but is mainly based on historical factors， domestic politics， the expectation for Germany’s international role， and positive incentives of its diplomatic practice， which will not vanish now that Merkel has left office. On the contrary， the new German government is itself a reflection of these factors， and it is foreseeable that the value-based diplomacy will continue and develop further.

Popular foundation for value-based diplomacy

The results of the 2021 German general election illustrate the generational change and the shift of values among the German electorate. The Christian Democratic Union of Germany （CDU） and the Social Democratic Party （SPD）， the two long-standing major parties in the country， lost the most voters. In most of the time during the election season， the approval rating of the Green Party， once as high as 29 percent which outpaced that of the two major parties， had stabilized at around 22 percent. Although it eventually won only 14.8 percent of the votes due to reputational damage to some of its leading politicians， the Green Party still represented the second largest force when forming the new government. The Green Party is widely recognized by its most outspoken emphasis on values. Originating in the New Social Movements of the late 1960s， it has evolved over the decades from its initial advocacy of cosmopolitanism， environmentalism and pacifism to focus more on themes such as women’s rights， grassroots democracy and multiculturalism， thus representing a more diverse proportion of the constituents. The Green Party’s voters are the strongest supporters of post-nationalist liberalism.

The political ideas of the Greens are particularly popular among the younger generation， and the Greens were ahead of all other parties in the 2021 election among young， university-educated voters. Political issues championed by the Greens have also moved to the center stage of political debate in Germany， with issues such as climate change， environment， digitalization， and sustainable development appearing in the platforms of all parties， and elaborated in a more nuanced manner. The Greens’ proposal of “ecological modernization of the economy” was written into the coalition agreement of the new government， which also aims to reform the German economy into a“social-ecological” market economy.

The continued decline of the major parties and the rise of the Greens reflect the changing public opinion in German society and the trend of a further realignment of domestic politics. Traditional parties tend to assess their constituents on the basis of religion， economic status and social class， but all these have now given way to some post-modernist values. Germans have focused more on individual freedom and value realization， emerging issues such as climate change and the digital transition and their impacts on democratic values and human security. In a 2021 poll conducted by the K？rber Foundation in collaboration with the Pew Research Center， 65 percent of the respondents aged 18 to 34 believe that Germany should be more proactive in international affairs and that climate change is currently the most important challenge. 71 percent see the digital transition as an opportunity for democratic development.15 On the whole， the younger generation of voters does not carry as much historical burden as their predecessors did， and they do not feel that Germany is inherently inferior to other Western countries in terms of identity and values. They see Germany as an example of the post-nation state with a greater sense of global citizenship and more responsibilities to defend liberal values and the international order. The diplomacy of the new German government will certainly reflect these aspirations of young people.

A new political generation on the rise

Demographic change in Germany is one main reason for the shift towards stronger public support for value-based diplomacy. The new generation is backing up the “post-nation state” identity and is placing more emphasis on the importance of the state as a carrier of values and a sponsor of realizing these values. The 2021 election highlighted the rapid rise of a new generation in German politics. With an average age of 47.3， the members of the current federal parliament constitute the youngest parliament since the reunification of Germany16 with 38.74 percent of them being under 45.17 In the coalition agreement， the three ruling parties decided to lower the age threshold for future parliamentary elections to 16， which will undoubtedly accelerate the generational shift in German political landscape.18 Among the four new leaders of the three ruling parties， two were born in the 1970s and one in the 1990s. Of the new government’s 17 cabinet members， nine were born after 1970. Green Party politician Annalena Baerbock became the youngest foreign minister in the history of Germany at the age of 41. In addition， the Ministry of Foreign Affairs， the Ministry of National Defense and other departments have appointed several vice-ministerial secretaries of state born after 1980. In general， the new German cabinet is mainly composed of politicians born in the 1970s and 1980s， which not only reflects the change in Germany’s demographic structure but also mirrors Germany’s mainstream ideas.

Baerbock already made clear how she would lead Germany’s diplomacy when she was waiting to formally take office， claiming that she would be more candid in emphasizing Germany’s values in global affairs. “Dialogue is the core part of international politics， but that does not mean you have to dissemble or remain silent，” she declared. She also stated that “for me， a values-driven foreign policy is always an interaction of dialogue and toughness，” and that “eloquent silence is not a form of diplomacy in the long run， even if some have seen it that way in recent years.”19 More interestingly， the new Finance Minister Christian Lindner， a 42-year-old Free Democratic Party （FDP） politician， argued that Germany should not sacrifice its values for economic gains. “Products made in Germany enjoy a high international reputation and there is no problem with quality itself，” he said， “But if German car corporations’ sales or market share are affected because of such factors as politics， values and so on， we will have to accept that.”20 Although these new-generation cabinet members that were born in the 1970s and 1980s appreciate the value-based diplomacy promoted by Merkel on the refugee issue and during the Ukraine crisis， they nevertheless believe that Merkel was too timid and not outspoken enough when upholding German values. Hence， they have committed themselves to carrying out Germany’s value-based diplomacy with more vigor.

Influence of postmodernism on new government’s diplomacy

Apart from the generational change， postmodernism has exerted additional influence on German politics and become a guideline of policymaking， which will undoubtedly further promote the implementation of the new government’s value-based diplomacy. One striking feature of the new government is that， except for Chancellor Olaf Scholz， 8 out of the 16 cabinet posts were given to women， an unprecedented proportion. This signifies not only a quantitative change， but also a qualitative one. The foreign， interior， and defense ministries， which represent the main state institutions in charge of foreign and security policies， are all led by women. It is even for the first time ever that women are holding the post of foreign and interior ministers. This new gender balance reflects the degree to which feminism has taken hold in German politics. Although Merkel did not explicitly stress her female identity when she was in office， she did proclaim herself a feminist after leaving office.21 The new Chancellor Olaf Scholz also considers himself a feminist.22

In fact， as feminist foreign policy has become a buzzword in German diplomacy， the ruling parties have included this term in their coalition agreement for the first time. They determined to “empower more political rights， resources and representatives for women and girls worldwide， promote social diversity， send even more women to international management positions and ambitiously implement the national action and development plans of UN Resolution 1325.”23 The core of feminist foreign policy consists of values and normative commitment， emphasizing that “the personal is political.”In general， feminist foreign policy focuses on human security， freedom and surveillance， as well as issues concerning national border control， citizenship and immigration. In addition， feminist foreign policy places diplomatic issues in the public sphere and aims to achieve social consensus through debate. Discussions about values make up the core content of foreign policy debates， and involve controversial topics such as human rights and sovereignty， European integration and citizenship， as well as values and interests. At the same time， more diverse actors participate in public discussions on foreign policy， which will accelerate the internationalization of German domestic political issues. As feminists are reshaping the strategic culture of German diplomacy and security， German values are bound to play an increasingly important role in Germany’s diplomatic decision-making and practice.

Expectations of Germany as an advocate for values

Europe and the United States have high expectations for the new German government to assume more responsibilities around the world and continue to play an exemplary role as a defender of values. After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic， Germany pushed for a recovery plan when it held the presidency of the EU Council and led the EU in responding to major issues such as the pandemic， climate change and the digital transformation. In addition， Germany has also made important financial contributions during internal negotiations within the EU. Germany’s accomplishments were well received by the EU countries， and that is why the EU expects more such actions from Germany’s leadership.

The challenges facing the EU today are not only related to economy and security， but more importantly related to basic values and rules. The rise of populism within the EU， especially the legal disputes with Poland and Hungary， are challenging the EU’s legal standards and fundamental values.24 On its external borders， the EU faces security threats from Russia. On the whole， the EU faces a more hostile security environment， which is particularly the case as the global game intensified in recent years. Soft power and other factors have become weaponized tools of political competition. There is an increasing number of mixed threats and emerging threats， and the line between war and peace is gradually blurred. The EU is at risk of “strategic contraction”because of economic， strategic， political and values challenges. In this context， credible German leadership means taking more concrete action to strengthen a Europe that can protect its citizens， uphold its values and interests， and contribute to international peace and security.

On the other side of the Atlantic， US President Joe Biden has similar high expectations for Germany’s leadership role. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken even declared that “the United States has no better friend in the world than Germany.”25 As the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance enacted by Biden administration in March 2021 suggests， it is expected that Germany leads the EU in the implementation of the US global strategy， “to reinvigorate and modernize our alliances and partnerships around the world， to work handin-hand to advance our shared interests and values. Our democratic alliances enable us to present a common front， produce a unified vision， and pool our strength to promote high standards， establish effective international rules， and hold countries like China to account.”26 For the US， who is still repairing the practical and moral damage done by the Trump administration’s breach of international rules， a sorely tested Germany has become the partner the Biden administration has to rely on to uphold and establish international rules.

The new German government has responded positively to European and American expectations. The coalition agreement makes clear that Germany will develop a common strategy within the European framework， to protect its citizens’ free lifestyle， peace， and human rights in Europe and on a global scale. Germany counts on the EU to implement effective protection based on the rules of Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union， and calls on the European Commission to make more consistent and expeditious use of existing law； Germany is committed to shaping transatlantic relations on a European basis and countering the rise of authoritarianism through a rules-based international order； Germany will build climate and energy partnerships within the transatlantic alliance， conduct close cooperation on human rights， health policy， trade， transport， international standards， disarmament， geopolitics and security issues， and launch transatlantic dialogue on data sovereignty， internet freedom and artificial intelligence.27

There is a consensus across the Atlantic that Europe and the US should strengthen unity to empower the West and prevent any potential damage to the liberal order， which has a broad popular base in Europe. In 2022， Germany and its allies will launch important strategic documents including the EU’s “Strategic Compass” plan and NATO’s new strategic concept， which will specifically lay out the approach for Europe and the US to define their interests， integrate their resources， and resolve their differences. As then Director of the German Council on Foreign Relations， Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook， pointed out， while none of these documents offer solutions to perennial problems， they all have to answer some essential questions such as“what we stand for” and “who we are.”28 In other words， Germany and its allies need to assert their shared values and identity at a time when the West is facing more apparent challenges and citizens are more aware of the fragility of Western institutions.

Value-based multilateralism of the new German government

During the Merkel era， Germany’s value-based diplomacy was more a value-driven stress response to crises particularly in Europe and its neighboring areas， and mainly in the area of security. In the future， the new German government will advance its value-based diplomacy in a more proactive manner under the strategy of holistic multilateralism.

On the policy agenda of the new German government， multilateralism takes up a central position and is the coordinating link between the various fields and directions of German diplomacy. The White Paper on Multilateralism issued by the German government in May 2021 stated that Germany’s multilateral activities will be guided by values.29 The overall goal of the new government’s value-based diplomacy is also to promote value-based multilateralism and to resist authoritarianism-based multilateralism. In the eyes of Germany， the difference between these two kinds of multilateralism lies in the fact that the former recognizes norms and principles， while the latter only regards it as a tool to achieve the goals and interests of nation states.30

Germany uses value-based multilateralism as a yardstick to distinguish its diplomatic partners and define its interests. Multilateralism requires countries to willingly devote resources to the common goals of all stakeholders and adjust their positions in order to enable cooperation. Germany expects this willingness from its partners， and Germany， based on its post-nationstate identity， is even more willing to meet the expectations of its partners in order to achieve the goals of multilateralism. By this measure， Germany’s most important partners today are France and the United States and the corresponding multilateral institutions， the EU and NATO.31

At the global level， the German government has proclaimed it will seek to work closely with its democratic partners to deepen partnerships in diplomacy， security and development policies， and defend the Western values of freedom， democracy and human rights. The foremost multilateral mechanism that Germany attaches importance to is the United Nations. In addition， Germany also supports the Democratic Alliance， the Alliance for Multilateralism， the Group of Seven （G7）， the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development （OECD） and other multilateral mechanisms consistent with German values. It intends to coordinate closely with other Western democracies regarding their institutional competition with authoritarian states.32 In a press release announcing Germany’s takeover of G7 rotating presidency in January 2022， the German Foreign Ministry indicated that during its presidency， Germany will set three key agendas： climate protection， multilateralism， and strengthening democratic resilience. It announced that in addition to the summit meeting at the end of June， two foreign ministers’ meetings will be held at the end of May and in autumn respectively， and partners from Africa and the Pacific region will be invited to attend as special guest countries. Germany will also contribute to the realization of goals in some of the United Nations’ core areas that concern liberal principles and norms. To address global issues such as climate change and the pandemic， Germany is committed to promoting the development of relevant multilateral mechanisms. In addition， the new German government will work to harmonize different forms of multilateral trade systems around the world. In the field of disarmament and arms control， Germany will strengthen its “disarmament policy offensive” with world denuclearization as the common pursuit of mankind. In that respect， Germany is committed to advancing disarmament negotiations between the United States and Russia， and promoting the participation of China and other nuclear-armed countries in the future process of nuclear disarmament and arms control.

Germany’s Value-based Diplomacy and China-Germany Relations

Value-based diplomacy has certainly enabled Germany to play a more important role in international politics. In recent years， with significant transformation in the international situation and global landscape， changes are also taking place with regard to Germany’s status and role in China’s diplomacy. Germany has always been regarded as a one of those Western countries that adopt a more pragmatic policy towards China. It is even more commendable that China-Germany relations can stay on a calm and pragmatic course despite the greater uncertainty and instability brought about by the US policy shift towards China and by the emergence of ideology and identity politics in great-power competition. Given this， the new German government’s value-based diplomacy will undoubtedly raise concerns about the future development of China-Germany relations. But it is worth noting that the German approach is in nature different from the US ideological diplomacy， and there may be common ground between Germany’s valuebased multilateralism and China’s diplomacy， which will bring fresh impetus to bilateral relations. That said， it cannot be denied that the values and rules advocated by Germany’s foreign policy are largely inconsistent or even conflicting with the value system and concepts of China’s diplomacy， which means China-Germany relations are bound to face some new challenges and difficulties.

Opportunities for the development of China-Germany relations

First， with value-based diplomacy as its overall framework and foundation， Germany’s foreign policy does not deliberately distinguish between high politics and low politics in the traditional sense. On the contrary， postmodernist sentiments and the post-nationalist identity determine that Germany’s diplomacy pays more attention to major issues in global governance. Besides， Germany does not define its risks and challenges merely in terms of global distribution of power and its rise and decline as in traditional diplomatic concepts， according to which power competition limits and hinders cooperation in international relations. Instead， Germany’s valuebased diplomacy rejects an understanding of international relations from the perspective of power politics and does not have as much misgivings about China’s rapid development and international influence as the United States does. Although Germany is a rising power and has the ambition to shape the international order， as a post-nation state， Germany does not judge the rise of other great powers from the perspective of power competition. Its valuebased diplomacy will not specifically oppose the development of China. Moreover， China’s commitment to shaping the international order by more actively participating in global governance fits well with the aim of Germany’s diplomacy. Therefore， Germany’s value-based diplomacy may even reduce the sense of competition and the competitive relations between China and Germany in high politics， which is undoubtedly positive for the establishment of a broader cooperative relationship between the two sides.

Second， with rules-based international order as the core of its valuebased diplomacy， Germany’s view of the international order has distinctive German characteristics such as an emphasis on the rule of law， stability and prudence. At a time when the US diplomacy is unstable due to its domestic ideological trends and political polarization， Germany’s defense of a rulesbased international order will play a role in preventing the US from further undermining global stability. When it comes to upholding the foundational rules of the existing international order， and especially preventing any further disruptions by the United States， there is much room for cooperation between China and Germany， as both countries pursue the rule of law in international relations and are defenders of international law.

Third， the essence of Germany’s value-based diplomacy determines that the German government will not conduct international relations along ideological lines， but will act based on specific rules and try to focus on behavior rather than countries. Therefore， the differences in values between China and Germany will not lead to an estrangement of their bilateral relations， and similarly will not lead to Germany joining the US efforts to“decouple” from China for ideological reasons. On the contrary， Germany will resist America’s attempts for decoupling and still seek China’s support and endorsement for its value-based diplomacy and rules-based international order.

Challenges for China-Germany relations

Germany’s traditional policy towards China was the strategy of“constructive engagement.” Since 2019， however， the strategic framework of Germany’s policy towards China has shifted towards a strategy of “realist engagement.” The core of constructive engagement is to promote change through trade relations， while the realist engagement policy recognizes divergences and differences between the two countries in ideology and political systems， but does not seek to change the other side. Although the foundations of China-Germany relations are competitive， the two countries still have ample room for dialogue and cooperation in areas of common interest.33 It can be predicted that as the new German government accelerates its valuebased diplomacy， the content of Germany’s realist engagement policy towards China will become more specific， with a potentially negative impact on ChinaGermany relations in the following aspects：

First， the new German government will place more emphasis on issues concerning human rights and values in its China policy. Baerbock explicitly stated that she would “promote values” （für Werte werben）.34 Provoked by some German politicians， issues related to Xinjiang and Hong Kong， on which the three ruling parties in Germany have clearly stated their positions， may seriously hinder the development of bilateral relations， and the Green Party and the Free Democratic Party may even cross the line on the Taiwan question， sowing the seeds of risks for the future of China-Germany relations.

Second， the new German government will increasingly introduce valuerelated factors into China-Germany economic and trade cooperation in areas such as information technology， fair trade and the China-EU investment agreement. It will stress norms and principles to more forcefully safeguard Germany’s perceived own interests. Germany hopes to make clear the extent of common and converging interests in domains of practical cooperation， and will not blindly expand the areas and scope of China-Germany economic and trade cooperation. In an interview with Time in December 2021， Baerbock said that the new German government would strengthen communication and understanding with China on common values and standards. Values and interests were not at odds with each other， she explained， but in order to avoid serious competitive disadvantages for the German economy， Germany would not allow China to disobey rules and standards.35

Third， Germany will promote transatlantic cooperation to encourage the development of stronger regulatory standards for trade in services， attach greater importance to G7， OECD and other “like-minded” multilateral mechanisms， spearhead the establishment of future global trade rules， inject value-based factors into economic and trade cooperation， and restrict China’s development by means of multilateral rules.

But even so， the realistic character in Germany’s value-based diplomacy towards China continues to manifest itself in two aspects. On the one hand， although German politicians and official documents have proclaimed the value orientation in China policy more than ever before， German leaders have focused mostly on the rules of competition in China-Germany relations when they highlight ideological competition. For example， Scholz pointed out in his first government statement in December 2021 that Germany and China were divided over human rights， and that Germany “cannot turn a blind eye to the serious violations of human rights” and “should be vocal in the breach of universal standards.” Nevertheless， he refrained from using the term “institutional competition” against China， which reflects his consideration of avoiding ideology-based diplomacy. On the other hand， Germany’s realistic approach also results in a more rational perception of China’s reality. Scholz stressed that as China becomes more confident and powerful， Germany should also respond based on this reality. As nothing alters the fact that China is a country with a vast territory， a long history， that plays an important role in today’s world， Germany needs to cooperate with China in the fields of human rights， climate change， pandemic and arms control， and carry out fair and mutually beneficial economic competition under the same rules of the game.36

Conclusion

The value-based diplomacy proposed by the new German government is the continuation and inheritance of the same policy initiated by the Merkel government. Historical memory， changes in the domestic political environment， international expectations， and positive incentives in diplomatic practice will all promote the advancement of Germany’s value-based diplomacy. Discussions about interests and values have always been at the center of foreign policy analysis. Emphasizing the values of German diplomacy does not mean ignoring the material national interests； instead， it goes beyond the traditional research approach of the dichotomy between interests and values to explore how Germany defines its national interests in its foreign policy under its unique “post-nation state” identity.

Although the new German government strongly intends to promote value-based diplomacy， Germany still faces the challenge of limitations in national strength and practical constraints in the international environment. The reasons why Germany can favorably carry out its value-based diplomacy in Europe are that Germany has the economic strength to play a leading role in Europe， and that Germany’s adherence to its post-nation state identity has satisfied the expectations of European countries， which have also been affected to varying degrees by post-nation state and postmodernist concepts. However， in a world of diverse value systems， Germany will inevitably run into obstacles when the implementation of its value-based diplomacy conflicts with value systems of stronger countries， in which case it will be forced to make realistic compromises.

1 “Mehr Fortschritt wagen. Bündnis für Freiheit， Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit，” SPD， November 24， 2021， https：//www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/974430/1990812/04221173eef9a6720059cc353d759a 2b/2021-12-10-koav2021-data.pdf.

2 Stefan Talmon， “Rules-based Order v. International Law？ German Practice in International Law，”Universit？t Bonn， January 20， 2019， https：//gpil.jura.uni-bonn.de/2019/01/rules-based-order-v-internationallaw/.

3 David A. Lake， Lisa L. Martin and Thomas Risse， “Challenges to the Liberal Order： Reflections on International Organization，” International Organization， Spring 2021， pp. 225–257.

4 Xiong Wei， “The Path and Dilemma of Germany’s Embedded Rise，” World Economics and Politics， No.1， 2021， pp.106-125.

5 Jürgen Habermas， The Postnational Constellation， Cao Weidong， trans.， Shanghai People’s Publishing House， 2002， pp.70-132.

6 Christoph M？llers， The Basic Law of Germany： History and Content， Zhao Zhen， trans.， China Legal Publishing House， 2014， p.110.

7 Jean-Pierre Chevènement， “A Conversation with Fischer，” in Cao Weidong， ed.， Why Europe Needs a Constitution， Renmin University of China Press， 2004， pp.17-18.

8 Jan-Werner Müller， “Verfassungspartriotismus. Eine systematische Verteidigung，” Vorg？nge， No.3， 2010， pp.111-118.

9 Zheng Chunrong， ed.， Blue Book of Germany： Annual Development Report （2016）， Social Sciences Academic Press of China， 2016， p.2.

10 Zheng Chunrong， ed.， Blue Book of Germany： Annual Development Report （2016）， p.3.

11 Edgar Wolfrum， Der Aufsteiger. Eine Geschichte Deutschlands von 1990 bis heute， Stuttgart： KlettCotta， 2020， p.157.

12 “Merkel： Ein Flüchtling ist keine Krise， sondern ein Mensch，” October 23， 2021， https：//neuesruhrwort. de/2021/10/23/merkel-ein-fluechtling-ist-keine-krise-sondern-ein-mensch.

13 Zheng Chunrong， ed.， Blue Book of Germany： Annual Development Report （2016）， p.6.

14 Philip Stephens， “Merkel is the Speaker for the West，” Financial Times Chinese edition， November 22， 2016， http：//www.ftchinese.com/story/001070243？archive.

15 “K？rber-Stiftung， the Berlin Pulse Survey 2021/22，” https：//www.koerber-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_ upload/koerber-stiftung/redaktion/the-berlin-pulse/pdf/2021/TheBerlinPulse_2021_komplett.pdf.

16 “Das Durchschnittsalter der Abgeordneten jeweils zu Beginn der Wahlperioden，” Deutscher Bundestag， https：//www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/272474/c450bf40c5fe1e8c70756ee37e57663f/Kapitel_03_02_ Durchschnittsalter-pdf-data.pdf.

17 “Sitzverteilung des 20. Deutschen Bundestages，” Deutscher Bundestag， https：//www.bundestag.de/ parlament/plenum/sitzverteilung_20wp.

18 “Mehr Fortschritt wagen. Bündnis für Freiheit， Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit，” SPD， BüNDNIS 90/DIE GRüNEN und FDP.

19 “Annalena Baerbock über Au？enpolitik ‘Schweigen ist keine Diplomatie’，” taz， 1. Dezember 2021， https：//taz.de/Annalena-Baerbock-ueber-Aussenpolitik/！5819421.

20 “Exclusive： Afghan Refugees Should Not Take ‘Dangerous’ Road to Europe， FDP Top Candidate Christian Lindner Says，” DW News， September 2， 2021， https：//www.dw.com/en/exclusive-afghanrefugees-should-not-take-dangerous-road-to-europe-fdp-top-candidate-christian-lindner-says/a-59059387.

21 “Germany’s Angela Merkel declares ‘yes， I am a feminist’，” DW News， September 8， 2021， https：// www.dw.com/en/germanys-angela-merkel-declares-yes-i-am-a-feminist/a-59127993.

22 “20 Fragen an： Olaf Scholz，” EMMA， 27. September 2021， https：//www.emma.de/artikel/ kanzlerkandidatolaf-scholz-338945.

23 “Mehr Fortschritt wagen. Bündnis für Freiheit， Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit，” SPD， BüNDNIS 90/DIE GRüNEN und FDP.

24 Judy Dempsey， “Poland Tests the EU’s Future，” Carnegie Europe， October 14， 2021， https：// carnegieeurope.eu/2021/10/14/poland-tests-eu-s-future-pub-85565.

25 Laurenz Gehrke， “Blinken： US has ‘no better friend in the world than Germany’，” Politico， June 23， 2021， https：//www.politico.eu/article/united-states-no-better-friend-than-germany-us-ally.

26 The White House， “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance，” March 2021， https：//www. whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.

27 “Mehr Fortschritt wagen. Bündnis für Freiheit， Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit，” SPD， BüNDNIS 90/DIE GRüNEN und FDP.

28 Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook， “Vom Ende des Reagierens： Deutschland in einer gef？hrlichen Welt，”Internationale Politik， Januar/Februar， 2022， S.58-63.

29 “Gemeinsam für die Menschen. Wei？buch Multilateralismus der Bundesregierung，” das Ausw？rtiges Amt von Deutschland， Mai 2021， https：//www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2460050/ c43d710424e1f0c2d16e86a70f35ad02/weissbuch-multilateralismus-data.pdf.

30 Hanns W. Maull， “Multilateralismus und Partnerschaft in der deutschen Au？en-und Sicherheitspolitik，”in SWP-Studie， Deutsche Au？enpolitik im Wandel， 30. September 2021， https：//www.swp-berlin.org/ publications/products/studien/2021S15_Deutsche_Aussenpolitik.pdf.

31 Ibid.

32 “Mehr Fortschritt wagen. Bündnis für Freiheit， Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit，” SPD， BüNDNIS 90/DIE GRüNEN und FDP. Hanns W. Maull， “Multilateralismus und Partnerschaft in der deutschen Au？enund Sicherheitspolitik，” in SWP-Studie， Deutsche Au？enpolitik im Wandel.

33 Xiong Wei， “The Strategic Transformation of German’s China Policy and Merkel’s Diplomatic Heritage，” Chinese Journal of European Studies， Vol.38， No.6， 2020， pp.1-11.

34 Felix Lee， Jasmin Kalarickal und Tobias Schulze， “Annalena Baerbock über Au？enpolitik ‘Schweigen ist keine Diplomatie’.”

35 J？rg Lau und Samiha Shafy， “Annalena Baerbock ‘Werte und Interessen sind kein Gegensatz’，” Zeit Online， 22 Dezember 2021， https：//www.zeit.de/2021/53/annalena-baerbock-aussenpolitik-russland-china？ utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com.hk%2F.

36 Olaf Scholz， “Wir werden neue Wege einschlagen，” die Bundesregierung， 15. Dezember 2021， https：// www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/suche/regierungserklaerung-1991504.