US“Minilateralism”and Its Effort to Reshape the Global Economic and Trade System

Shen Wei & Hu Yaohui

During his four years in office， President Donald Trump of the United States successively withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership （TPP）， the United Nations Educational， Scientific and Cultural Organization （UNESCO）， the Paris Agreement on climate change and the World Health Organization （WHO）， which was viewed as “moving against the current of multilateralism.” However， in parallel with the above measures， the US has been actively engaging in negotiations with trading partners of significance， which resulted in the revised US-South Korea Free Trade Agreement （KORUS）， the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement （USMCA）， and the US-Japan Trade Agreement. Aside from the above achievements， the US has been negotiating free trade agreements with the United Kingdom and Kenya， and indicated a willingness to engage with other former TPP countries with which it has not signed FTAs.1 Compared with his predecessor， President Joe Biden has made value a theme in his balance-ofpower diplomacy， and organized small clubs of like-minded countries to create a false image of multilateralism. By building frameworks dedicated to specific issues and formulating new rules for economic globalization， his goal is to promote rules favorable to the US in such “minilateral” economic and trade systems.

Therefore， it is improper to generalize the US withdrawal from international organizations and treaties and its obstruction of the normal operation of the World Trade Organization （WTO） as “counterglobalization” or “de-globalization.” Instead， the US has chosen to actively pursue trade negotiations of limited scope， with the aim of reshaping the global trading system in a more flexible and targeted way that serves its own will and needs and recreating a globalization favorable to its interests， which can be understood as an arrangement of “minilateralism” in economics and trade.

This article is to analyze the current US reconstruction of the global economic and trade structure and rules by means of creating minilateral systems. Beyond reviewing existing literature that touches upon the topic， the article will try to define the concept of minilateralism and examine the motivations and core characteristics of US minilateralism， while following the latest moves by the Biden administration. It will also provide recommendations for China to adopt countermeasures when necessary. The first section clarifies the meaning of minilateralism through a literature review on the theoretical framework of minilateralism and the evolution of US minilateralist practices. The second and third sections discuss the driving forces behind and the core characteristics of US-style minilateralism respectively， while the fourth section delves into its strategic objectives. The fifth section talks about the Biden administration’s continuation of minilateralism in its economic and trade policy， and the last section briefly examines the implications of US minilateralism and proposes recommendations for China’s countermeasures.

The Meaning and Theoretical Framework of US Minilateralism

Minilateralism in existing literature

The concept of minilateralism was first put forward in the 20th century， and was introduced into the Chinese academic community of international relations and international political economy in the 21st century.“Minilateralism” has different translations in Chinese，2 but they share similar connotations.3 The English literature which these scholars cited when talking about relevant concepts can also be traced to the same origin.

In addition， there are disagreements between scholars as to the number of participating countries required for an arrangement to be identified as“small multilateralism” or “minilateralism.” C. A. Primo Braga and Alexander J. Yeats propose that a minilatilateral agreement consists of two or more trading partners，4 while William T. Tow argues that they usually have “three or four” members.5 Gu Jing understands a “minilateral mechanism” as cooperation among “a small number of participants， usually only three to five members.”6 Zhang Yong believes that the number of participating countries should meet the three-or-more requirement.7 Su Changhe has a different view， proposing that the criteria for minilateralism should focus on the form of cooperation rather than specific number of participants.8 Inferring from the term’s wording， both the attribute “small” as in “small multilateralism”and the prefix “mini” as in “minilateralism” demonstrate a significant reduction， shrinkage or contraction in the number of participating countries compared with global multilateral mechanisms， and it is unnecessary to define “minilateralism” with specific numbers.

It is widely understood that minilateralism emerges due to the efficiency problem of collective action. Winston Fritsch proposed as early as 1988 that the tendency toward minilateralism arose out of dissatisfaction with the innate shortcomings and dilemmas of multilateralism.9 Braga and Yeats held the same view that the dissatisfaction is targeted toward the problem of efficiency.10 More recently， Moises Naim wrote in Foreign Policy that multilateralism has been stagnant for a prolonged period of time and would not yield effective results， and thus minilateralism is a smarter way of doing things.11 Chris Brummer also believes that minilateralism helps the post-Western world of decentralized economic power to find a right path forward.12 Miles Kahler conducted an in-depth analysis of the relationship between the number of actors and the effectiveness of collective action， and argues that multilateralism poses an insurmountable obstacle to collective action， and minilateral cooperation is better at overriding the hurdle of collective action than expanded multilateral cooperation， and would facilitate problem-solving in a more efficient way.13 In other words， the larger the grouping， the lower the possibility of providing the best public goods.14

The core characteristics of minilateralism are efficiency， flexibility and exclusivity. First of all， the decrease in the number of participants in collective action drives down negotiation costs， which makes it easier to reach agreement and solve problems more quickly. Second， participants in minilateral arrangements share certain common interests or connections，15 are easier to find common ground and reach consensus，16 or harbor similar ideas which enables them to forge coalitions to realize common interests or formulate rules acceptable to each side.17 Furthermore， minilateralism rejects the participation of outsiders， thus adopting the form of exclusive clubs.18

Lastly， there are two main objectives for countries in adopting the minilateralist strategy. One is the enlargement of minilateral rules. For example， Jonathan D. Aronson and Peter F. Cowhey put forward the idea in 1993 that since minilateralism is more likely to succeed than multilateralism， it is better to promote the globalization of bilateral and minilateral agreements， and to shift from top-down multilateralism to bottom-up minilateralism. The other objective is the realization of national interests. For example， the Trump administration demonstrated a tendency toward minilateralism，19 and intended to change those international arrangements which it felt were inimical to US interests or which it disliked. This amounted to a “counter-institutionalization international strategy”20 or a new globalization strategy for the sake of countering conventional globalization. Steward Patrick also pointed out that minilateral arrangements are becoming a complement or substitute for traditional inter-governmental cooperation. Although formal international organizations remain， an increasing number of countries choose to join this type of more flexible treaty network. Such“new multilateralism” has a strong appeal to the US， as it would allow the US to choose among different international frameworks to pursue diplomacy and policy choices， in an attempt to consolidate its central place in the world order.21

Historical evolution and the meaning of US minilateralism

In view of existing research and the current circumstances， this article defines US-style minilateralism as a national external strategy which bypasses traditional multilateral institutions inimical to US interests and engages in cooperation with a small number of like-minded partners to form a club-like exclusive and flexible trading system that can operate in a rapid and efficient way. It aims to achieve specified policy goals， pursue core national interests， maintain a firm grasp on trade rules， and implement and promote the idea of “America First.” In the era of globalization when economic security is equal to national security， and when the US is frustrated by the current global economic and trade system， it is smart statecraft to turn to minilateral economic clubs and reshape the global trading rules through intra-club experiments and rules-upgrading， so as to reconstruct the economic globalization in its favor.

Due to its dissatisfaction and disappointment with multilateralism and eyeing the multiple advantages of minilateralism， the US has experimented with this economic strategy since the 1980s as an alternative or supplement to multilateralism.22

The US-Canada FTA signed in 1989 reflected the US penchant for bilateral or minilateral trade policy. The political impetus created by the successful signing of the agreement prompted US government officials to believe that the US-centered FTA could serve as a substitute for the multilateralist liberalization process， which was manifested at that time as the liberalization process pushed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade （GATT）. As former US Treasury Secretary James Baker once said， “We hope liberalization will occur in the Uruguay Round. If not， we might be willing to explore a market liberalization club approach through minilateral arrangements or a series of bilateral agreements. In this fashion， North America can build steady momentum for more open and efficient markets.”23

This was based on the idea that a series of sequential bilateral agreements， in the nature of free trade pacts， could build on each other to achieve higher levels of trade liberalization， and that the potential economic benefits of increased trade achieved through liberalization on a piecemeal basis might be worth the risk of fragmentation and disruption to the world trading systems as a whole.24 Such an “à la carte” mode of international cooperation maintains a certain degree of continuity. Since then， successive US administrations have pursued minilateral forums with the aim of picking and choosing cooperative frameworks that enhance their freedom of action and policy autonomy and are more aligned with American values， so that the US could design goals consistent with its preferences and minimize restrictions to its latitude.25

At the beginning of the 21st century， the George W. Bush administration highlighted the importance of bilateral and regional arrangements aside from multilateral negotiations， and advocated a “competitive liberalization” strategy.26 During the Barack Obama administration， the US government launched the high-profile TPP and negotiated the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership （TTIP） Agreement with the European Union， demonstrating clear continuity in US trade agreements across different time periods. While the subsequent Trump administration signaled its attempt to bypass multilateral rules and showed a preference for bilateral and minilateral agreements，27 and engaged in frequent trade negotiations with other countries， this can be seen as the re-adoption of previous US statecraft. At first glance， the Trump administration seemed to have pursued trade protectionism， but in fact， Trump just went a step further with the old tactic in a more radical way.28

The Driving Forces behind US Minilateralism

In recent years， the US has begun a new round of efforts to foster a minilateral economic and trade system. The fundamental driving force for this has been US dissatisfaction with existing economic multilateralism， which it deems inimical to its economic interests and to its attempt to promote new rules， in which the WTO system is seen as the biggest villain.

Structural inefficiency and failure of existing multilateralism

Dissatisfaction with the inherent shortcomings of multilateralism is the direct reason for the US to turn toward minilateralism. For the US， the shortcomings are reflected in the unique structural inefficiency of multilateralism， including a multitude of participants， complexity of issues， divergence of interest， clumsiness of voting mechanisms， and deficiency of execution mechanisms. These problems make it difficult to reach agreement on relevant issues.

The Doha Round of WTO negotiations is a prime example of inefficiency and failure of multilateral negotiations. This round began in November 2001 and was originally scheduled to be concluded before January 1， 2005， but since no agreement was reached by the end of that year， it was finally suspended in July 2006. This round has yet to make any improvement in upgrading substantive rules， and has fallen far short of the actual needs of global economic development.

This is not the first time that the multilateral trading system has confronted a negotiation crisis. During the first 15 years of GATT， despite three rounds of negotiations， few outcomes were achieved. The Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations took three years to finally conclude. The Tokyo Round lasted for seven years. The Uruguay Round， which began in 1986， was once postponed and finally ended in 1993. For this reason， as early as 1994， multilateral trade negotiations as a means to promote trade liberalization were widely criticized， as academic and policy communities expressed concern that the principle of unanimity under the multilateral framework was subject to abuse by a few countries to hinder the negotiation process.29

WTO members harbor huge divergence of interests due to variations in their individual levels of economic development， which has led to fierce opposition on many issues within the WTO. In addition， since the rule generation process in multilateral agreements under the WTO still runs on the principle of unanimity， it is extremely unlikely for the large number of participants to reach an agreement on any rule.30 Without a consensus， multilateral negotiations inevitably wind up in an impasse. At the same time， as the world economic development is entering a new stage where the competition of new patterns of trade will directly affect the future global economic landscape， multilateralism has hindered the US attempt to formulate rules in new fields， which has drawn the attention of successive US governments.31

Take the “Singapore issues，” which include trade and investment， trade and competition， government procurement transparency and trade facilitation， as an example， the WTO Singapore Ministerial Meeting in 1996 incorporated these issues into the negotiation agenda， with the main supporters being a group of developed countries led by the US. These countries insisted on linking trade with high labor standards under the pretext of protecting human rights， but this position invited stern opposition from the developing members. This divergence stemmed from the fact that the issues involved， such as investment， intellectual property right protection， competition policy， government procurement， environment and even human rights， were areas where developed countries enjoyed obvious advantages， but were seen by developing members as going too fast and too far on trade liberalization for them to digest， and forcing them to assume obligations disproportionate with their ability without taking their special circumstances into consideration.32 Developing members in the WTO believed that these issues would exacerbate the inequity of rules and the imbalance of burdens.33 Since the WTO needed to protect the interests of developing countries and many developing members put up great resistance to the negotiations， the“Singapore issue” of trade facilitation was not included in the negotiations until 2004， while the issues of investment， competition and government procurement transparency were excluded from the negotiations due to resistance of developing members. This apparently run counter to the United States’ practical needs.

The disparities in economic strength and interests among member economies led a large number of developing countries to refuse to adopt the US-supported issues. Besides， the principle of unanimity also remains an obstacle for the US to achieve its objectives within multilateral mechanisms. Therefore， the US finds it impossible to achieve its goal through the WTO and has decided to bypass the inefficient and ineffective multilateral WTO mechanism and turn to small groups instead.

Existing WTO rules inimical to maximization of US interests

In the 1980s， the US regarded minilateral arrangements only as an alternative rather than a substitute when the GATT liberalization process failed. Nowadays， due to China’s economic rise， the US believes that the WTO rules make it easier for China to take advantage of the international trading system and prevent the US from reaping rewards， revealing its intention of changing course and replacing the multilateral trading system with minilateral arrangements.

From the US perspective， China’s claim to be a developing country takes advantage of WTO rules， which allow it to maintain higher tariffs and other trade barriers so as to ensure its economic growth. The US has repeatedly submitted memorandum to the WTO， in which it cited China’s growing GDP and foreign direct investment as well as the large number of Chinese multinational corporations to prove that China has ranked among the richest economies and it is thus unreasonable to be granted the status of developing country. The US believes that this utilization and revision of WTO rules allow China to enjoy a longer transition period and relevant safeguard measures， more moderate tariff reductions， and the ability to take advantage of some export subsidies. For the US， all these “unfair” trade practices are at the expense of American interests， such as the significant decrease of US domestic employment opportunities and the corresponding increase of jobs in China， which constitutes a “theft” of American jobs.34

In addition， the US believes that the government measures to support state-owned enterprises （SOEs） and their anti-competitive commercial transactions cause market distortions， and it is necessary to foster an environment of fair competition in international trade by regulating the activities of SOEs.35 However， WTO rules for SOEs are far from perfect. The free trade agreements prior to the TPP generally did not directly regulate SOEs， except that in some free trade agreements， SOEs were defined as “public bodies” and subject to some restrictions.36 Previous free trade agreements generally included chapters on anti-competitive activities by SOEs， but these were generally only frameworks and lacked specific provisions to cover all possible activities of SOEs and government measures related to SOEs.37 Moreover， the definition of SOEs is a problem of standard， which varies between countries， circumstances and disputes involved. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures（SCM） uses the term “public body” aligned with subsidies.38 Though not the government in a precise sense， public bodies are regarded as de facto government agencies. Similarly， in government procurement agreements， it is required to first determine which party is a government agency. Nongovernmental organizations that have close contact with government agencies are also considered to be covered by government procurement agreements. The reason why the recognition of government agencies is so important is that only government measures are within the scope of WTO agreements.39 The chapter on SOEs in the TPP inherits the basic structure of the SCM Agreement，40 whose foundational concept is the use of subsidies. The purpose of the SCM Agreement is to regulate government provision of financial support to private enterprises participating in international trade. There are also rules applicable to government subsidies in the TPP. Therefore， the TPP chapter on SOEs and the SCM Agreement are complementary， which target different aspects of government-industry relations—one about government-private sector relations and the other about government-public sector relations. The TPP chapter on SOEs bridges the missing link of the SCM Agreement by directly regulating government-SOE relations. The SCM Agreement still applies to SOEs， but this application only occurs in the following scenarios： 1） SOEs perform the functions of government and are providers of financial support；41 or 2） SOEs receive government subsidies and then participate in international trade as private enterprises.42 However， these two scenarios do not fundamentally involve the government-SOE relationship. In comparison， the TPP rules on SOEs cover other aspects of the relationship and their consequences. The rules cover： 1） competition distortions in domestic or foreign markets due to SOEs receiving non-commercial assistance；43 2） extensive activities of SOEs including trade in services and investment； and 3） the relationship between inter-SOE support and competition distortions in domestic and foreign markets.44 These aspects are not covered by the current SCM Agreement. The TPP chapter on SOEs focuses on government support and subsidies that distort global trade and market competition. In this sense， the TPP chapter on SOEs is complementary to the SCM Agreement. The common goal of the two agreements is to regulate government support to enterprises participating in the market， and the combination of the two would ensure the equity of the global market.

In addition， the US has initiated the “three-zero plan” of zero tariffs， zero non-tariff barriers and zero subsidies within small groups and incorporated issues such as SOEs and subsidies into trade negotiations， which in effect extended US rules to other trade agreements. For example， although the China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment （CAI）， the negotiations on which were concluded on December 30， 2020， did not directly use the term “state-owned enterprises，” it adopted the expression of“covered entities，” which further expanded the scope of SOEs. According to Article 3 of Part 2 of China-EU CAI， aside from state-owned enterprises and state-controlled enterprises in the general sense， private enterprises in which the government controls the decision-making by holding a minority stake or through directives despite having no holdings， are also included. This is obviously influenced by the goal of restricting SOEs advocated by the US， the EU and Japan.

Although the US intends to reform WTO rules in order to restrict China’s government subsidies and other non-market measures， it is extremely difficult to fundamentally change WTO rules， since the principle of unanimity makes such a reform an impossible task.45 Recognizing that there is no instrument available in the WTO to force China to make changes，46 the US has been resorting to other means.

Core Characteristics of US Minilateralism

Driven by the awareness that the existing trade multilateralism runs counter to its interests， from the exploration under the Obama administration and the radical approach in the Trump era， to the smooth， precise and stable promotion after Biden took office， the US-style minilateral trade system is gradually taking shape and revealing its core characteristics.

Negotiation efficiency

Rather than engaging in painstaking， drawn-out negotiations within formal， binding， universal （or large-membership） organizations， under minilateral arrangements， governments can act quickly and effectively，“designing nimble coalitions of the relevant， interested， and capable.”47

Take the USMCA as an example. The US， Mexico and Canada agreed in September 2018 to start negotiations on upgrading the North American Free Trade Agreement （NAFTA）. In November of that year， the three heads of state jointly signed the text of USMCA， which was then submitted to the legislatures of the three countries for deliberation and ratification. The US Congress passed the revised USMCA in January 2020， which was then signed into law by President Trump. The USMCA entered into force on July 1， 2020. It took less than a year for the three countries to conclude USMCA negotiations， the US had dominated the agenda and pace throughout the process.

As for the free trade agreement with South Korea， the US formally proposed to revise the KORUS on July 12， 2017. The two countries held the first two rounds of negotiations on January 5 and 31， 2018， and reached consensus on the main text on March 28. On September 24 of the same year， presidents of the two countries officially signed the new KORUS. It was only one year and two months from proposition to formal signing of the revised text.

In addition to the significant improvement in efficiency brought about by the decrease in the number of participants， President Trump’s negotiation style of maximum pressure also played a part in the rapid conclusion of negotiations without much delay. By incorporating countries with specific stakes and common interests in minilateral clubs， the US is able to obtain bargaining chips in the negotiation. For example， in the process of KORUS amendment， tensions on the Korean Peninsula and the frequent missile tests by North Korea prompted the two sides to prevent trade frictions from undermining the stability of bilateral strategic alliance. Therefore， the two sides were able to reach agreement quickly and completed the amendment within a few months.48 This strategy highlights the edge of efficiency， which is almost impossible under multilateral negotiation mechanisms.

Club-style exclusivity

While the smaller number of participants dramatically improves negotiation efficiency， the speedier negotiation process can also be attributed to the fact that the US and other countries find it easier to reach consensus under minilateralism， since the countries or regions participating in minilateral agreements share certain commonalities. In addition to the abovementioned strategic alliance as in the case of the US and South Korea， these countries， with similar economic development levels， usually have a certain degree of common interests， appeals or positions on some topics or issues， which allows them to resonate with each other on certain policies. In fact， the US is highly selective when choosing partners for negotiating minilateral agreements.49

In terms of rules， both the “poison pill” clause embedded in the USMCA and the strict origin requirements integrated in new minilateral agreements intend to protect the achievements within small groups from spilling over， and serve to exclude and isolate non-members.50 In terms of discourse， invisible value barriers are set up for the minilateral clubs through joint statements， with the most prominent example being the US-EU-Japan trilateral joint statements which repeatedly presented suggestions on WTO reform.

The “poison pill” clause in the USMCA prohibits signatory states from concluding free trade agreements with non-market economies. In other words， only countries that conform to “market-oriented” values can enjoy the benefits brought by further trade and investment liberalization， while nonmarket economies are excluded and even blocked from cooperating with club members in any mutually-beneficial trade interactions. Coincidentally， countries and regions that are entitled to form minilateral clubs with the US， such as Japan， Canada and the EU， do not recognize China’s market economy status， thus it is crystal clear which country the US is attempting to exclude from the clubs. This value-based orientation is also reflected in the US-EU-Japan joint statement. The three parties unanimously advocated that “non-market-oriented policies and practices” “create unfair competitive conditions” and “undermine the proper functioning of international trade.”Therefore， they intend to “further their discussion on various elements or indications that signal that non-market oriented policies and practices exist for businesses and industries， to enhance information sharing on non-market-oriented policies and practices of third countries， to engage with other trading partners on identifying means to maintain market-oriented conditions.”51

Closely related to the market economy is the issue of SOEs and zero subsidies in the “three-zero plan.” The US-EU-Japan joint statement highlighted “the challenges posed by third parties developing State Owned Enterprises into national champions and setting them loose in global markets.” Asserting that the competitive edge of such SOEs primarily comes from special subsidies， the three parties concurred that this has created distortions that negatively affect domestic farmers， industrial producers， and workers.52 In order to counter this factor， the definition of public bodies becomes the key. In their joint statement in January 2020， the three sides unanimously affirmed that “to determine that an entity is a public body， it is not necessary to find that the entity possesses， exercises or is vested with government authority.” Through a stricter definition of public bodies， they demonstrate a shift of focus from control toward the functions they perform， revealing their preference for the shared “market-oriented” value as well as their common hostility to China’s government subsidy measures.53 Currently， WTO agreements only contain clauses on state trading enterprises， and lack special provisions for SOEs. By refining the definition of SOEs， government subsidies and competition neutrality， the TPP is the first international trade agreement to incorporate specified clauses and even chapters on SOEs . For the three parties， the current WTO framework does not have effective tools to curb China’s SOEs.54

As to the status and treatment of developing countries， the US， the EU and Japan argue that some major trading countries claiming developing country status in the WTO have surpassed those members recognized as developed countries in terms of economic development. However， there is no clear definition and classification of developing country in WTO agreements， and determination of the developing country status is based on the members’own choice. The WTO does not have a criterion to clearly define the “special and differential treatment” for developing economies either.55

In short， the US， the EU and Japan believe that problems such as nonmarket economy status and SOEs cannot be solved under the existing WTO framework， and only the internal consensus of small groups based on shared values could provide the basis for reform. It is one characteristic of exclusive minilateralism that members with significant influence in global trade formulate rules first and clear obstacles of the “unanimity” voting system in multilateralism， to play a leading role in future globalization.56

Given that the primary purpose of the US in forging minilateral clubs is to achieve specific objectives in line with its own interests， these clubs reflect the idea of “American First” and echo with the concept of a “US-centered FTA” mentioned in US minilateral arrangements in the last century.

Adjustment flexibility

The arrangements of minilateralism are also more flexible. Take the USMCA as an example. The “sunset clause” contained in the USMCA stipulates the term of validity and requires a joint review of the agreement every six years. After the review， parties can choose re-negotiation or an extension for another 16 years. This clause gives the whole agreement and related issues a more temporal and flexible character. The “sunset clause”ensures that if the agreement cannot effectively deal with new circumstances， the three countries can renegotiate and solve the problems in a timely manner when the six-year term expires； if the new agreement， like NAFTA， gradually produces adverse effects on the US， the US can prevent the problem from further worsening by proposing revisions or even termination of the agreement through mechanisms provided by the clause.57 Learning from the huge trade deficit in the North American Free Trade Area during the last years of NAFTA， the US has realized the importance of flexibility in new free trade agreements to cope with changing situation.58

Similarly， in the process of KORUS amendment， the Trump administration also signaled that the agreement might be terminated or subject to revision in the future if South Korea’s trade surplus with the US continued to increase. All this demonstrates that the US has learned the lessons of the WTO and set out to embed certain flexibility in the trade agreements it negotiates， so as to make timely adjustments according to its own interests and policy preferences.59

Main Appeals of Building a US-centred Minilateral System

The new minilateral trade club created by the US is mainly aimed at eliminating the adverse impacts caused by multilateralism， and pulling economic and trade relations back to the “right track.” The US is committed to applying the rules within small groups to global trade， so as to firmly grasp the rules-making power in a new round of global economic competition.

Taking the initiative to formulate global economic and trade rules

Free trade agreements under the minilateral framework have the function of a “negotiation laboratory” where trade negotiators and policy-makers can study and deal with evolving issues in the global economy in order to create precedents. The US gave up the WTO as its main ground for trade policy reform， and turned to minilateral experiments， striving to promote global change and build models with new norms initiated within its own system.

Since the US withdrew from the TPP， the USMCA has become the main ground where the US practices its new trade rules. Regarded as the gold standard of US trade policy and a template of its future trade agreements，60 the USMCA features rules in the following three aspects：

Digital trade rules. The rise of the internet and digital trade has had a profound impact on the development of international trade. At present， more than half of cross-border trade in services is completed through information and communication technology. According to statistics， the trade in goods and services based on cross-border data circulation brings the economic growth of more than 1 trillion yuan globally every year.61 Data has gradually become a new factor of production beyond raw materials， labor and capital， and all countries hope to secure the advantage of making rules in the new wave of global digital trade.

However， the WTO digital trade talks remain deeply divided. For example， on the concept of digital trade itself， China prefers the term“e-commerce，” which focuses on cross-border trade in goods and relevant trade barriers， aiming to maintain its advantageous position in the internet e-commerce industry.62 The European Union proposes the exclusion of audio-visual services for the purposes of maintaining cultural diversity and protecting personal data.63 In comparison， given its strong competitive advantage in the field of digital trade， especially digital trade in services， the US promotes free flow of data， on which its competitiveness depends， and the protection of digital content property as well as the expansion of market access in the digital industry.64 Therefore， the concepts of China and the EU are inconsistent with US interests. In addition， major differences exist among countries in the areas of tariffs and domestic digital service tax， which also run contrary to the concept of free flow of cross-border data advocated by the US.65

As a major power attempting to expand its digital trade advantages， the US will not surrender its rules-making authority in digital trade， let alone just wait patiently for the long stalled multilateral mechanism to restart. The US enjoys a comparative advantage over Canada and Mexico， and has a larger market share in both digital services and goods trade.66 This has driven the US to test digital trade rules in the USMCA， which can be regarded as a trade agreement containing the most advanced digital trade and intellectual property rules.67 It is also the first time in a trade agreement that digital trade problems are specifically brought up and solved. It is likely to set the tone for other trade agreements in the future，68 and further promote the expansion of digital trade rules set by the US through minilateral mechanisms.

Take data circulation as an example. Article 3 of Chapter 19 of the USMCA stipulates that the electronic transmission of digital products among the three countries shall be subject to zero tariff； Article 4 requires the application of the principle of non-discriminatory treatment to digital products； and Article 11 requires that except for the need to achieve a legitimate public policy objective， no party shall prohibit or restrict the crossborder transfer of information by electronic means.69 The above provisions are intended to eliminate digital trade barriers， encourage the free flow of cross-border data， and strive for a high degree of liberalization in the field of digital trade. The US has highlighted its dominance over rules-making on these emerging issues. By achieving pre-emption of agenda-setting and rulesmaking through formulation of norms and standards， the US serves its own economic interests and maintains its industrial advantages.

The US government has also promised that the final text of the USJapan Trade Agreement will be more advanced than the USMCA in terms of standards. The trade negotiation between the US and Japan fully covers key issues such as prohibiting the imposition of tariffs on the electronic transmission of digital products， ensuring non-discriminatory treatment of electronic products as well as zero barriers to data flow in various industries， and eliminating data localization requirements to ensure that enterprises can flexibly apply innovative coding technology to their own products.70

Investor-state dispute settlement （ISDS）. Recently a hot issue of international investment law is how to effectively achieve a balance between maintaining the regulatory power of the host country and protecting the interests of foreign investors， and the balance is gradually tilting towards the former. The US is among the advocates for state regulatory power. John Roberts， Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court， believes that private adjudicators in arbitrations have possessed excessive power to examine the public policy of the host country and determine the validity of the country’s legislative， administrative and judicial activities.71

In the NAFTA era， 14 cases out of 21 in total in which the US was sued were related to appeals against expropriation （especially indirect expropriation） constituted by the actions of the host government， and such cases generally involved the laws and regulations of the host government on public policies.72 The USMCA introduces double insurance of entity and procedure in Chapter 14 on investment， which restricts the initiation of arbitration on indirect expropriation to derogate from the host country’s regulatory power. From the perspective of entity， indirect expropriation shall not be interpreted arbitrarily. Annex 14-B of the USMCA specifies the factors to be considered and the manner of “case-by-case， fact-based inquiry”in which one determines whether an action or series of actions constitutes an indirect expropriation. At the same time， one party’s non-discriminatory regulatory actions that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives shall not be deemed to constitute indirect expropriation. In terms of procedure， according to Annex 14-D， indirect expropriation is clearly excluded from arbitrable matters between the US and Mexico.73 The double insurance mechanism further strengthens the US regulatory power as the host country， and effectively reduces the risk of being sued.

Given the return of the Calvo Doctrine， which holds that jurisdiction in international investment disputes lies with the country in which the investment is located， and the changing value orientation of the investment dispute settlement mechanism， the relevant provisions of the USMCA may have an exemplary effect and be absorbed into the trade agreements signed by more and more countries that want to retain their regulatory power over foreign investment to a greater extent.

Discriminatory provision against non-market economy countries. The discriminatory clause against non-market economy countries contained in the USMCA is named after a comment made in an interview by then US Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross， who compared the clause to a“poison pill” that may be copied. According to Ross， with a precedent set， it will be easier for the provision to be added to other trade deals as one of the prerequisites to make a deal.74 To some extent， this statement indicates that the experimental results of the discriminatory rule contained in the USMCA will continue to be incorporated into trade agreements between the US and other countries.

To sum up， the US intends to establish a model project through the entry into force of various minilateral agreements.75 The internationalization of internal rules within small clubs and the globalization of regional rules is not a move of a specific American government， but a legal means that the US is familiar with， which provides institutional convenience and a supplement for the construction of a US-dominated international legal order. A typical case in the 20th century is when the US， after failing to persuade the United Nations and the International Chamber of Commerce， chose to bypass them and instead lobbied the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development （OECD） and passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in order to legitimately extend its long-arm jurisdiction to countries around the world.76

From the perspective of the US， this concept can be boldly interpreted as the following： in the US-centered imperial order network， it is a natural constitutional right for the imperial central to abandon the legal system that is not suitable for its interests， such as WTO economic and trade rules， and instead launch regional “pilot legislation” within the empire before promoting its application on a larger scale.77

Effectively eliminating “unfair trade practices” against the US

Through the system of minilateralism， trade negotiations have become a tool for the US to achieve the specific policy goals of reducing foreign trade barriers， artificially balancing bilateral trade flows， and realizing its own core interests.

The main reason for the US to restart NAFTA negotiations was that NAFTA no longer conformed to the concept of “America First.” When NAFTA was just signed in 1993， the trade between the US and Mexico was relatively balanced. After that， trade deficit of the US to Mexico continued to increase， reaching nearly $57 billion in 2016 and as high as $68 billion in the auto sector alone， thus creating the motivation for a subversive revision of NAFTA.78 With the upgrade， the USMCA is able to further expand market access for American food and agricultural products. For example， Canada has further increased export quotas for US dairy products， as well as market access opportunities for poultry， while tariffs on whey and butter have been cut to zero. Tariffs on agricultural trade between Mexico and the US will also remain at zero， which is conducive to “fairer” food and agricultural trade between the two countries.79

In the case of the new US-South Korea Free Trade Agreement， the two biggest complaints of the US were the huge bilateral trade deficit and the trade barriers for US exports to the South Korean market.80 According to bilateral trade data between the two countries， the main source of US trade deficit with South Korea was the automobile industry. In 2016， the US imported$16 billion worth of South Korean vehicles， nearly ten times the value of US auto exports to South Korea. Although Americans prefer cars made by South Korean auto makers Hyundai and Kia， Trump blamed the deficit on the “bad and unfair” trade agreement between the two sides， which he threatened to scrap.81 Eventually， the agreement was not significantly revised， except on the issue of automobile exports， which revealed the US intention to arbitrarily reverse the trade deficit between the two countries. According to the new KORUS， the upper limit for each US automobile enterprise to export vehicles to South Korea has been doubled from 25，000 to 50，000. At the same time，the exported vehicles are no longer required to meet South Korea’s emission standards， but only need to meet American standards. Moreover， South Korea’s tariff on trucks imported from the US will be reduced from the previous 25 percent to zero in 2021， further lowering the threshold for American auto companies to enter the South Korean market. On the other hand， South Korea’s steel export quota to the US is now only 70 percent of its average steel exports to the US from 2015 to 2017， which cannot exceed 2.7 million tons.82

The intention of the US-Japan Trade Agreement negotiations was also to reduce the huge trade deficit of the US to Japan. According to the Office of the US Trade Representative （USTR）， the figure reached $67.6 billion in 2018.83 Dissatisfied with the deficit to Japan， the Trump administration intended to address the imbalance through bilateral agreements. The negotiated USJapan Trade Agreement became a big victory for US farmers and business communities. Japan needs to cut or exempt nearly $7.2 billion of tariffs for US agricultural products， and more than 90 percent of US agricultural products exported to Japan will enjoy zero or preferential tariffs.84

As far as US-EU relations are concerned， the two sides issued a joint statement in July 2018， agreeing to work together toward zero tariffs， zero non-tariff barriers and zero subsidies on non-auto industrial goods， and work to reduce barriers and increase trade in services， chemicals， pharmaceuticals， medical products， as well as soybeans， thus making trade “fairer and more reciprocal.” The Summary of US-EU Negotiating Objectives， issued by the USTR in 2019， once again pointed out that the main goal of negotiations with the EU was still to resolve the issue of tariffs and non-tariff barriers.85 It is worth mentioning that the joint statement used “like-minded partners”to describe the US， the EU and some other countries， whose major task is to reform the WTO and address unfair trading practices， including forced technology transfer， industrial subsidies， and distortions created by state-owned enterprises.86 The statement， echoed by the US-EU-Japan joint statement in 2020， showed the recognition of each other’s values among the US-led minilateral club members.

To sum up， in the process of signing free trade agreements or negotiating with different allies， the US has consistently sought to expand its own exports by way of rules-making， in order to artificially reduce the US trade deficit with other countries. The US government believes that the unfair trade agreements it once signed have damaged its national prosperity. In order to completely reverse the trade deficit and achieve “fair and reciprocal” trade， new agreements negotiated must meet the American standard of being “good and fair.”

Biden’s Minilateral Economic and Trade Policy

Although the Biden administration has frequently thrown out the slogan of returning to multilateralism after taking office， judging by its behavior， it still demonstrates a preference for small groups such as the “alliance of democracies”and value-based clubs.

First， it is undeniable that the structural flaw of the WTO， namely a diversity of issues to address amid largely divergent interests between its members， will not disappear with a change of government in the US， and the US will not suddenly dispel its doubt that the WTO can still promote American rules. In the 2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report， the USTR clearly reiterated the US opinion on the WTO， namely， that“Members must rethink how development is approached at the WTO and that it is time to move beyond the outdated， failed framework of the Doha Development Agenda.” The report further suggested that “Members should begin the process of identifying opportunities to achieve results， even if incremental ones， and avoid ... leaving everything to a package of Ministerial statements and decisions，” and the WTO must “find a means of achieving trade liberalization between Ministerial Conferences.”87 It can be seen that the US concerns about the inefficiency of WTO outcomes have not been dispelled.

In addition， the US will still encounter differentiated interests from time to time in the pursuit of its trade agenda within the WTO system. For example， in the discussion on agricultural issues in 2020， the WTO Committee on Agriculture proposed seven areas of negotiations， but the US“sought to focus agriculture discussions on efforts to improve transparency and emphasized the need for Members to work toward realistic and doable outcomes.”88 On fisheries， the US has always advocated for strong subsidies constraints and prohibitions on specific subsidies， but “while these proposals directly address the worst forms of industrial fishing subsidies， Members at all levels of development continued to press for exceptions.”89

Therefore， promoting American rules and dealing with economic and trade issues through minilateral diplomacy is still a strategy that the US will not abandon. Among the policy priorities listed in the USTR report， only the task of implementing “necessary reforms to the WTO’s substantive rules and procedures” was directly related to the WTO， while the key issue of“establishing high-standard global rules to govern the digital economy” would be addressed in cooperation with “allies and like-minded trading partners” with shared democratic values. The US would also work with “partners and allies”to address the gaps in international trade rules. Even when it comes to digital trade and multilateral dialogue within the WTO， the US has still made it clear to work with “like-minded WTO members.”90 These policies demonstrate the commonalities and continuity of the Biden and Trump administrations on some issues and strategies.

Moreover， the Biden administration is stepping up efforts to form valuebased alliances in the economic and trade field to lead the formulation of global economic rules. For example， the US-Japan-India-Australia quadrilateral mechanism is different from traditional military alliances， and is committed to cooperation on “fundamental issues of economics， technology， climate， and security.”91 US Secretary of State Antony Blinken pointed out the imporatnce of economic alliances in the face of economic coercion， “When one of us is coerced， we should respond as allies and work together to reduce our vulnerability by ensuring our economies are more integrated with each other than they are with our principal competitors.”92

Once partners are called up and clubs initially take shape， discussions about economic and trade rules are then put on the agenda. For example， the US is trying to work with its regional allies to develop digital trade agreements and standards for Indo-Pacific economies in areas such as data use， trade facilitation and e-customs arrangements， with China excluded. Biden also made no secret of his position when meeting with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel in Brussels， proposing that the US should re-lead and formulate trade rules， and exclude China by only inviting the “democratic countries”to participate. The US is also pressing the China issue within G7， which has become the focus of recent G7 trade ministers’ meetings. The statement of the latest ministerial meeting in October 2021 alluded to China under the captions of “Free and Fair Trade” and “Modernizing Trade.” The issues mentioned in the statement， including subsidy notification and transparency， steel excess capacity， industrial subsidies， state-owned enterprises， forced labor and the free flow of data， are all points the US has made against China on various international occasions including the WTO in recent years. Although China-related issues were not mentioned under the caption of “WTO Reform”in the statement， the short part recalled the points highlighted by G7 Leaders’Carbis Bay communiqué， which were mainly targeted at China.93

In short， the US strategic shift of replacing multilateralism with minilateralism is not a move by a certain government or a whim of a single leader. The underlying motivations， including the lack of trust of the US in multilateral mechanisms， and the difficulty in effectively containing China in these mechanisms， will not come to an abrupt end with a change of government in the US. Out of the need to achieve its own strategic goals， US minilateralism will continue.

Conclusion

The US minilateralism in economics and trade has fully reflected the concept of “America First，” the exclusivity of small clubs， and the tactic of pressuring trading partners into negotiating and signing agreements to address trade deficits. These are all contrary to the principle of mutual benefit and the principle of non-discrimination in the WTO， and their influence cannot be ignored. The free trade system that the US is trying to reshape and reform is actually a minilateral system where the US advances the principle of “America First.” The free trade agreements promoted by the US， featuring exclusive and high-standard rules at the core， have produced the effect of solidifying rules and strengthening control.94

The changes in global economic and trade rules initiated by the US through minilateral diplomacy are gradually spilling over to many regional trade and investment agreements， including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership （RCEP） and the Comprehensive and Progressive TransPacific Partnership （CPTTP）， both of which incorporate the “three-zero plan”and bring issues such as SOEs and subsidies into discussion， reflecting the shadow of American rules.

In addition， the provisions explicitly or implicitly targeting China in the agreements reached by minilateral trade clubs may lead China into a state of trade exclusion and marginalization. This can be seen both in the replication of“poison pill” clause in the Summary of US-Japan Negotiating Objectives，95 and the United States’ ill-intentioned choice of Kenya as a negotiating partner due to its opposition to negotiating a trade agreement with China.96 Therefore， it is becoming even more important for China to actively advocate multilateralism and a mutually beneficial multilateral trade order.

Amid the gradual multilateralization of American minilateralist rules， China has no choice but to face the institutional challenges brought about by the US reshaping of global rules. While critically learning from some US practices， China needs to create international rules in line with its own interests and put itself at the forefront of global economic development trends. In addition， the US has established a global legal hegemony and judicial monopoly based on its economic hegemony. Under the new situation of great changes that we have never encountered in a century， China must try to understand the juridical mechanisms and logic behind the United States’ legal warfare instruments， so as to better handle the ongoing international trade， investment， financial and economic frictions and dismantle the US-constructed trade containment.97 At the same time， China should take the initiative to respond to unfavorable situations by resorting to legal means of all kinds， and refute the biased definition of “market economy status” by the US， the EU and Japan on multilateral platforms such as the WTO. It is China’s responsibility to gradually establish a jurisprudential basis of international law that reflects China’s practices and values， and promote a new global order that truly and equitably benefits all countries and the international community.

1 “2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual Report，” USTR， https：//ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/ Press/Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20FINAL.PDF.

2 Wang Yan， “Reflection on the Routes and Obstacles of International Economic and Trade Law Reform，”Studies on Foreign Social Sciences， No.4， 2019， p.6.

3 Zhang Yong， “A Brief Analysis of Obama Administration’s Minilateral Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific，”The Chinese Journal of American Studies， No.2， 2012， p.70.

4 C.A. Primo Braga and Alexander J. Yeats， “Minilateral and Managed Trade in the Post-Uruguay Round World，” Minnesota Journal of Global Trade， Vol.3， No.1， 1994， p.231.

5 William T. Tow， “Minilateral Security’s Relevance to U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific： Challenges and Prospects，” The Pacific Review， Vol. 32， No.2， 2019， pp.232-244.

6 Gu Jing， “The Anatomy of America’s New Multilateralism Foreign Policy towards East Asia，” Southeast Asian Studies， No.6， 2011， p.51.

7 Zhang Yong， “A Brief Analysis of Obama Administration’s Minilateral Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific.”

8 Su Changhe， Global Public Issues and International Cooperation： An Institutional Analysis， Shanghai People’s Publishing House， 2000， pp.238-239.

9 Winston Fritsch， The New Minilateralism and Developing Countries， Textos para discuss？o， No.208， Puc-Rio， 1988， p.2.

10 C.A. Primo Braga and Alexander J. Yeats， “Minilateral and Managed Trade in the Post-Uruguay Round World，” Minnesota Journal of Global Trade， Vol.3， No.1， 1994， p.234.

11 Moises Naim， “Minilateralism： The Magic Number to Get Real International Action，” Foreign Policy， https：// foreignpolicy.com/2009/06/21/minilateralism/.

12 Chris Brummer， Minilateralism： How Trade Alliances， Soft Law， and Financial Engineering Are Redefining Economic Statecraft， Cambridge University Press， 2014.

13 Miles Kahler， “Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers，” International Organization， Vol.46， No.3， 1992， p.707.

14 Wang Xiaowen， “Minilateralism in the Context of Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific StrategyTaking the Strategic Interaction between the US， India， Japan and Australia as an Example，” Forum of World Economics & Politics， No.5， 2020， p.60.

15 Zhang Yong， “A Brief Analysis of Obama Administration’s Minilateral Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific.”

16 Wang Lianhe， “On the New Pattern of Alliance of America in the South China Sea under the Framework of Indo-Pacific Strategy，” International Review， No.1， 2021， p.108.

17 Takashi Terada， “China’s Global Financial Ambition： Linking Minilateral Frameworks，” International Economic Review， No.1， 2014， p.166.

18 Shi Tianyi， “The Logic of Alliances in US Asia-Pacific Multilateral Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War Era，” Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies， No.2， 2015， p.54.

19 Wang Zhongmei， “On Some Multiple Choice Questions for China’s FTA Strategy，” World Economy Studies， No.9， 2018， p.34.

20 Wang Mingguo， “Selective Withdrawal， Multilateral Competition and Trump’s CounterInstitutionalization International Strategy，” International Forum， No.1， 2020， p.21.

21 Stewart Patrick， “The New ‘New Multilateralism’： Minilateral Cooperation， but at What Cost？”Global Summitry， Vol.1， No.2， p.120.

22 C.A. Primo Braga and Alexander J. Yeats， “Minilateral and Managed Trade in the Post-Uruguay Round World.”

23 James Baker， “The Geopolitical Implications of the U.S.-Canada Trade Pact，” The International Economy， 1988， p.35.

24 Bruce J. Heiman， “The Conduct of International Economic Relations in the Bush Administration，” The Fletcher Journal of World Affairs， Vol.13， No.1， 1989， p.15.

25 Stewart Patrick， “The New ‘New Multilateralism’： Minilateral Cooperation， but at What Cost？”

26 Simon J. Evenett and Michael Meier， “An Interim Assessment of the US Trade Policy of ‘Competitive Liberalization’，” World Economy， Vol. 31， No.1， 2008， pp.31-66.

27 Abbey Stemler， Scott Shackelford and Eric Richards， “Paris， Panels， and Protectionism： Matching US Rhetoric with Reality to Save the Planet，” Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law， Vol.19， No.3， p.545.

28 Wang Zhongmei， “On Some Multiple Choice Questions for China’s FTA Strategy，” World Economy Studies， No.9， 2018， p.34.

29 C.A. Primo Braga and Alexander J. Yeats， “Minilateral and Managed Trade in the Post-Uruguay Round World.”

30 Weng Guomin and Song Li， “The Impact of the USMCA on International Economic and Trade Rules and China’s Response： From A Comparative Perspective of NAFTA and CPTPP，” Zhejiang Social Sciences， No.8， 2020， p.21.

31 Wang Zhongmei and Xu Qianyu， “Strategic Exclusion and Rule Reconstruction： On the Implications of the US FTA Trade Policy，” International Business Research， No.4， 2021， p.12.

32 Che Pizhao， “WTO’s Contribution and Challenges to International Law，” Jinan Journal （Philosophy and Social Sciences）， No.3， 2014， p.7.

33 Deng Wei， “Viewing the Crisis of Multilateral Trading System from the Suspension of the Doha Round，” Economic Survey， No.1， 2007， p.45.

34 “Reforming Developing-Country Status in the World Trade Organization，” https：//www. federalregister. gov/documents/2019/07/31/2019-16497/reforming-developing-country-status-in-the-worldtradeorganization.

35 “Levelling the International Playing Field Between Public and Private Businesses： What Have We Learnt So Far？” OECD， May 6， 2014， http：//www.oecd.org/corporate/C-MIN（2014）20-ENG.pdf.

36 Mikyung Yun， “An Analysis of the New Trade Regime for State-Owned Enterprises Under the TransPacific Partnership Agreement，” Journal of East Asian Economic Integration， Vol.20， No.1，2016， pp.3-35.

37 “Levelling the International Playing Field Between Public and Private Businesses： What Have We Learnt So Far？”

38 Agreement and Subsidies on Countervailing Measures， art. 1.1（a）（1）， April 15， 1994， Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization， Annex 1A， 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 （a）（1）.

39 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann， “World Trade Principles—E. Principles of Public International Trade Law，”in Rüdiger Wolfrum ed.， The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 2014， pp.10-13， opil. ouplaw.com/home/EPIL.

40 Mitsuo Matsushita， “State-Owned Enterprises in the TPP Agreement，” in Julien Chaisse et al. eds.， Paradigm Shift in International Economic Rule-making： TPP as A New Model for Trade Agreements？ 2017， p.187， pp.192-193.； Daniel C.K. Chow， “How the United States Uses the Trans-Pacific Partnership to Contain China in International Trade，” Chicago Journal of International Law， Vol.17， No.2， 2016. p.370， p.398.

41 SCM Agreement art. 1.1（a）（i）.

42 SCM Agreement arts. 3， 5-6， 15.

43 SCM Agreement arts. 3， 5-6， 15.

44 TPP art. 17.8.

45 Jeff Mason and David Lawder， “Trump Targets China in Call for WTO to Reform ‘Developing’Country Status，” Reuters， https：//www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-wto/trump-targets-china-in-call-forwto-toreform-developing-country-status-idUSKCN1UL2G6.

46 Dennis Shea， “China’s Trade-Disruptive Economic Model and Implications for the WTO，” https：// geneva.usmission.gov/2018/07/27/55299/.

47 Stewart Patrick， “The New ‘New Multilateralism’： Minilateral Cooperation， but at What Cost？” p.125.

48 Jeffrey J. Schott and Euijin Jung， “KORUS Amendments： Minor Adjustments Fixed What Trump Called ‘Horrible Trade Deal’，” https：//www.piie.com/system/files/documents/pb18-22.pdf.

49 Shen Wei and Xu Chi， “Origin and Formation of US ‘Minilateralism’ against Globalization—Understanding the China-US Phase One Trade Deal，” Cross-strait Legal Science， No.3， 2020， p.41.

50 Wang Zhongmei and Xu Qianyu， “Strategic Exclusion and Rule Reconstruction： On the Implications of the US FTA Trade Policy，” p.12.

51 “Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States， Japan， and the European Union，” USTR， September 25， 2018， https：//ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2018/september/joint-statement-trilateral..

52 Ibid.

53 “Joint Statement of the Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of Japan， the United States and the European Union，” https：//trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158567.pdf.

54 Xu Hongqiang and Zhang Qi， “The Core Demands of US， EU and Japan for WTO Reform and China’s Countermeasures，” Intertrade， No.2， 2019， p.18.

55 Ibid， pp.19-20.

56 Wang Zhongmei and Xu Qianyu， “Strategic Exclusion and Rule Reconstruction： On the Implications of the US FTA Trade Policy，” p.12.

57 Jason Marczak， “With Bipartisan Support， USMCA Can ‘Stand the Test of Time’，” Atlantic Council， https：//www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/with-bipartisan-support-usmca-can-stand-the-test-oftime.

58 Shen Wei and Xu Chi， “Origin and Formation of US ‘Minilateralism’ against Globalization--Understanding the Changes of China-US Trade Deal （Phase One），” Cross-strait Legal Science， No.3， 2020， p.41.

59 Jin Xiangdan， “Motivation and Impact of the Trump Administration’s Revision of KORUS，” Collected Papers for Korean Studies， No.1， 2020， p.241.

60 “Ambassador Lighthizer Issues Statement on House Passage of the USMCA，” USTR， https：//ustr. gov/ about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/december/ambassador-lighthizer-issues-statementhouse-passage-usmca.

61 Wang Yan， “Reflection on the Routes and Obstacles of International Economic and Trade Law Reform.”

62 WTO， INF/ECOM/19， April 24， 2019.

63 WTO， INF/ECOM/43， October 15， 2019.

64 Chen Huanqi and Zhou Nianli， “The Core Demands of US Digital Trade Rules and Differences with China from USMCA，” International Economic and Trade Exploration， No.6， 2019， pp.108-109.

65 Ke Jing， “WTO E-Commerce Negotiations and the Trend of Global Digital Trade Norms，” International Outlook， No.3， 2020， p.47.

66 Chen Huanqi and Zhou Nianli， “The Core Demands of US Digital Trade Rules and Differences with China from USMCA，” pp.108-109.

67 “Digital Trade and Innovation in a 21st-century USMCA，” https：//www.bsa.org/files/policyfilings/0802201921stcenturyusmca.pdf.

68 Eleanor Wragg， “USMCA： A High-water Mark for Digital Trade？” https：//www.gtreview.com/ magazine/volume-18-issue-3/usmca-high-water-mark-digital-trade/.

69 “Chapter 19 Digital Trade，” USTR， https：//ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/ Text/19-Digital-Trade.pdf.

70 “Fact Sheet on U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement，” USTR， https：//ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/fact-sheets/2019/september/fact-sheet-us-japan-trade-agreement.

71 “Selected Statements and Actions Against Investor-State Dispute Settlement （ISDS），” https：//www. citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/isds-quote-sheet.pdf.

72 Zhang Qinglin and Zhong Li， “Analysis of the Reform of the ISDS Mechanism in the USMCA： From the Perspective of the Regulatory Power of the Host Country，” Journal of China Central South University（Social Science Edition）， No.4， 2019， p.44.

73 “Chapter 14 Investment，” USTR， https：//ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/ Text/14-Investment.pdf.

74 David Lawder and Karen Freifeld， “U.S. Commerce’s Ross Eyes Anti-China ‘Poison Pill’ for New Trade Deals，” https：//www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-ross-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-commerces-rosseyes-anti-china-poison-pill-for-new-trade-deals-idUSKCN1MF2HJ.

75 Wang Pengyuan and Zhu Yingni， “The U.S. Considerations of the USMCA Agreement， Characteristics and the Challenges It Brings to China，” Price Monthly， No.8， 2020， p.81.

76 Jiang Shigong， “The Judicial Long Arm of the Empire： The Legal Support for American Economic Hegemony，” Cultural Landscape， No.4， 2019， p.87.

77 Jiang Shigong， “The Inner Logic of Super-Large Political Entities： ‘Empire’ and the World Order，”Cultural Landscape， No.2， 2019， pp.18-28.

78 “Opening Statement of USTR Robert Lighthizer at the First Round of NAFTA Renegotiations，” USTR， https：//ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/august/opening-statement-ustrrobert-0.

79 “United States–Mexico–Canada Trade Fact Sheet Strengthening North American Trade in Agriculture，”USTR， https：//ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada- agreement/ fact-sheets/strengthening.

80 “USTR Lighthizer Statement on the Conclusion of the Second Special Session of the U.S.-Korea FTA Joint Committee，” USTR， https：//ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/october/ ustr-lighthizer-statement.

81 Alexia Fernández Campbell， “Trump’s New Trade Deal with South Korea， Explained，” https：//www. vox.com/2018/9/24/17883506/trump-korea-trade-deal-korus.

82 Ibid.

83 David Lawder， “U.S. Raises Trade Deficit Concerns with Japan， No Deal on Individual Issues，”https：//www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-japan/u-s-raises-trade-deficit-concerns-with-japan-no-deal-onindividual-issues-idUSKCN1RS2DF.

84 “President Donald J. Trump Has Secured a Tremendous Victory for American Farmers and Businesses with New Japan Trade Agreements，” The White House， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/ president-donald-j-trump-secured-tremendous-victory-american-farmers-businesses-new-japan-tradeagreements/.

85 “United States-European Union Negotiations，” USTR， https：//ustr.gov/sites/default/files/01.11.2019_ Summary_of_U.S.-EU_Negotiating_Objectives.pdf.

86 “Joint U.S.-EU Statement Following President Juncker’s Visit to the White House，” https：//ec.europa. eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_18_4687.

87 “2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program，” USTR， https：//ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2021/2021%20Trade%20 Agenda/Online%20PDF%202021%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202020%20Annual%20 Report.pdf.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan，” The White House， March 12， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/03/12/pressbriefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-march-12-2021.

92 Antony Blinken， “Reaffirming and Reimagining America’s Alliances，” US Department of State， https：// www.state.gov/reaffirming-and-reimagining-americas-alliances/.

93 “G7 Trade Ministers’ Communiqué - October 2021，” October 22， 2021， https：//www.gov.uk/ government/news/g7-trade-ministers-communique-october-2021.

94 Wang Zhongmei and Xu Qianyu， “Strategic Exclusion and Rule Reconstruction： An Analysis of the Trade Policy Implications of the US FTAs，” International Business Studies， No.4， 2021， p.12.

95 “United States-Japan Trade Agreement （USJTA） Negotiations，” USTR， https：//ustr.gov/sites/default/ files/2018.12.21_Summary_of_U.S.-Japan_Negotiating_Objectives.pdf.

96 Jack Caporal， “Going Solo： What Is the Significance of a U.S.-Kenya Free Trade Agreement？” https：// www.csis.org/analysis/going-solo-what-significance-us-kenya-free-trade-agreement.

97 Shen Wei， “The Legal War in the Sino-US Trade Friction： From the Unreliable Entity List to the Blocking Method，” Comparative Law Research， No.1， 2021， pp.199-200.